Historiography


Excerpt
The data "suggest that the interconnected influences of family, neighborhood, partisanship, slaveholding, agricultural production, and religious affiliation combined to generate markedly different responses within a single county during the great crisis of 1860-61." (186)

Synopsis
Crofts analyzes individual voting returns for Southampton County from the 1840s thorough the election of 1860 and the secession votes in 1861. Crofts finds that the most salient determinate for voting seemed to be geographical location. Crofts' analysis divides the county into two halves--one upper section, where whites outnumbered slaves and were generally small and medium landholders, voted Whig by a two-to-one majority, and the other lower section, where slaves and free blacks outnumbered whites and whites were either big landholders or landless workers, voted strongly Democratic. Neighborhoods with sharp wealth skew tended to be strongly Democratic, while those with a more even smallholding demographic tended to be Whig. According to Crofts, the 1860 presidential election vote in Southampton followed a pattern established for years, but the secession voting created a much more polarized electorate. Secession, he argues, increased the division between the upper and lower county and the highest polarization ever between slaveholders and nonslaveholders.

Relationship
We do not find the kind of clear division in Augusta that Crofts found for Southampton--one section of the county committed to growth and Whiggery, another largely planter dominated and Democratic. Crofts' geographic argument accounts mainly for the division he sees between upper and lower Southampton, while ours systematically tests for the salience of a variety of geographic variables. We found a strong presence for slavery across Augusta unlike Crofts for Southampton. On the other hand, we do see in 1860 voting patterns that the areas of concentrated Democratic voting were also ones with high levels of slaveholding and wealth.

Excerpt

"Without slavery the North became differentiated and complex in the ways that the South could not. The North's highly populated countryside could support a tight mesh of factories, canals, and railroads not possible in the South." (22)

"The most crucial economic differences between Indiana and Mississippi were not as much a consequence of ideology as of structural circumstances. Not a lack of entrepreneurial values, but a slavery-induced limitation on the local market size prevented Mississippi from becoming a commercial, urban, and middle class society as did Indiana." (187)

Synopsis

Benson's study describes the Southern community as more localized, atomized, and locally uniform than the Northern community and he posits a localitic culture in the South compared to an institutional, structural culture in the North. One important difference between the two places was their relative ability to sustain businesses within the local communities. Benson points to extensive landholding in the Southern communities and the consequences of consistent out-migration. Slavery, he suggests, determined the difference between these communities in ways more structural than ideological.


Excerpt

"Slavery was headed to the North in the wake of a corn economy." (52)

Synopsis

Earle argues that slavery was economically effective only when applied to staple crops such as cotton and tobacco. He distinguishes between the intensive need to attend to these staple crops and other crops such as wheat which demanded intense bursts of attendance for short durations. Slavery was efficient for the former and wage workers for the latter. Earle traces the change in agricultural production in the Eastern Shore of Maryland in the eighteenth century from tobacco to wheat and in the Lower Midwest in the nineteenth century from wheat to corn. Earle characterizes corn as a crop requiring fairly intense cultivation and as easily adaptable to the efficiencies of slave labor. He argues that in the Lower Midwest the transition to corn brought with it pressure to use slave labor in these border states and made the region a key battleground over slavery in the 1850s.

Relationship

We agree with Earle that slavery was used across a range of crops, especially corn. While wheat
required fewer man hours and was not as efficiently produced with slave labor, its production was only part of a larger economy in Augusta. Earle's calculation of slavery's utility in wheat production does correspond to our findings. We found that the most successful Augusta plantations were slave-based and concentrated in relatively higher wheat production, but that wheat production on average in Augusta was not nearly as productive as in Franklin. In corn production, a more labor intensive crop, Augusta's farmers, both slaveholders and nonslaveholders, were far more productive than their Franklin counterparts.


Excerpt

"Southern whites, rural and urban, lived as did Northerners--in a stratified society marked by great inequalities in status, material condition, and opportunity." (1136)

"The burden of recent research is that small social and economic elites exercised a degree of control over the most important institutions in the antebellum North that bears close resemblance to the great power attributed to the great planter-slaveowners by William E. Dodd a half century ago and by Eugene D. Genovese more recently." (1142)

"Far from being in any sense members of a colony or dependency on the North, the Southern upper classes enjoyed close ties with the Northern capitalists who were, in a sense, their business partners. The South was an integral component of a wealthy and dynamic national economy, no part of which conformed perfectly to a textbook definition of pure capitalism." (1147)

"That they were drawn into the most terrible of all American wars may have been due, as is often the case when great powers fight, as much to their similarities as to their differences. The war owed more, I believe, to the inevitably opposed but similarly selfish interests--or perceived interests--of North and South than to the differences in their cultures and institutions." (1146)

"For all of their distinctiveness, the Old South and North were complementary elements in an American society that was everywhere primarily rural, capitalistic, materialistic, and socially stratified, racially, ethnically, and religiously heterogeneous, and stridently chauvinistic and expansionist--a society whose practice fell far short of, when it was not totally in conflict with, its lofty theory." (1149)

Synopsis

Pessen brings together a wide array of scholarship in this sweeping essay on whether the North and South were so different on the eve of the Civil War. He divides his analysis into three parts: economy, social structure, and politics and power. In the section on economy Pessen argues that the regions were more complementary than opposed. Pessen carefully avoids explaining "away" rather than explaining Southern industrial activity, pointing out that the South's high per capita rates of industrial growth depended entirely on the fact of low white population. Pessen argues that social structures in the North and South were similar in wealth distribution, vertical mobility rates, and lifestyles and fashions.
Though similar, Pessen points out, the sections "were not carbon copies of one another." The chief difference was slavery. In politics and political power Pessen summarizes a range of quantitative studies of voting patterns and finds that in both sections leadership was conferred on successful wealthy men and that parties were pragmatic engines of economic and social promotion. Even in the 1850s national parties remained cohesive on all issues except those directly related to slavery and its expansion; moreover, he points out, most issues of concern were local. On a whole range of indicators, Pessen summarizes literature that "appears to overturn the traditional view of a distinctive antebellum South."

Pessen considers the low density of population a possible product of difference between the sections, not at all a historical accident. Pessen suggests that striking similarities in the sections do not erase their visible differences, and that these differences, especially those rooted in the social and daily life of communities, might have been decisive in overcoming the ties of similarity.

**Relationship**

We agree with Pessen's comparative approach, of course. Augusta and Franklin are examples of the expansionist and successful, rural and capitalistic American society of 1860 that Pessen suggests prevailed. We emphasize too that because of their success these places make excellent places to search for the difference slavery made.

**Sam Bowers Hilliard, Hog Meat and Hoecake: Food Supply in the Old South, 1840-1860 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972).**

**Excerpt**

"Not always linked directly to all human activity in this area, cotton was the main force behind its culture and economy. It enriched the planter, impoverished the soil, made big farmers out of little ones and planters out of farmers. . . . Finally, it sustained the institution of slavery, making it a central element of the regional society and economy." (19)

"It is obvious that a description of the South as having been either 'self-sufficient' or 'dependent upon the West for food' would be unrealistic. From North Carolina to Louisiana, a number of agricultural 'regions' existed with each solving its problem of food supply as its situation, resources, and predilections permitted. In this respect the South differed little from other large sections of the country. But there is no justification for seeing the antebellum South as an area of such concentration on staple export agricultural production that it had to import most, or even much, of its food. As a region, it was, despite the exceptions noted, largely feeding itself." (235)

**Synopsis**

Hilliard examined the U.S. Census agricultural schedules for the South and built estimates of Southern patterns of consumption to test whether the region was so specialized in staple crops that it was not self-sufficient. Hilliard found that landholding size was not as significant as location in determining the mix or ratio of staple crop and corn in the South. He found that the heaviest corn production areas were in the hill country and that internal markets allowed corn grown in these regions to support intense

Excerpt

"This study of antebellum society in microcosm supports the planter-dominance rather than the yeoman-democracy view of the Old South. There were more landholding farmers and nonslaveholding farmers in 1860 than in 1850 in Harrison County, but there were also many more slaveholding planters. And the position of small farmers and nonslaveholders relative to large operators and slaveholders declined in every category of agricultural wealth and production during the 1850s. . . . Overall, there is certainly more empirical evidence of an economy dominated by planters than for one of rough equality among yeoman farmers. The question of political democracy is more complex, but there too the evidence points toward planter domination and a monopoly of leadership by the wealthy." (391-92)

Synopsis

Campbell argues against the yeoman-democracy thesis of Frank L. Owsley and his students that a large middle class operated "typical" Southern farms and that these smaller farmers (often nonslaveholders) owned comparable land in quality and size to slaveholders. Campbell's evidence from a county study in Texas suggests that in the 1850s planters did move to dominate the best land and "pushed out" nonslaveholding smaller farmers. Campell uses U. S. census data, linking individuals and households across agriculture, population, and slaveholding schedules. Campbell points out that even small producers of corn declined in their position relative to the planters of Harrison County in the 1850s.

Relationship

The debate between the Owsley school emphasizing "plain folk democracy" and the Genovese interpretation stressing "planter hegemony" may have run its course. Drew Gilpin Faust's 1987 review of the literature in Interpreting Southern History suggests that such arguments might be an "anachronistic oversimplification." We do not find in Augusta the planter dominance of the best soil that Campbell sees in Harrison County, Texas; however, we do not compare 1850 and 1860 to measure this change over time. We both find political domination of the leadership by the wealthy.


Excerpt

"Within such a framework of knowledge, the effort rigidly to classify the South as either 'distinctive' or
'American' as 'traditional' or 'modern' is perhaps becoming an anachronistic oversimplification--especially as our expanding understanding of the North has shown it to have been far less uniformly progressive and advanced than historians once thought. . . Within such a seamless web of influences, it becomes difficult to identify an obvious center." (117-118)

**Synopsis**

Faust summarizes the literature on the South's distinctiveness, concluding that new work should emphasize the complexity of social and economic structures in both the North and the South. Faust also calls for a theoretical framework that embraces the divergent explanations of Genovese, Wright, Wyatt-Brown and others.

**Excerpt**

"Professor Pessen has long held that wealth is the best single indicator of social class and of power, that wealth in the antebellum United States was very badly distributed, that highly undesirable class distinctions were embedded in the system, and that an image of extensive economic and social mobility is unjustified." (1151)

"The problem of rural intergenerational mobility, either associated with or apart from geographical mobility, moreover, has hardly been touched and may be beyond reach. And, for the substantial proportion of rural nonfarm population for whom real income is elusive, we just do not yet have adequate evidence that wealth was 'the surest sign of social, as well as of economic, position' (page 1130), unless only great wealth is meant." (1151)

**Synopsis**

Alexander criticizes the secondary sources on which Pessen rested his argument, and considers these sources too limited, focused more on town than rural life. Alexander points specifically to population density as a key difference between the sections, one that needed explanation and elaboration.

**Relationship**

Alexander's criticism focused on Pessen's summary of the literature of wealth distribution by Gavin Wright and Lee Soltow. We find in Augusta and Franklin a similar distribution of wealth, a finding that confirms Pessen's view and supports Wright's and Soltow's analysis of wealth and income. Our findings also support Alexander's argument that population density may have created divergent social structures.

**Excerpt**

"However similar the motivations of planter capitalists and industrial capitalists, however efficiently each section followed its comparative advantage, and however rapidly both sections were growing economically, one section included a slave-based agriculture and the other had, in addition to a commercial agriculture based on family farms, a developing industrial sector based upon wage labor. One section was more influenced by planter-slaveowners, the other more by merchant and industrial capitalists. These features affected the structure of society and led, for example (as Pessen notes), to certain restrictions on what was politically acceptable. Thus, beneath the structural similarities and some important similarities in motivation, behavior, and belief, there remained key differences, in desired policies and in the sources of wealth. These differences, even with some basic similarities in belief and behavior, in conjunction with the importance of attitudes toward race and slavery, had obvious implications for national political and social life." (1159)

Synopsis

Engerman disagrees with Edward Pessen's conclusion that the South and North were more similar than different and that their similarities had as much to do with the coming of the Civil War as their differences. Engerman argues that Pessen discounts the role of slavery played in establishing baseline differences between the sections that became the crucial determinants in the coming of the war.

Relationship

Engerman notes that the trend in scholarship (agreeing with Pessen) has been toward less emphasis on differences between the sections and more on the South's similarity, especially in the area of economics. Engerman, though, points out that much of the scholarship to that point was not comparative but instead based on separate analysis of only one of the sections. Engerman argues that only comparative analysis will enable more definitive answers to the question of difference and similarity between North and South on the eve of the Civil War.


Excerpt

"The Civil War has usually been described as a conflict between two wholly distinct sections, abruptly divided by state boundary lines. It grew out of the controversy over slavery, it is said, and was waged on the one side by slaveholders and their misguided neighbors, while on the other side the people of the North fought to emancipate the slaves and maintain the Union. Such a view, though a natural one, gives an incorrect impression of the character of the struggle. In the first place, the boundary between the sections, throughout most of its course was artificial. . . . In the second place, there was in the beginning, and there existed during the whole course of the war, a middle section in which the question of slavery was unimportant compared with other issues. . . . This great homogeneous section, extending almost the whole width of the country, had it in its power to determine the outcome of the Civil War. Its white population was nearly as great at that of the eleven seceded States." (1-2)

"Viewing the results of the election in the Borderland as a whole, two facts stand out with great
distinctness. The first was the relatively slight change that took place in the former party alignments, which indicates in itself that the issue of union or separatism was not popularly regarded as the chief one of the campaign. The second was the conservative attitude of the voters. In practically every section of the Borderland they expressed their preferences for Douglas or Bell, the two candidates who emphasized in their appeals for support the necessity of continuing the policies of compromise and conciliation in settling sectional differences." (75)

Synopsis

Smith argues that the Borderland constituted a distinct and homogeneous region of approximately 5 million white people. The region had interests with both the North and the South but was more cohesive and united within than with either section. Smith suggests that slavery as an issue remained unimportant in the Borderland until the secession crisis when the issue of slavery was ripped from its normal context as just one of a cluster of issues. Parts of the Borderland, he argues, "were [geographically] different without being disunited." Smith also argues that white people of the Borderland were "much less attached to slavery than those of the South." (31)

Relationship

We find Smith's interest in the Borderland as a distinct region compelling. Smith's work discusses climate, natural geography, transportation, markets, and ethnicity. We do not support Smith's argument that slavery was of "slight importance" in the region, that slave labor was "utterly unsuited" to wheat production and "out of the question" for corn.


Excerpt

"Pennsylvania was the northern 'parent'--and Virginia the southern one--that together nurtured much of the Border." (446)

"In looking at the Upper South and Border and what the war meant for these regions, it is hard to avoid the sweeping assessment: that the U.S. Civil War was another great watershed in which the victory went to a zealous, skilled, and destiny-minded minority--the principal cadre of which just happened to be descended from the intense and grasping Puritan and Yankee minority that had also been the largest single force in the two previous cousins' wars. The defeat of southern culture, agriculture, and politics did not end at the borders of the former Confederacy." (456)

"Religious denominationalism, as much as economics or ideology, drove the great transatlantic political currents that ultimately ended slavery, maintained the United States as one nation, and inhibited the British government, despite its huge textile industry, from aiding the embattled cotton states. . . Those great currents, the two nations' Protestant belief systems, were surprisingly similar. In the United States, especially in Greater New England, the Second Great Awakening bred an evangelical politics of social and moral intervention that coalesced into the Republican Party and underpinned the election of
Abraham Lincoln, for all that he wisely softened the neo-Puritan message. . . . In both nations, nineteenth-century selectoral politics still strongly reflected religion and denominationalism." (390)

Synopsis

Phillips takes a broad perspective on ethnicity, politics, and culture in the American Revolution, War of 1812, and American Civil War. He calls these the "cousins' wars" because he sees them as three related events in the English-Atlantic world, all of them related by lineage to England's own Civil War and the religious strife that accompanied it. Phillips' analysis of the Civil War's causes focuses on geography and agriculture. He argues that the divisions between North and South were primarily religious--Puritan Yankee New England and Episcopalian, Methodist South. The great Border region was divided by history and settlement, a region of mixed loyalties where in 1860-61 the decisive loyalties were worked out. Phillips' account of the war's origins is explicitly cultural, and his account of political expression follows in this vein.


Excerpt

"By examining variations in family culture and structure, both black and white, free and slave, this study attempts to specify which elements in those variations are race specific and which derive from the general social and cultural environment that affected whites and Afro-Americans equally. In My Father's House searches for the origins of the prejudices and stereotypes of southern black and white families and explores what difference family and community made in the course of events in nineteenth-century Edgefield." (13)

Synopsis

Burton's detailed study of Edgefield, South Carolina, examines family, religious, class, and social structures to understand the differences and similarities between blacks and whites in the nineteenth-century community. Burton finds that the main difference was between the "town-dwelling black family and all the rest, black and white." Burton locates family patterns in the context of political power, pointing out that as black Republicans were defeated at the end of Reconstruction, for example, the incidence of female-headed black families increased in the towns. Black men, he points out, continued their patriarchal authority in the rural areas. Exclusion from nonagricultural employment, then, not legacies of slavery or Africa, according to Burton, kept men from heading households in these urban places.

Relationship

Burton's finding (48) that rich and poor whites lived in proximity to one another corresponds to our Southern county. Burton's emphasis in his study is on social structures--especially family and kinship--and how they change over time, not on the Civil War, politics, or the relationship between structures and events. Our study concentrates, instead, on the social and economic logic of the
communities by which they would align themselves in the flow of events. Edgefield's proportion of
slaveowners in 1860 was nearly double that of Augusta, though the distribution of slaves and
slaveownership in Augusta was more concentrated in the smaller slaveholders (less than 10 slaves).
Despite these distinctions, Burton's study of Edgefield's family and social structures corresponds to ours,
though there were many important differences. Edgefield was bigger than Augusta in 1860 and had a
majority black population. But both places cultivated industries, were organized around small towns and
villages with a county seat of roughly the same size, built elaborate road and railroad infrastructures,
nourished a growing professional class, harbored steep inequities in wealth distribution, devoted most of
their resources to agriculture, and practiced widespread slavery.

William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease, The Web of Progress: Private Values and Public

Excerpt

"Behind all the calculations and statistics, the counting of bales and the totaling of horsepower, the
assessment of resources and the evaluation of experience lay critical differences in values. Share the
same plans for urban growth they might. But the business ethic which shaped Boston's dedication to
achieving that growth was central to her entire culture, which it was only peripheral in Charleston."
(219)

Synopsis

William and Jane Pease develop a wide array of data drawn from censuses, city directories, newspapers,
church records, and municipal records to compare Boston and Charleston in the antebellum period. They
are most concerned with class structures and the activities and social structures of the elite leading the
cities. They conclude that significant differences characterized these places. First, they find that Boston
was a city of greater human capital, taking full advantage of resources and free labor to energize and
develop a dynamic capitalism. Second, they find that Charleston languished in the satisfaction of
slavery's social benefits to white elites, no matter that its profitability suffered on worn out soil and in
depressed cotton and rice markets. The Peases describe an aggressively industrial North, where the
ambitious sorts of men had set aside agrarian values and agricultural profits.

The differences the Peases find between these cities generally fit a larger framework of Yankee
dynamism and Southern languor in society and economy. Boston's Unitarian establishment, for example,
the Peases' claim, set a tone of liberalism that "encouraged innovative responses to new economic forces
without at the same time threatening social or political stability," while Charleston's Episcopalians and
main-line Presbyterians "reinforced traditional values" that "limited the city's ability to seize and exploit
new opportunities." (137)

Relationship

The comparison between North and South of these cities offers an excellent basis for beginning to
examine differences and similarities. The Peases study also offers an excellent appendix on methods and
data analysis. In many ways, it seems, the Peases study sets out to find differences and finds them, then
attributes them to slavery and differing attitudes toward modernization. Our study examines some of these same questions but within the context of geographical relationships and finds that the differences are not the ones that the Peases identified. We see little difference in elite views of modernization and we find a dynamic developmental view in the Southern county. We also see a vibrant agricultural Northern community where the connections between commercial agriculture and skilled industrial development make the Northern economic and social logic distinctly different from the South’s.


Excerpt

"Those who consider North and South utterly distinct and antagonistic by the late antebellum period will find this book an unmistakable challenge. The evidence presented here shows that many northerners and southerners believed that sectional differences were negotiable and looked forward to peaceful perpetuation of the Union. Upper South Unionists, the particular focus of this study, often embraced northern values. They expected the upper South's economy to develop increasing resemblance to the North's rather than to the deep South's. To be sure, the outbreak of war in April galvanized irreconcilable nationalisms North and South, including a defiant sense of southern separateness. But until that fateful juncture, the upper South spurned secession. Moderates both North and South outnumbered the antagonistic minorities in each section who fed on each other, gradually eroding the center. An undoubted majority of Americans preferred that the center hold and expected it to do so." (xix)

Synopsis

Crofts' book focuses on the three "populous and pivotal states" of North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, attempting to combine an analysis of the upper South in late 1860 and early 1861 with an analysis of the Republican party's response to upper South Unionism. He concludes that "one must take into account both slaveholding and previous patterns of party allegiance to understand why the upper South and lower South took such different stances during the months after Lincoln's election. (xvi)." Crofts identifies "three waves of change" that swept over and fundamentally reshaped the upper South's political contours. The first wave of the secessionist movement differed in the upper South from the lower South in that it did not "dislodge any state from the Union.(xvii)." Rather, the call for secession created an "explicitly antisecession countermobilization," resulting in a second wave of change that "swept away the popular underpinnings of secession in February 1861 (xvii)." Unlike the lower South, the persistence of the Whig opposition party in the upper South, Crofts asserts, "provided institutional barriers against secession." The third wave arose with Lincoln's proclamation calling for troops on April 15, which immediately engulfed upper South Unionism. Crofts writes that "original and converted secessionists joined hands to defend southern honor and constitutional principles against what they perceived as corrupt, tyrannical opposition (xviii)."

"A comparative glimpse at the Black Belt casts that hierarchy into sharper relief, for there the setting was rather different. To begin with, the richest landowners held a larger while the poorest held a smaller share of the total real wealth. Indeed, the Upcountry bore a closer resemblance to much of the rural North in this regard. Even more striking were geographical distinctions in absolute wealth: the Black Belt elite was far more imposing than its Upcountry counterpart. Real estate holdings among the top tenth of Black Belt's landowners normally averaged well over $20,000; in the Upcountry they averaged well under $10,000." (25)

Synopsis

Rather than a study of Populism itself, Hahn's book examines the "experiences leading to and ... informing" the Populist 'moment. (10).'' His analysis of these experiences focuses on the transformation of social relations and confrontations in the context of a market economy penetrating into a Georgia Upcountry society of "different organization and sensibility." Yeomen in this society owned their farming operations and resources, relied on household labor, and maintained "a distinctive sort of contact with the labor market (49)." Hahn argues that relationships of "production and exchange, the habits of mutuality, the common use-rights, and the customs of inheritance" encouraged anticommmercial sentiments along with a "general authoritarianism (85)" that created deep-seated animosity toward the slaveholding class. By convincing the white citizenry of their common stake in slavery, slaveholders "implicitly questioned the loyalties of the lower classes and exposed their fears of social conflicts (85)." Though yeomen expressed "complex reasons" for defending the Confederacy, "the requirements of defending a nascent slaveholders' republic brought those conflicts to the surface (85)." In the Civil War's wake arose an exploitative credit system, tied to changing local, national, and international markets, that held yeomen to staple agriculture. This situation led to political unrest in the Upcountry during the 1880s, fueling the "fires of Southern Populism (152)." The experience of an expanding agricultural market, railroad construction, and rising land values at this time all led to an increasing concentration of wealth. Hahn argues that "impersonal forces" were not responsible for the Upcountry's absorption into the national and international market, rather it "was accomplished, in large part, by landlords and, especially, by merchants who sought to make the best of postwar conditions, to extend the realm of staple agriculture, and to reap profits," resulting in heightened yeomen animosity towards local storekeepers, landlords, and Northern capitalists (169). Hahn ultimately sees the controversy over fence law as the pivotal force that "galvanized budding antagonisms" and "paved the road to Populism (240)."


Excerpt

"And while slavery certainly made the Old South 'different' from the North, the question whether differences outweighed similarities and generated an irrepressible conflict remains a matter of interpretation. North and South after all, shared the same language, the same Constitution, the same legal system, the same commitment to republican institutions, the same predominantly Protestant religion and British ethnic heritage, the same history, the same memories of a common struggle for
McPherson's book is a narrative account of the causes and fighting of the Civil War. McPherson believes that a genuine conflict over slavery divided North and South before the war. He argues that as long as "the slavery controversy focused on the morality of the institution where it already existed, the two party system managed to contain the passions it aroused." (41) When the controversy, however, began to focus on slavery's expansion into new territories conflict became "irrepressible." (41) McPherson asserts that past attempts to explain southern defeat have lacked the "dimension of contingency (857-858)." He believes that "Northern victory and Southern defeat in the war cannot be understood apart from the contingency that hung over every campaign, every battle, every election, every decision during the war."(858)

McPherson's treatment of the coming of the war in Battle Cry of Freedom differs sharply from ours. For McPherson the conflict builds inexorably from a clash over modernization. He argues that secession was purely about protecting slavery and the right to extend it and that nonslaveholders join the cause because of white supremacy. He stresses the South's "defensive-aggressive temper" which grew from its "economic subordination" to the North, an economy that was "racing ahead of the South in crucial indices." (91) We find instead regions that were intensely competitive and successful, and a Southern community in which moderation and Whig ideas predominated acting with purpose to enter the war when it came. McPherson's approach does not address the complex regional, subregional, and local interests and the internal conflicts over the future growth and development of the country.

James M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Knopf, 1982).

Excerpt

"Although speeches and editorials in the upper South bristled with references to rights, liberty, state sovereignty, honor, resistance to coercion, and identity with southern brothers, such rhetoric could not conceal the fundamental issue of slavery. The following table shows the correlation between slaveholding and support for secession in the Virginia and Tennessee conventions . . . The popular vote in secession referendums illustrated the point even more graphically . . . The upper South, like the lower, went to war to defend the freedom of white men to own slaves and to take them into the territories as they saw fit, lest these white men be enslaved by Black Republicans who threatened to deprive them of these liberties." (283-84)

"Heavy investment in social overhead capital, which transforms a localized subsistence economy into a nationally integrated market economy; rapid increases in output per capita, resulting from technological innovation and the shift from labor-intensive toward capital-intensive production; the accelerated growth of the industrial sector compared with other sectors of the economy; rapid urbanization, made possible by an increase in agricultural productivity that enables farmers to feed the growing cities; an expansion
of education, literacy, and mass communications; a value system that emphasizes change rather than tradition; an evolution from the traditional, rural, village-oriented system of personal and kinship ties, in which status is 'ascriptive' (inherited), toward a fluid, cosmopolitan, impersonal, and pluralistic society, in which status is achieved by merit." (13)

Synopsis

McPherson's book synthesizes historical scholarship on the Civil War and Reconstruction around the idea of "modernization." He builds his argument around several main points: that the war and Reconstruction were stages in America's progressive "modernization," that New England was the engine of "modern" development in economy, society, culture, and intellectual life, and that the Republican Party was the driving force behind the idea of "modernization." Modernization, according to McPherson, was effectively a value system associated with the Protestant work ethic, associated most especially with New England Presbyterians, Quakers, Congregationalists, and Unitarians. McPherson suggests that some Americans did not easily swallow the idea of modernization; resisters to modernization, he points out, were Catholics and Southerners. Considered broadly, McPherson's North and South were distinct regions on divergent tracks of development.

Relationship

We disagree with McPherson's New England-centric approach to the problem of the coming of the war, the development of the Republican Party, and the character of the Southern and Northern societies and economies. McPherson's list of different Northern and Southern paths of development, of course, is encompassing enough to describe patterns of development we find in Augusta and Franklin, but McPherson's analysis offers no gradations. His approach is built around fundamental and far-reaching differences between the sections, ours around the social and economic logic of local communities and the difference that slavery made in orienting them.


Excerpt

"Most important, however, the core of the secessionist persuasion was aimed at the same republican values of Southerners that Republicans appealed to among Northerners. Although the secessionists and their allies did, indeed, warn of the dangers of abolition and escalate demands concerning slavery in the territories, the essence of their appeal had less to do with black slavery than with protecting the rights of Southern whites from despotism. The central issue was neither race nor restriction, but republicanism. Where Republicans had located the antirepublican monster in the Slave Power conspiracy, secessionists identified it with the Republican party, which they labeled a threat to self-government, the rule of law, Southern liberty, and Southern equality." (240)

Synopsis

This is a study on the breakdown of the Second American Party System and the coming of the Civil

Excerpt

"What were the conditions that permitted the economic arguments against slavery to become so much more effective in the mid-1850s than they had been in the 1830s or 1840s? The question is puzzling since the period 1843-1857, during which the economic critique of slavery rose to preeminence, is often portrayed as one of vigorous economic expansion and general prosperity. . . . One part of the free U.S. population failed to share in this prosperity. These were the non-farm manual workers, especially those in the North, and especially the native-born skilled males." (354-55)

Synopsis

Fogel's book builds and extends his earlier work with Stanley Engerman in Time on the Cross. The book addresses many of the criticisms of their controversial work and more directly addresses the moral problem of slavery in American history. But Fogel's key argument in the development of the Republican Party and its successful national campaign in 1860 focuses on the "hidden depression" among Northern non-farm manual workers in the 1850s. He argues that these men represented about a quarter of the North's electorate and that they suffered from competition from immigrants, depressed wages, and declines in real income. At the same time, Fogel points out, prices for wheat, corn, and meats rose in the period on demand from shortages in Europe, making the non-farm worker poorer. He estimated the average decline in real income between 1848 and 1855 at 25 to 50 percent, and compares it to the economic misfortune in the Great Depression. These workers made up the key vote in the Republican column in 1860 and they were particularly receptive to Republican claims about the smothering role of the South and slavery in their present and future economic development.
There are, of course, scholarly dissenters from this standard interpretation. Historians such as David Potter, J. Mills Thornton, Michael Holt, William Gienapp, and William Freehling have questioned the political narrative that makes the conflict over slavery seem relatively straightforward, in either the North or the South. Their regions are marked by strong countercurrents, compromises, and possibilities for alignments other than those that brought on the war. Other historians have argued that African Americans did more to free themselves than Abraham Lincoln ever did. In the eyes of Leon Litwack, Ira Berlin, Barbara Fields, and others, the focus on white Northern soldiers and civilians gives undue credit to reluctant friends of freedom. Without the desperate efforts by slaves to free themselves, they argue, the Union cause would have remained a cause for Union alone. It was anonymous African Americans who forced the hands of Union generals, who forced them to take a stand on slavery, who forced them to recognize that only by ending slavery could the North win the war. Assuming an implicit and intrinsic push toward freedom on the part of the North, these historians warn, gives that society far too much moral credit." (158)

"They [Ken Burns and James McPherson] both dramatize the ways that antislavery, progress, war, and national identity intertwined at the time of the Civil War so that each element became inseparable from the other. Slavery stands as the antithesis of progress, shattering nation and creating war; war is the means by which antislavery spreads and deepens; the turn against slavery during the war recreates national identity; the new nation is freed for a more fully shared kind of progress. This story has become common sense to Americans: emancipation, war, nation, and progress all seem part of one story, the same story." (147-148)

**Synopsis**

Ayers traces the course of Civil War historiography and the lack of recent debate over its meaning and causation. He suggests that a standard interpretation in popular American culture emerged around the work of James McPherson, Ken Burns, and Michael Shaara. Ayers offers alternative approaches to the war and its causation, especially to the "modernization" thesis at the heart of the current standard interpretation.


**Excerpt**

"Recently, however, historians have begun to point out that politics often involves the whole fabric of human interrelationships and that political alignments are frequently shaped by local social and economic factors which do not appear in formal national or state party platforms. What is needed to discover and evaluate the importances of these factors, they persuasively argue, is a more comprehensive 'social analysis' of political history." (2)

"By 1860 the leadership of the opposing parties had also changed considerably from that of the Whigs and Democrats in in the late 1840s. . . . the Republican and Democratic leaders by 1860 came from
much more similar backgrounds. . . . [they] tended to come from the same socioeconomic groups. . . . Republicans continued to be almost exclusively Protestants while a large proportion of Democrats were Catholics. . . . Aside from this notable difference in religious background, however, the leaders of the two parties were remarkably alike." (291)

"In many ways then the votes for and against Lincoln in 1860 did not result from a single campaign but represented the continuation of a division which had occurred earlier." (302)

Synopsis

Holt examines the politics of the city of Pittsburgh and places it in the larger context of Pennsylvania and national party politics in the antebellum era. Holt argues that as the demographic profile of voters, especially the ethnoreligious profile, changed in the 1850s, the political parties resembled each other and converged. In the beginning of the second party system Holt finds distinct differences between the Whigs and Democrats. Whigs were more likely to be middle and working class, native born, Protestant, and led by much wealthier leaders than the Democrats. Whig leaders were more connected to the business enterprises of Pittsburgh while Democrats were more likely to be lawyers and other professionals. In this climate, he argues, in Pennsylvania the Republicans did not make a direct attack on slavery or its extension as a moral issue, but instead attacked the idea of slavery as a labor ideology—that it might eventually weaken the position of white working men in a free wage society. Holt finds that in Pennsylvania the tariff issue was not as important to voters as historians have assumed, and that Pennsylvania prosperity in the late 1850s helped make the tariff less crucial in the election. Instead, Holt asserts that local issues explain the ways voters aligned in the state and national election—in Pittsburgh the railroad tax issue divided the electorate in ways more powerful than the extension of slavery issue.


Excerpt

"To a large but not exclusive extent, therefore, explaining the Whig party's expiration requires explaining the shifting relationships after 1844 between the forces of interparty conflict and intraparty division. The diminution of the first and exacerbation of the second together did alienate Whig voters, provoke their defection, and thereby contribute to the problem of 'not enough people.'" (954)

"Sectional division was not the only thing that destroyed the Whig party and drove it to its grave. But the death of the Whig party clearly contributed to the outbreak of the war, if only by clearing the way for and, in the form of essential northern Whig converts, aiding the rise of the Republican party as the major opponent of Democrats in American political life." (981)

"For over thirty years, the accepted interpretation of the war's coming in the academy has been that it resulted from basic social, economic, and ideological differences between the sections deriving from the presence of African-American slavery in the South and its absence from the North. In its cruder—and more common—formulation, the 'forces' that caused the war were self-generating and operated toward their inevitable conclusion almost without the need of human agency. And most certainly, this argument
goes, specific political leaders cannot be held accountable for the war since the sectional conflict producing it involved mass public opinion and sensibilities growing out of different economic and social systems, not something as epiphenomenal as politics." (982)

Synopsis

Holt meticulously tracks the rise and fall of the Whig party at the national, state, and local levels. Holt wants to explain how the Whig party could so completely disintegrate in the 1850s. His analysis concentrates on the party structures in the localities and states, where Holt finds the party suffered from weak interparty conflict and strong intraparty divisions.


Excerpt

"While the most detailed study of the Virginia Democratic Republicans insisted that ethnicity and religion did not influence voting, the analysis of both polling place 'neighborhoods' and individual voters shows ethnoreligious factors to have been crucial determinants of partisan identification for a significant number of voters. The importance of neighborhoods clustered around churches with a community core of kinship networks can hardly be exaggerated." (11)

"The Old Dominion lagged as a genteel republic in the age of the common man." (264)

"Party allegiance had no effect on the way delegates voted on apportionment. Instead, delegates from east and west stood fast on the opposite sides of the issues. The final division on representation could have been no less partisan or more sharply sectional." (281)

"The conflict over secession pitted a party dominated by slaveholders against one representing men with no direct stake in the peculiar institution and divided the electorate in a sectional fashion that had previously been associated with the question of constitutional reform." (291)

Synopsis

Shade argues that Virginia in the 1850s became more "democratic" and that neither the Whigs nor the Democrats were sectional parties within the state. The Whigs were not, he argues, the "party of the West," nor were the Democrats the party of the Tidewater. Shade contradicts older interpretations that stressed the geographic split in Virginia--that the non-slaveholding Germans of the Valley and the small independent farmers in the counties of the southwest typified Democrats or that large slaveholders in the east and nascent manufacturers in salt, iron, and woolens in the west were Whigs. Instead, Shade asserts that Whigs prevailed in towns and in town-dominated counties and that Democrats did better in agricultural areas where large planters were clustered. Shade finds the ethnoreligious explanation for party formation most persuasive. Neighborhood, church, and family ties, he finds, determined party allegiance. The state changed dramatically in the 1850s as fewer than half of Virginia white men became farmers and the power of the planters among the social elite declined significantly. The change in leadership was equally dramatic, Shade finds. Lawyers rise and planters declined in the state.
representation at the constitutional conventions. Shade considers this growth and development the crucial factor for explaining Virginia's movement toward secession. The election of 1860, he argues, in Virginia resembled the same patterns already established in earlier elections, patterns that were completely swept away in the six months before the 1861 constitutional convention that voted to secede. The elections for constitutional convention delegates for the first time set non-slaveholding unionists against slaveholding secessionists.

**Relationship**

Our data remain inconclusive on Shade's argument that the Valley counties were dominated by religious and ethnic political alignments. Shade finds that Scots-Irish--Presbyterian and Anglican--Valley residents supported the Whig Party and the Know-Nothings, while the Germans--Mennonite, Lutheran, and German Reformed--residents voted Democratic. We agree with Shade that political affiliations were determined by ethnic and religious identity in the Valley, though our analysis of Augusta County does not show a direct correlation. We suggest that there may have been more difference between counties and less within counties on the ethnic and religious correlation with political expression.


**Excerpt**

"The American political system was particularly vulnerable to sectional strains and tensions. One reason was the institutional structure of American politics. The Civil War occurred within a particular political institutional framework that, while it did not make the war inevitable, was essential to the coming of the war." (84)

"There was nothing inevitable, however, about the rise of the Republican party. Another set of events in the 1850s might have led to a different outcome, and thus the historian must analyze these developments from the perspective of the time, with due allowance for chance and contingency, rather than reasoning backward from the war's beginning in 1861. The Republican party's growing strength did not foreclose the possibility of avoiding war, but it significantly narrowed the range of options and limited the ability of political moderates to defuse the slavery issue in national politics."

**Synopsis**

Gienapp points to elements in the U.S. Constitution which created opportunities to destabilize the American political system. The lack of clarity on the right of secession, the size of states, the creation of the electoral college, the four year term for the President, and the voting practices of antebellum states combined in a way that produced a political realignment in the 1850s and helped make possible a civil war in the 1860s.

William W. FreehlingThe Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854, Volume 1

Excerpt

"The Border South produced over half of Dixie's industrial products. The lower South produced less than a fifth. In 1850 the Border South's Baltimore, St. Louis, and Louisville ranked first, third, and fourth in order of size among southern cities, with a combined population of almost 300,000. The lower South's three largest cities, New Orleans, Charleston, and Mobile, ranked second, fifth, and seventh in Dixie, with a combined population well short of 200,000. The three leading Border South cities, despite twice as many whites as Gulf counterparts, possessed only a fourth as many slaves. In cities and in the countryside, the Border South melted into a North-South twilight-zone, more like Chicago than Charleston, more akin to midwestern grain farms than to southwestern cotton plantations." (19)

Synopsis

Rather than viewing the South as a monolith, Freehling emphasizes the South's diverse and at time contradictory nature by focusing on sub-regional differentiation. He believes the lower South was ultimately radicalized because its distrust of the upper South's position on the expansion of slavery. Freehling attempts to show "that two antithetical abstract systems, democracy and despotism, when forced to rub against each other in close southern quarters, intriguingly intermeshed to shape not just politics but a world ix)." He sees Texas' annexation as the "largest turning point on the road to disunion (353)." The issue consumed the southern election of 1844, focusing attention for the first time on "which party's measures, not men, were most loyal to slavery (561)." The result was a "Southern Whig drubbing" from which never recovered, revealing a "profoundly endangered republic (562)." Freehling believes annexation was a pivotal victory for the "Slavepower." Not even the Kansas-Nebraska Act "made southern frontiers safer (564)."


Excerpt

"While it is undoubtedly true that some white southerners feared that any reform more radical than temperance was too closely linked to abolition and were thus unreceptive or hostile to it, it is also true that the greater intellectual ferment in Washtenaw County--rather than merely a deeper conservatism in Tuscaloosa County - partly accounts for the counties' different receptions to these two radical causes . . . . Despite their important differences, the similarities between Washtenaw and Tuscaloosa Counties with respect to antebellum reform are also important. During the antebellum years, more people participated in or in some way encountered temperance and evangelical benevolence than Fourierism, women's rights, and even abolitionism. In both counties, proponents of benevolence not only desired to provide people with the means to salvation; they also endeavored to transform the morals of Americans and to remove the barriers that they believed created social problems, hindered the development of human potential, and ultimately stood in the way of economic progress. Temperance devotees also promoted similar goals. These two reforms, as well as abolition, were advanced by individuals who identified
closely--though at times elusively--with the growth of American towns and cities, education, and the market economy." (470)

**Synopsis**

Quist's study looks at how deep and extensive the antebellum reform climate penetrated into the lives of most Americans. He argues that a study of reform during this time must assess how "most Americans observed and experienced it - that is, as it functioned in the village and the countryside." (4) Quist examines two counties--Tuscaloosa, Alabama and Washtenaw, Michigan--and reveals that the residents of both counties embraced the antebellum reform impulse. Quist's study challenges the historiographical tendency to see the South, with its cotton based plantation economy, as an increasingly distinctive region opposed to the North's free labor economy, because he finds just as vibrant a reform movement there as in his Northern community. In both places, Quist finds, market forces helped sustain and energize reform movements. Quist argues that the differences in the counties' reform movements resulted from the "greater intellectual ferment in Washtenaw County . . . rather than merely a deeper conservatism in Tuscaloosa County" and that this partly accounts for the counties' different receptions to reform. (479) Quist's study emphasizes the similarities between these places and their reform histories. Slavery plays out differently, however, as a reform issue, and Quist notes that its effect in the Southern community was unifying, while its effect in the Northern community was fracturing.

**Eugene D. Genovese, Yeomen Farmers in a Slaveholders' Democracy (Agricultural History, Volume 49, No. 2, April 1975, 1975).**

**Excerpt**

"Plantation-belt yeomen either aspired to become slaveholders or to live as marginal farmers under the limited protection of their stronger neighbors. And there was nothing irrational or perverse in their attitude. White labor was scarce and unreliable, at least if a farmer needed steady help. Any farmer who wanted to expand his operations and make a better living had to buy slaves as soon as possible (338)."

**Synopsis**

Genovese's article focuses on the question of why yeomen farmers maintained allegiance to the slaveholding elite, "a social order that objectively oppressed them in a variety of ways (332)." He argues that it is important to distinguish between yeomen farmers of the up-country and those of the plantation belt. Up-country farmers held allegiance to the slave South not because they were "ignorant" but because they rejected an "outside world which threatened to impinge on the culture as well as the material interests of the local community (336)." Plantation belt yeomen accepted their position not because of ignorancce or "racial fears," but because "they saw themselves as aspiring slaveholders or as nonslaveholding beneficiaries of a slaveholding world, the only world they knew (340)." Slaveholders maintained this loyalty by placing the slavery question "beyond discussion," creating "mutually desired silence and limited intercourse (341, 336)." The democratic movement in the South during the Jacksonian era assisted in erasing the slavery question from politics, thereby guaranteeing the slaveholders' property base.
Relationship

In our county slavery seems to have penetrated all geographic regions—from mountains to valleys. In Augusta County we find that nonslaveholders and slaveholders alike were acting within a matrix of national and local affairs. Far from rejecting the outside world to protect their locality, Augustans found themselves interlocked within larger mechanisms. Their struggle was how to negotiate these complex and intricate connections.


Excerpt

"It seems probable that, despite the unequal distribution of power in the antebellum South, the class dynamic joining and separating planters and yeoman farmers, slaveholders and nonslaveholders, urban professionals and plain folk, was more fluid, contingent, interactive, and multi-directional than the long-standing debate concerning wealth and power in the Old South has allowed." (572)

Synopsis

Brooks' article uses wartime evidence of enlisted soldiers in the Texas Brigade and their relationships with officers to argue that the yeoman and slaveholders in the Old South had a relationship of give and take. Brooks finds that in the Texas Brigade represented Texas antebellum society. Of the original privates, 26 percent were poor (real and personal wealth less than $500), 67 percent were middle class (wealth of $500 to $19,900), and 7 percent were wealthy (above $20,000). He also finds that the proportion of slaveholders to nonslaveholders in the Texas Brigade mirrored the society at large—73 percent of families in Texas were nonslaveholders, and those slaveowners with less than ten slaves were the vast majority of slaveholders (71 percent). Officers were almost uniformly from the professional classes of lawyers, physicians, educators, and merchants.

Relationship

We agree with Brooks' characterization of the antebellum Southern society as fluid and contingent. Brooks, though, seems to project backward into the antebellum period his findings of enlisted men's agency and the power they wielded within the army. While our study does not examine the attitudes and actions of enlisted men during the war, it does measure the fluidity of society in Augusta County and the political expression of voters in 1860. We do not find persuasive evidence to suggest that the lower and middle class men of the county had disproportionate power in relationship to the leading citizens.


Excerpt

"In setting out to explain secession to their fellow Southerners, the commissioners have explained a very
great deal to us as well. By illuminating so clearly the racial content of the secession persuasion, the commissioners would seem to have laid to rest, once and for all, any notion that slavery had nothing to do with the coming of the Civil War. To put it quite simply, slavery and race were absolutely critical elements in the coming of the war.” (81)

Synopsis

Dew uses the speeches of the secession commissioners to examine the reasons these Southern secessionists gave for secession. Not surprisingly, these men emphasized in their speeches that Republican victory meant racial equality, racial amalgamation, and race war. Dew's narrative is aimed mainly at those who think slavery was not a causative factor in the coming of the war (relying instead on explanations such as states' rights). This book shows just how openly the secession commissioners linked slavery with the reasons for secession.

Relationship

Dew's book differs from our article in several important respects. Mainly, his book examines the rhetoric of the secession commissioners but not how it is received in Virginia. Our article explores the fundamental social logic by which some of that rhetoric might resonate with Augusta residents and Virginians generally and why much of it did not. Secession, in our view, had little to do with fears of race war or even slavery as a racial system; instead, we emphasize that secession stemmed from the categorization of widespread but subtle social and economic differences into a binary political expression.


Excerpt

"Slavery also discouraged the development of towns, thus putting an additional brake on the growth of consumer demand. Because slaveholders had an economic incentive to keep their workers busy all year around, many plantations were often diversified enterprises that grew their own food, employed their own carpenters, and owned their own mills. Smaller farmers needing such services often turned to their wealthier neighbors to hire out a skilled artisan or utilize the plantation's blacksmith. Virginia towns, therefore, had relatively little to do with the day-to-day operations of a plantation outside of marketing its crops." (160)

"Fertile soils, dense networks of family farms, thriving towns, and close proximity to booming urban markets all helped make Cumberland a showcase for northern agriculture. Travelers frequently commented on the beauty of the small, neat farms and well-kept countryside." (43)

"Virginia and Pennsylvania, I conclude, became a house divided because of the Old Dominion's failure to develop a large commercial city . . . A major aim of this book is to explain how Philadelphia launched itself into a cycle of self-reinforcing growth." (3)
Majewski's quantitative study compares Virginia and Pennsylvania, looking especially at a county in each state—Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and Albemarle, Virginia. His purpose is to "understand the roots of regional divergence" and he finds them in the economic structures of the two places and how economic policies shaped the trajectories of growth and development. He is particularly interested in the growth of Philadelphia and its effect on the hinterland surrounding it. Part of Majewski's purpose is to "isolate the impact of slavery" (3) on the course of economic development. Majewski concludes that Virginia's low population density was the "Achilles' heel" of its economy and that slavery was to blame for this weakness. Farmers, planters, and slaves spread across the countryside could not develop the necessary consumer demand for self-reinforcing growth that compared to Pennsylvania's towns and major city—Philadelphia. (128)

Relationship

Majewski's emphasis on population density and the generally forward-looking ideology of Virginia corresponds with our own interpretation. Majewski's concern is to explain why Virginia with all of its capital and investment failed to develop "a true central place" that could accelerate industrial growth. Ours is to explain the social logic of communities in Pennsylvania and Virginia that would allow political expression to result in the conflict and crisis of secession. Majewski's counties are both contiguous to our counties and his data on density, wealth, farm values, industrial concentration, and capital investment compare closely with ours. We differ with Majewski's emphasis on slavery as a hindrance to economic growth and a suffocating system, instead seeing it as productive and successful, widely adopted and adapted by Augustans.

Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1986)

Excerpt

"What sort of an economic class did the slaveholders comprise, and what sort of an economy did they bequeath to the postbellum South? The key to both of these questions is a basic difference between investment in slaves on the one hand, and investment in land and most forms of industrial capital on the other: slaves were movable, the other forms of investment were not. . . This simple distinction had a pervasive influence on economic life, affecting population growth, private investment patterns, farming practices, mineral exploration, and political coalitions. Slavery generated a weaker and looser connection between property holders and the land they occupied." (17)

Synopsis

Wright's book draws a distinct difference between the economic development of the South and the North in the antebellum period. Wright examines the structures of economic growth—town development, railroads, agricultural practices, and manufacturing and mining. Wright points out that the average slaveholder held almost two-thirds of his total wealth in slaves (19) and he explains how slavery's legacies extended into the post Civil War period. Wright argues that slaveholders placed little wealth or value on land, a practice that set them apart from the North were intensive land value growth was the norm. Slaveholders, according to Wright, were "land killers" whose disregard for the land and the low
value associated with land led them to adopt wasteful agricultural practices that led to severe soil erosion.

Relationship

We agree with Wright's emphasis on land value as an important sign of the difference slavery made, but most of Wright's evidence comes from the Cotton South. In our study it does not appear that slaveholders adopted a wasteful extensive agricultural production. Instead, we find that Augusta's agricultural enterprises were highly productive even on the worst soil in the county.


Excerpt

"To the extent that theoretical or applied economic analysis can imply something about the subtleties of human behavior, this study suggests that southerners indeed were different from their Yankee brethren. But it need not imply, as generations of scholars have claimed, that they were irrational beings or that theirs was a precapitalist economy mired in an ignorant devotion to slave agriculture. . . Their differences were a matter of degree, of speed of response and adjustment." (163)

Synopsis

Bateman and Weiss seek to explain the lack of southern manufacturing and industry on the eve of the Civil War. They conclude that southern manufacturing was not entirely backward or lacking in capital formation, but that planters and slaveholders did not participate in industrial enterprises at a high rate, despite the high returns that manufacturing produced for investors. They argue that southerners were "exceptionally adverse to risk, were not knowledgeable about the benefits of diversification, failed to alter their expectations in the light of accumulating evidence on the greater profitability of manufacturing, or attached unagreeably high social costs to industrial diversification." (161)

Relationship

Bateman and Weiss adopt methods similar to ours for examining the linkages between slaveholders and industrial enterprises. We agree with Bateman and Weiss that southern industry was far from backward or lacking in capital formation, but we find no evidence to support the idea that southern leaders were adverse to risk or that they perceived a social stigma to investing in industries. In our study the most successful planters were also engaged in related low-skill industries, such as distilling or lumbering.


Excerpt
"American historians keep wanting the Civil War not to have happened, the slavery issue not to have been intractable, keep wanting to deny the centrality of racial problems to our history, to downplay the facts that many whites positively enjoyed racial discrimination and profited from it while many others genuinely hated it and sacrificed to end it." (207)

"Revisionism is partly a matter of how fine-grained one's picture is. Focus on broad demographic and economic developments--different rates of immigration to North and South, westward expansion, the growth of the slave population, and the glowing prospects of the slave-based economy--and the class between a potentially politically powerful North and a thriving, expansionist slavocracy seems unavoidable. Focus on how to explain the failure of four state delegations to be represented at the Whig nominating convention in 1839, and chance looms large. Begin a political history in 1819 and end in 1861, and one must face up to the deep sectional split over slavery. Begin in 1852 and end in 1856, and a welter of swirling, unsettled issues and alignments cloud the image." (210)

**Synopsis**

Kousser reviews Michael F. Holt's collection of essays in Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln. Kousser considers Holt a revisionist on the causation of the American Civil War and points out that many explanations of causation depend on when a study starts and the width of the focus. Kousser is convinced that revisionist historians of the Civil War have avoided facing the importance of slavery and race in the causation of the war, instead preferring to substitute a range of explanations--the fears of whites that they would be enslaved, the ethnocultural tensions between parties, the politics of Abraham Lincoln and the sectional Republicans and their attempt to create a national party in 1864 around issues not as divisive as slavery, and the importance of republicanism to both North and South in the crisis.


**Excerpt**

"When I speak of the Republican ideology, therefore, I am dealing with the party's perception of what American society, both North and South, was like in the 1850s, and its view of what the nation's future ought to be." (5)

"The irrepressible conflict view is also weak when it centers on the moral issue of slavery, particularly in view of the distaste of the majority of northerners for the Negro and the widespread hostility toward abolitionists. Moral opposition to slavery was certainly one aspect of the Republican ideology, but by no means the only one, and to explain Republicans' actions on simple moral grounds is to miss the full richness of their ideology. And the revisionists can be criticized for denying altogether the urgency of the moral issue, and for drastically underestimating the social and economic differences and conflicts that divided North and South." (5)

"At the center of the Republican ideology was the notion of 'free labor.' This concept involved not merely an attitude toward work but a justification of ante-bellum northern society, and it led northern..."
Republicans to an extensive critique of southern society, which appeared both different from and inferior to their own. Republicans believed in the existence of a conspiratorial 'Slave Power' which had seized control of the federal government and was attempting to pervert the Constitution for its own purposes. Two profoundly different and antagonistic civilizations, Republicans thus believed, had developed within the nation, and were competing for control of the political system." (9-10)

Synopsis

Foner's book argues that the Republican Party's ideology centered on the concept of "free labor" and that "the creation and articulation of an ideology which blended personal and sectional interest with morality so perfectly that it became the most potent political force in the nation." (309) Foner treats ideology as pervasive, a systemic feature of nineteenth-century politics. By examining the way Republican ideology posed a threat to the very foundations of Southern society and economy, Foner suggests, we can see the root causes of the Civil War. Free labor, Foner contends, was so important to Republicans because it defined the right of white, laboring, productive citizens to enter the market with their skills, an ideology in direct confrontation with slavery. Free labor ideology helped bring conservatives closer to radicals in the party, as over time they came to see free labor linked inextricably to free soil and free men.


Excerpt

"Our results destroy any hope for a clear-cut class division in the voting alignments of these states. At best we can point to slight variations in the sorts of counties that voted for each ticket. The most significant differences in social background were those which separated the Breckinridge and Bell constituencies." (450)

"Our search yielded little clear-cut evidence of class alignments in voting behavior on the brink of the Civil War. Even with the inclusion of ethnocultural variables, which often explained as much as economic factors, our socioeconomic models were never able to account for as much of the variation in the vote as party identification alone." (456)

Synopsis

The authors examine voting in both state and national elections and the secession elections to determine whether there was strong continuity between the Breckinridge vote and votes for immediate secession and whether voter turnout played a role in secession with Unionists staying home. The authors use multiple ecological regression to estimate the differences in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The authors find realignment a commonality in all three states, but one that depended more on previous party preference than on class in determining who voted for secession.

Eric Foner, "The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New

Historiography-27

Excerpt

“While rightly rejecting the economic determinism of progressive historians, the new political historians seem to be in danger of substituting a religious or cultural determinism of their own. Indeed, the interpretive framework of the new school is strikingly similar to that of the progressives. Both pose a sharp distinction between 'real' and 'unreal' issues, both put thousands of persons in the quasi-conspiratorial position of concealing their real intentions, and both take an extremely limited view of individual motivation. . . . But the new interpretation leaves a yawning gap between political processes and the outbreak of war.” (200-01)

Synopsis

Foner gives an overview of the major schools of interpretation on the causes of the Civil War--"the new political history" and the "modernization thesis." Where new political historians, according to Foner, substitute religion and ethnicity for class determinism, modernization historians reduce the conflict to an "industrial" or "modern" (usually ill-defined) North versus an agricultural or "pre-modern" South. Foner suggests that both approaches do not sufficiently address the social history of North and South. He argues that little is known about the rank-and-file Republicans, Democrats, Northerners, and Southerners, about the everyday citizens and their relationship to politics. Foner emphasizes that American society as a whole was highly competitive and individualistic, and that any explanation of the Civil War must combine social and political approaches, taking account of how social and economic structures affected political ones and how events occurred in the wider context of these structures.


Excerpt

"Voting in antebellum America was not so simple an act after all, and high voter turnout, as all the foregoing evidence tells us, did not necessarily indicate a widespread and deep engagement in politics on the part of the American people. What it may more powerfully indicate, indeed, is the extraordinary achievement of American political parties in mobilizing voters, some of whom were ignorant of, uninterested in, skeptical about, or even averse to political affairs. . . . Where we differ from most interpretations is in the relationship between the parties and the American electorate. The parties, we argue, developed their elaborate structures and techniques for nominating candidates, devising platforms, conducting campaigns, and maximizing election-day turnout, not from the political passions of a uniformly engaged citizenry, but in response to the very variations of engagement we have been describing.” (79)

Synopsis

Altschuler and Blumin examine parties and the political process in the nineteenth century and look
intensively at eight communities in the pre-Civil War period. Their study concentrates on how the parties tried to shape the political process and on the level and nature of party activism within these communities. They find that at the local level party politics did not divide the leaders of either commercial ventures or social institutions. They find a shockingly low level of both participation and political activism in these places, and they argue that politics occupied a tenuous "space" within the lives of ordinary Americans, not at all a secure or persistent space. Politics, they suggest, did not enter everything in American society and life in these years. Instead, it competed for the attention of Americans who viewed parties as rude, base, self-aggrandizing institutions, far from the virtuous and altruistic presence in their lives of religion, civic duty, republicanism, and liberalism. Altschuler and Blumin consider these competing arenas "constellations" within the lived experiences of Americans. They consider slavery a "peculiar issue," a special force operating from outside the political parties system to upset it and rejuvenate it at the same time.

**Relationship**

Altschuler and Blumin are concerned primarily with explaining Americans engagement with the political process at the local level. We agree that politics only represented one sphere of Americans' lives and that many other parts of their lives competed with politics for attention and action. We also agree with Altschuler and Blumin that parties extended the machinery of a national and regional network into the local communities. We emphasize, though, the social logic of slavery and its comparative difference, while they see slavery as an issue that developed outside of the political arena and was brought into it. We emphasize instead the way differences in the social logic of communities, in the lived experiences of Americans, led to deep division over slavery as a political issue. They identify party activists in much the same way as we do--they scour the newspapers of their communities for names and build a list of identified activists.


**Excerpt**

"Wheat organized economic life as well as social experience. It shaped directly the lives of those who produced it and indirectly the well-being of virtually every resident of the valley. Commercial wheat production served as the main catalyst for the growth of towns and for the establishment of commercial linkages with other regions."

**Synopsis**

Koons and Hofstra's edited collection of essays examines the 19th century economic, social, religious, and cultural experience of residents in the Great Valley of Virginia. They argue that the valley was dominated by wheat production, but they point out that wheat achieved its greatest predominance in the post-Civil War period. They suggest that the Valley constituted a regional "middle country," a place to pass through rather than to settle. They point out that slavery was readily adaptable to the mixed economy of the region, and they argue that it may have prevented the economy from growing in the antebellum period. The essays in this volume describe the settlement patterns and architectural practices
of the region, finding that the Valley wealthy did not build large houses or elaborate estates on the model of the Tidewater planters. Instead, while they held slaves and practiced a dynamic commercial agriculture and mixed industry, they did not replicate the hierarchy or culture of the tobacco region. J. Susanne Simmons and Nancy Sorrells essay, "Slave Hire and the Development of Slavery in Augusta County, Virginia," documents the widespread practice of slave hiring throughout the agricultural economy of Augusta, calling such practices "the cornerstone" of the rural economy in Augusta.

**Relationship**

The essays in this book provide one of the closest examinations of the 19th century Valley of Virginia we have. We agree that slave hiring was widespread in Augusta and that slavery was well-established in the region. We agree also that wheat was a primary crop in the region in the 1850s and that wheat was never a monoculture in Valley.


**Excerpt**

"I have concluded that in Cumberland County, the pivotal partisan controversy arose over questions of political economy. In effect, the voters had to decide how they wanted their community to fit into the rapidly developing world of international capitalism." (14)

**Synopsis**

Watson's county study concludes that slavery was not a political issue in Cumberland County for most of the period because of the unanimity of whites on the matter. Proslavery rhetoric was not, therefore, crucial to party formation in the county. Parties were built around a cluster of issues related to economic development in the region, its merits and demerits. Watson finds that Whigs centered in the main towns cultivated a republican culture of progress, banking, and state supported railroads, while Democrats spread throughout the rural county emphasized the virtues of self-sufficient, profitable agriculture. Watson links these party developments to the Transportation Revolution. Rival communities within the county, he argues, vied for political power to achieve dominance-"each arose from a different social framework, each had its own vision of the social future, and each followed its own privileged elite." (322)

**Relationship**

Watson's county bore some similarity to Augusta County. Both were not especially planter dominated, though both were successful. Both had a strong central place and vibrant political parties and newspapers, as well as active social institutions. Augusta had a higher soil quality throughout and probably more productive agriculture in general. Watson's county grew cotton and corn not wheat and corn, as in Augusta, and it was well below the per capita production of North Carolina as a whole. Augusta by contrast was one of the leading agricultural producers in Virginia. Watson finds that
Cumberland's problem was "general economic stagnation" and a lack of growth. He finds this problem at the heart of the county's political struggles and sees it as a microcosm of a larger pattern of slow growth in North Carolina. Cumberland County voted steadily Democratic throughout the second party system, while Augusta was predominantly Whig.


Excerpt
"With slavery swiftly concentrating southward and slowly fading northward, different social attitudes and political priorities developed." (182-3)

Synopsis
Freehling's essays in this volume emphasize the geographic split in the South between the Lower South, the Middle South, and the Border South. He defines the Middle South as Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, and the Border South as Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Freehling considers slavery in the nineteenth century increasingly unviable in the Middle and Border regions, arguing that slaves were being sold to the Lower South in what he calls a "slave drain." (181)

Relationship
We disagree with Freehling's general thesis of Middle South slippage in its commitment to slavery and his geographical determinism. Instead, we emphasize slavery's adaptability in Virginia and the way social and economic institutions took shape around it.


Excerpt
"First, we emphasize the nature of institutional rules for voting in the traditional electorate, and second, we stress the bearing that individual-level information can have on wider questions of popular engagement in past political life." (6)

"In these and many other ways that we explore in this study, the individual-level information available in the poll books of Washington County has enabled us to refine the picture of the traditional electorate derived from aggregate returns. We are able to take account of the fact that system-wide cues at the top of the ticket produced higher turnouts; that socio-economic differences served chiefly to distinguish voters from nonvoters; that socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors separated partisan leaders but that these distinctions fell away in the wider electorate. None of this gives us warrant for generalizing about the policy issues that engaged state legislatures and the Congress; it does, however, help us to develop a sharper sense of the culture of those to whom policy cues were directed." (15)
"Somewhat to the edge of the world of intense ideological commitment defined by the regular partisans, was the mass of people--more concerned, we may surmise, with ordinary life, prone from time to time to abstain from the big choices, to abandon party, and even to join the opposition. What determined which of these diverging actions they would take or the degree to which they would align themselves completely with the visible partisans cannot be known for particular individuals in any but a few random cases. But what may be recovered of the culture in which these people lived suggests that the physical and social networks to which they belonged provided the essential settings in which their choices about everything else, including politics and public affairs, were made." (322)

**Synopsis**

Using a statistical program called RISK, Bourke and Debats try to piece together the salient variables that affected individual voting in an antebellum Oregon community. They find a subtle, modest, and perhaps mysterious connection between partisan choice and general social indicators, such as wealth, region of birth, marital standing, length of residency, age, occupation, and religious adherence. They also find that variables added together formed no coherent picture of partisan voting and socio-economic position. These variables "wash out" in the general electorate, and Bourke and Debats assert that consistent participation in the electoral process characterized those who had a stake in the community, for the most part the wealthy. The groupings of partisanship, then, were more spatial than social, as clusters of family and neighbors committed to partisan men around them.

**Relationship**

We cannot address the issue of permanence and mobility in this study of 1860, but the Valley project's archive indicates that wealth, status, and longtime residency coalesced into political authority. We have not tested for family structures and neighborhood partisanship, as Bourke and Debats did, but we do find spatial partisanship in both counties. Bourke and Debats also find that political affiliation was a part of a larger cultural and social matrix, "one experience among many that defined the lives of people who resided in a particular locality." (275) We agree with Bourke and Debats that the physical and social networks of the community set the context of its choices in public affairs.


**Excerpt**

**Synopsis**

Noe argues that Southwest Virginia was far from an economic backwater, resistant to the market economy in the years leading up the the Civil War. Instead, he finds that the region was remarkably energetic in its economic development, placing the shift in Appalachian history much earlier than other scholars such as Ronald D. Eller. Noe also finds high levels of slavery in subregions of the Southwest in the 1850s and a clear linkage between the introduction of the railroad and the growth of slavery and cash crop agriculture, mainly wheat. Noe's book is part of a growing literature on Appalachia, from John
Inscoe to Durwood Dunn and Gene Wilhelm, to find that slavery and market forces were at work in the region connecting it to other parts of the South and developing in it a class structure.


Excerpt
"It is now clear that these sorts of publications require an enormous amount of thought and effort beyond the basic work of research and writing. The process of creating historical scholarship that is truly intended for the electronic medium requires reconceptualizing the materials from the ground up to take full advantage of the electronic medium." (4)

Synopsis
Townsend describes the high costs and potentially high benefits of electronic scholarship and suggests that historians consider new forms for journal articles and monographs. He considers many of the digital publications to be little more than minor adaptations of the traditional print forms and calls for a scholarship that takes full advantage of the digital technologies.


Excerpt
"Sir, fanaticism is a great evil, and I would avoid contact with it as i would a plague; but business relations, private interests, social ties, the thies of brotherhood, the ties of intermarriage and of communication, in every form and shape in which they can take place, must to a great extent counterbalance this odious fanaticism; and in severing those political ties I would seek to withdraw these States from their allegiance to the Federal Government. I would seek to induce them to become part and parcel of our new government. I would seek to have a tier of friendly States between the slaveholding States and the States of the extreme North and Northwest. by pursuing this policy we would, I believe, ultimately effect a reconstruction of the Union upon such terms as we would dictate." (201)

Synopsis
This work is a biography of Alexander H.H. Stuart.

Vannevar Bush, "As We May Think" Atlantic Monthly, (July, 1945)

Excerpt
"Consider a future device for individual use, which is a sort of mechanized private file and library. It needs a name, and to coin one at random, "memex" will do. A memex is a device in which an individual
stores all his books, records, and communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility. It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory.

It consists of a desk, and while it can presumably be operated from a distance, it is primarily the piece of furniture at which he works. On the top are slanting translucent screens, on which material can be projected for convenient reading. There is a keyboard, and sets of buttons and levers. Otherwise it looks like an ordinary desk.

In one end is the stored material. The matter of bulk is well taken care of by improved microfilm. Only a small part of the interior of the memex is devoted to storage, the rest to mechanism. Yet if the user inserted 5000 pages of material a day it would take him hundreds of years to fill the repository, so he can be profligate and enter material freely.

Most of the memex contents are purchased on microfilm ready for insertion. Books of all sorts, pictures, current periodicals, newspapers, are thus obtained and dropped into place. Business correspondence takes the same path. And there is provision for direct entry. On the top of the memex is a transparent platen. On this are placed longhand notes, photographs, memoranda, all sort of things. When one is in place, the depression of a lever causes it to be photographed onto the next blank space in a section of the memex film, dry photography being employed."

"The owner of the memex, let us say, is interested in the origin and properties of the bow and arrow. Specifically he is studying why the short Turkish bow was apparently superior to the English long bow in the skirmishes of the Crusades. He has dozens of possibly pertinent books and articles in his memex. First he runs through an encyclopedia, finds an interesting but sketchy article, leaves it projected. Next, in a history, he finds another pertinent item, and ties the two together. Thus he goes, building a trail of many items. Occasionally he inserts a comment of his own, either linking it into the main trail or joining it by a side trail to a particular item. When it becomes evident that the elastic properties of available materials had a great deal to do with the bow, he branches off on a side trail which takes him through textbooks on elasticity and tables of physical constants. He inserts a page of longhand analysis of his own. Thus he builds a trail of his interest through the maze of materials available to him. . . . And his trails do not fade."

**Synopsis**

Bush sought to chart the future of physics and science in the post-war, post-atomic age. He directed the science community to examine the development of new computing technologies and machines which would enhance human memory, science, and the humanities.


**Excerpt**

"In the case of history, a discipline where the crisis in scholarly publishing is particularly acute, the attraction of an e-book should be especially appealing. Any historian who has done long stints of
research knows the frustration over his or her inability to communicate the fathomlessness of the archives and the bottomlessness of the past. If only my reader could have a look inside this box, you say to yourself, at all the letters in it, not just the lines from the letter I am quoting. If only I could follow that trail in my text just as I pursued it through the dossiers, when I felt free to take detours leading away from my main subject. If only I could show how themes crisscross outside my narrative and extend far beyond the boundaries of my book. Not that books should be exempt from the imperative of trimming a narrative down to a graceful shape. But instead of using an argument to close a case, they could open up new ways of making sense of the evidence, new possibilities of making available the raw material embedded in the story, a new consciousness of the complexities involved in construing the past."

"I am not advocating the sheer accumulation of data, or arguing for links to databanks--so-called hyperlinks. These can amount to little more than an elaborate form of footnoting. Instead of bloating the electronic book, I think it possible to structure it in layers arranged like a pyramid. The top layer could be a concise account of the subject, available perhaps in paperback. The next layer could contain expanded versions of different aspects of the argument, not arranged sequentially as in a narrative, but rather as self-contained units that feed into the topmost story. The third layer could be composed of documentation, possibly of different kinds, each set off by interpretative essays. A fourth layer might be theoretical or historiographical, with selections from previous scholarship and discussions of them. A fifth layer could be pedagogic, consisting of suggestions for classroom discussion and a model syllabus. And a sixth layer could contain readers' reports, exchanges between the author and the editor, and letters from readers, who could provide a growing corpus of commentary as the book made its way through different groups of readers."

**Synopsis**

Darnton's essay calls for a new form of historical scholarship that electronic publishing might make possible.


**Excerpt**

"Like every human medium of communication, digital media have been developed to perform tasks that were too difficult to do without them. Hypertext and simulations, the two most promising formats for digital narrative, were both invented after World War II as a way of mastering the complexity of an expanding knowledge base. . . . The earliest vision of hypertext reflects the classic American quest--a charting of the wilderness, an imposition of order over chaos, and the mastery of vast resources for concrete, practical purposes." (90-91)

**Synopsis**

Murray's book explores how narrative and narrative forms have changed in the electronic medium. She examines various electronic narratives, from games to simulations and other forms of cybernarrative. Murray emphasizes the importance of four characteristics of electronic narratives--spatial, participatory,
procedural, and encyclopedic.


Excerpt

"A cybertext is a machine for the production of variety of expression. . . . The study of cybertexts reveals the misprision of the spacio-dynamic metaphors of narrative theory, because ergodic literature incarnates these models in a way linear text narratives do not." (4)

"Cybertext, then, is not a 'new,' 'revolutionary' form of text with capabilities only made possible through the invention of the digital computer. Neither is it a radical break with old-fashioned textuality, although it would be easy to make it appear so. Cybertext is a perspective on all forms of textuality, a way to expand the scope of literary studies to include phenomena that today are perceived as outside of, or marginalized by, the field of literature--or even in opposition to it, for (as I make clear later) purely extraneous reasons." (18)

Synopsis

Aarseth argues that cybertexts constitute a wide range of texts from ancient to modern and digital. The digital technologies represent only an extension of a kind of literature, ergodic literature that requires physical acts on the part of the reader.


Excerpt

"Historians continued to believe in the moral and literary virtue of a clear, instructive narrative, but also cherished a newer desire for critical discussion of the sources." (220)

"Wise historians know that their craft resembles Penelope's art of weaving: footnotes and text will come together again and again, in ever-changing combinations of patterns and colors. Stability is not to be reached. Nonetheless, the culturally contingent and eminently fallible footnote offers the only guarantee we have that statements about the past derive from identifiable sources.... Only the use of footnotes enables historians to make their texts not monologues but conversations, in which modern scholars, their predecessors, and their subjects all take part." (223)

"Sadly, the footnote's rise to the status of standard scholarly tool has been accompanied -- in many cases -- by its stylistic decline to a list of highly abbreviated archival citations." (228)

"Only the use of footnotes enables historians to make their texts not monologues but conversations, in which modern scholars, their predecessors, and their subjects all take part." (234)

Synopsis

Excerpt

"Traditional developmentalism is being criticized for being a Western product that perpetuates social and spatial inequality because it is market-driven, technology-based, resource-intensive, and undemocratic. . . GIS utilization for research, planning and project assessment has generally come to be seen as a technicist legitimation of the historical power relations associated with traditional developmentalism." (196)

"Through the Eastern Transvaal case study, we argue for a participatory process of social transformation which employs advanced digital technology. Our argument for a participatory GIS is intended to demonstrate a GIS application where local knowledge, community needs, and specific social histories are appreciated and incorporated into the development process, and 'expertise' is viewed as interactive." (197)

Synopsis

Trevor Harris, et al.'s approach to GIS in South Africa land reform history seeks to broaden the application of historical GIS to include traditional knowledge and history of relatively powerless peoples, to create what the authors call a "participatory GIS." The authors contend that GIS is not inherently undemocratic technology, but argue that by expanding its inclusive capability GIS can serve wider interests.

Relationship

Harris et al.'s approach confronts some similar problems in our work--how to incorporate "local knowledge" or other kinds of information into a spatial analysis.

Richard G. Healey and Trem R. Stamp, "Historical GIS as a Foundation for the Analysis of Regional Economic Growth," Social Science History (Fall 2000)

Excerpt

"Therefore, GIS meets the requirements for making operational the methodological approach outlined in the previous section. In the first place, it enables the location of economic activity and other geographical constraints to be quantified in a consistent and comprehensive way, to provide what one might call a "controllable description" of the geographical aspects of the phenomena being studied. By this phrase we mean that the investigator can analyze the extent to which specific geographical constraints apply to different data layers: for example, how proximity to transportation infrastructure affects different types of industrial plants. In addition, the precise plants affected in different ways can be identified individually, so the impact of the constraints on their decision making and their productive

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activities can be investigated more specifically. Not only does geography matter, but GIS makes it much easier to determine the precise extent to which it matters in varying locations. This is a crucial point. The mathematical theory behind GIS gives a sound basis for the analytical operations it can perform. These analytical operations are designed to address precisely the kind of factors that nonspatial economic analysis must disregard because of its very assumptions, never mind its methodology. GIS is therefore an ideal complement to adjustment theory, providing comprehensive rather than partial investigation of processes of regional economic development."

Synopsis

Healey and Stamp argue for the use of historical GIS as a methodology for testing regional economic development and present findings in two case studies: the growth of railroads in the U.S. to 1900 and the development of the anthracite coal industry in Pennsylvania in the 19th century. The authors present an argument for undertaking a regional and local analysis of economic development and using the locational attributes of data to develop spatial approaches to questions of regional economic dynamics.


Excerpt

"Redlining during the middle decades of the twentieth century was a more complicated process than many historians have appreciated, in part because the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was neither the only nor the first lending organization to make maps with symbolic red lines." (88)

Synopsis

Hillier uses GIS to bring more precision to an investigation of mortgage lending in Philadelphia in the 1930s and 40s. She tests historians arguments that the federal Home Owners' Loan Corporation helped cause disinvestment in low-income, mixed-use areas of American cities, and in the process institutionalized an already existing practice of "redlining." Credit risk was determined by mapping on the basis of neighborhoods. Hillier found that "neither the security grade nor the property's proximity to a red area explain differences in the total number of loans it received or in the loan-to-value ratio." Private lenders, she found, did not categorically refuse to lend to those within or near the red lines.


Excerpt

"This chapter asks the same question posed by New Dealers during the Depression and by Worster and Hurt: what natural and human factors contributed to the dust storms of the 1930s? It uses different methods and evidence than earlier studies and explores the question at a regional scale." (95)

Synopsis
Cunfer examines the causes of the Dust Bowl, using historical GIS techniques and methodologies. He finds that drought, not overplowing or the ways people used the land, was the main cause for the storms.

**Humphrey Southall, Ian Gregory, and Paul Ell, Great Britain Historical GIS Project, 2002**

**Excerpt**

"The Great Britain Historical GIS is not simply an old map, or a collection of old maps. As far as possible it is a record of change, and in particular a record of changing boundaries, which has been assembled from a combination of old maps and also textual records of change. For example, an official report tells us that a particular district had its boundary changed on the 1st of January 1905, while two separate maps show boundaries in 1901 and 1908. Our system stores ALL of this information, including the date of the change, so it can construct an accurate map of the district for ANY date, not just 1901 and 1908. Exactly how we do this is explained in the description of the Mark I GIS, but the important point is that our system is not simply a base map for the historian -- it can be used as a base map generator, creating maps for a wide range of dates, types of unit and parts of the country."

**Synopsis**

Southall, Gregory, and Ell have developed this massive online historical GIS project containing ranges of data at the parish level in Great Britain from the 1830s forward for researchers.

**Robert M. Schwartz, Railways and Population Change in Industrializing England: An Introduction to Historical GIS June 22, 1999**

**Excerpt**

"The social and economic transformation of nineteenth-century England and Wales is the classic example of western industrialization and urbanization. Viewed from the perspective of social and environmental history, this transformation provides an interesting way to examine the impact of new technology on past human and physical environments. One far-reaching example is the steam-powered railroad system which grew to reach nearly all corners of England and Wales from its beginning in the 1830s to its apogee on the eve of World War I. The landscape of the Victorian City was a monument to the railway age, with its huge train stations and rail yards, together with the great earthworks and tunnels that the rail network required. To its stations, moreover, came more and more individuals and families who were moving to town in search of better opportunities, leaving the countryside behind and villages in decline.

Did the railways facilitate migration from countryside to town? What was the timing, extent, and geography of rural depopulation? Did rural men and women migrate in similar patterns? Thanks to GIS methods, all of these questions can be taken up more effectively now than was previously possible."

**Synopsis**

Schwartz's online class exercise applies historical GIS methods to examine questions of migration and
The basic model is one of integration and flexibility. Rather than many different web resources using different systems, the digital library integrates all these various resources of different media and different databases into a single integrated architecture. This entails powerful searching facilities across these different resources, standard interfaces, and in general built in interoperability across resources. This is further reinforced by using standard classification systems across the entire library, as well as the integrated presence of collections, references and tools. In addition, there is maximum flexibility of the data and resources contained by the digital library. Instead of resources being locked into one software system, or one style of presentation, everything - whether a text, a map, image, video, audio recording or database record - sits in the system as an independent, discrete object. These objects then can be used in different ways, as well as combined and detached from each other in accordance with different software functions and needs.

Synopsis

David Germano and a team of researchers in Religious Studies at the University of Virginia have created a digital library of Tibetan culture and history. The digital library uses FEDORA ("Flexible Extensible Digital Object Repository Architecture") to build system-wide integration. Germano has also developed a full GIS of Tibet with multimedia documentation of Tibetan places and events, and textual ethno-historical analysis of Tibetan places and events.

Excerpt

"While it is hard to see power in the possession of a soil map, or politics in the measurement of atmospheric temperature, there are real ethical issues arising from many applications of GIS: a technology that can be used to promote democracy can also be used to deny it. The gerrymandered 1992 electoral map of North Carolina was designed by a GIS to empower minorities, but previous generations would have seen the creation of such an engineered district as an extreme abuse of the electoral process." (34)

"Thus geographical data modeling is the set of rules used to create a representation of geography in the discrete, digital world of a computer database. The human mind uses a myriad of poorly understood methods for structuring geographical knowledge; it is GIS's supreme conceit that one can structure a useful representation of geographical knowledge in the absurdly primitive domain of the digital computer, just as it is cartography's conceit that one can accomplish the same objective with pen and
paper. Yet clearly there are areas of human activity—finding underground pipes, tracing the ownership of land, navigating through unfamiliar cities, managing forests—where it can be done with satisfaction."

(36)

**Synopsis**

Goodchild argues for research to advance the technology beyond its limitations and to study the impact technology has on the organizations that use it.

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**John Pickles, "Representations in an Electronic Age: Geography, GIS, and Democracy,"**  

**Excerpt**

"Since electronic information technologies provide more information and faster access across broader spans of space, they are presumed to be technologies that are liberating. Such a mythos of public benefit accruing from the ability to gain access to new and broader forms of data, and to represent this data spatially in a wide array of images, has been instrumental in the adoption of the new telematics within universities, planning agencies, environmental bodies, and the corporate and business world." (20)

**Synopsis**

Pickles traces some of the arguments within the discipline of geography over the use and practice of GIS. Some geographers have embraced the technology while others have seen it as an "instrumental reassertion in a discipline that has fought hard to rid itself of notions of space as the dead and the inert." Pickles argues that GIS needs a "critical theory" that understands the technology within the broader set of economic and cultural relationships defined by power, business, markets, and academic pressures.