Historiography

Espen Aarseth, *Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). [Citation: Key = H063]

Excerpt

"A cybertext is a machine for the production of variety of expression. . . . The study of cybertexts reveals the misprision of the spacio-dynamic metaphors of narrative theory, because ergodic literature incarnates these models in a way linear text narratives do not." (4)

"Cybertext, then, is not a 'new,' 'revolutionary' form of text with capabilities only made possible through the invention of the digital computer. Neither is it a radical break with old-fashioned textuality, although it would be easy to make it appear so. Cybertext is a perspective on all forms of textuality, a way to expand the scope of literary studies to include phenomena that today are perceived as outside of, or marginalized by, the field of literature--or even in opposition to it, for (as I make clear later) purely extraneous reasons." (18)

Synopsis

Aarseth argues that cybertexts constitute a wide range of texts from ancient to modern and digital. The digital technologies represent only an extension of a kind of literature, ergodic literature that requires physical acts on the part of the reader.

Thomas B. Alexander, "Antebellum North and South in Comparative Perspective: A Discussion," *American Historical Review* 85 (1980): 1150-1154. [Citation: Key = H008]

Excerpt

"Professor Pessen has long held that wealth is the best single indicator of social class and of power, that wealth in the antebellum United States was very badly distributed, that highly undesirable class distinctions were embedded in the system, and that an image of extensive economic and social mobility is unjustified." (1151)
"The problem of rural intergenerational mobility, either associated with or apart from geographical mobility, moreover, has hardly been touched and may be beyond reach. And, for the substantial proportion of rural nonfarm population for whom real income is elusive, we just do not yet have adequate evidence that wealth was 'the surest sign of social, as well as of economic, position' (page 1130), unless only great wealth is meant." (1151)

"In 1860, the Northern county median in population density had about thirty-two persons per square mile; 95 percent of the Southern counties were lower in density of white residents. Apart from the extreme frontier states of 1860, the median county in every Southern state had a white population density below that of the median county of any Northern state (except that Maryland was tied with Illinois). Such relative dispersion of Southern whites may well have resulted in important sectional distinctions in economy, social structure, or concentrations of power." (1152)

Synopsis

Alexander criticizes the secondary sources on which Pessen rested his argument, and considers these sources too limited, focused more on town than rural life. Alexander points specifically to population density as a key difference between the sections, one that needed explanation and elaboration.

Relationship

Alexander's criticism focused on Pessen's summary of the literature on wealth distribution by Gavin Wright and Lee Soltow. We find similar distribution of wealth in Augusta and Franklin, a finding that confirms Pessen's view and supports Wright's and Soltow's analysis of wealth and income. Our findings also support, however, Alexander's argument that population density may have created divergent social structures.

Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). [Citation: Key = H052]

Excerpt

"Voting in antebellum America was not so simple an act after all, and high voter turnout, as all the foregoing evidence tells us, did not necessarily indicate a widespread and deep engagement in politics on the part of the American people. What it may more powerfully indicate, indeed, is the extraordinary achievement of American political parties in mobilizing voters, some of whom were ignorant of, uninterested in, skeptical about, or even averse to political affairs. . . . Where we differ from most interpretations is in the relationship between the parties and the American electorate. The parties, we argue, developed their elaborate structures and techniques for nominating candidates, devising platforms, conducting campaigns, and maximizing election-day turnout, not from the political passions of a uniformly engaged citizenry, but in response to the very variations of engagement we have been describing." (79)

"We were able to locate on the census manuscripts 88 of the 110 men who played a visible role in their political party on the county level or higher. Of these, a third were professionals (twenty-five lawyers and four physicians), five-eighths were merchants, manufacturers, planters and other businessmen, and
one-twentieth were clerical workers. Not one was a skilled or unskilled worker, or even an independent handworking artisan, despite the fact that more than 42 percent of the adult white male workforce in Richmond County was made up of such workers and artisans. (Lawyers comprised 28 percent of the group, and 2 percent of the general workforce.) More than half reported property that placed them within the highest wealth decile in the county, and more than three-fourths placed within the highest quintile. Moreover, the few men who reported little or no property were, for the most part, young businessmen and professionals, and included several young lawyers and planters still living in the homes of their wealthy (and politically active) parents." (90-91)

"What [our data] do tell us is that the institutionalized party system in Augusta contained an extraordinary concentration of lawyers, partisan publishers, officeholders, and rich merchants and planters at its activist core." (91)

"Political friendship was premised on the existence of a relatively closed and continuous fraternity of like-minded and similarly active men, drawn in part from the local community and in larger part from other communities across the county and state." (118)

Synopsis

Altschuler and Blumin examine parties and the political process in the nineteenth century and look intensively at eight communities in the pre-Civil War period. Their study concentrates on how the parties tried to shape the political process and on the level and nature of party activism within these communities. They find that at the local level party politics did not divide the leaders of either commercial ventures or social institutions. They find a shockingly low level of both participation and political activism in these places, and they argue that politics occupied a tenuous "space" within the lives of ordinary Americans. Politics, they suggest, did not enter everything in American society and life in these years. Instead, it competed for the attention of Americans who viewed parties as rude, base, self-aggrandizing institutions, far from the virtuous and altruistic presence in their lives of religion, civic duty, republicanism, and liberalism. Altschuler and Blumin consider these competing arenas "constellations" within the lived experiences of Americans. They consider slavery a "peculiar issue," a special force operating from outside the political parties system to upset it and rejuvenate it at the same time.

Relationship

Altschuler and Blumin are concerned primarily with explaining Americans' engagement with the political process at the local level. We agree that politics only represented one sphere of Americans' lives and that many other parts of their lives competed with politics for attention and action. We also agree with Altschuler and Blumin that parties extended the machinery of a national and regional network into the local communities. While they see slavery as an issue that developed outside of the political arena and was brought into it, we emphasize instead the way differences in the social logic of communities, in the lived experiences of Americans, led to deep division over slavery as a political issue. They identify party activists in much the same way as we do--they scour the newspapers of their communities for names and build a list of identified activists.

**Excerpt**

"To the extent that theoretical or applied economic analysis can imply something about the subtleties of human behavior, this study suggests that southerners indeed were different from their Yankee brethren. But it need not imply, as generations of scholars have claimed, that they were irrational beings or that theirs was a precapitalist economy mired in an ignorant devotion to slave agriculture. . . . Their differences were a matter of degree, of speed of response and adjustment." (163)

"There is enough evidence of racially integrated factories to discredit any belief that whites universally shunned firms that employed slaves. . . . integrated work forces occurred commonly in the extractive and transportation industries, but were also found in "textile mills." (88)

"Fortunately, we need not rely on opinion, qualitative arguments, or scattered evidence to see that slaves were successfully employed in manufacturing and, more important, that many who were not employed in manufacturing were nonetheless capable of being so. There is ample evidence of their being used in manufacturing. (82)

"The absence of available substitutes gives a firm monopoly power whatever its absolute size in the market it serves. When buyers have no alternatives from which to choose, the seller gains price control. In this sense, monopoly power probably existed throughout the antebellum southern manufacturing markets." (145) "While the aggregate size of [the South's] industrial economy may have been sufficiently large, the region was not a unified market, but was composed of many small, local markets." (144)

"Given the antebellum South's poor overland transport facilities, its widely dispersed and predominantly rural population, the nature of most of its manufactured products (heavy, low-valued relative to weight, natural resource intensive), its sales distribution methods, and the imperfect information channels, one could anticipate in this era that for most products even a state market definition would overstate actual market size as viewed by most buyers and sellers." (146)

**Synopsis**

Bateman and Weiss seek to explain the lack of Southern manufacturing and industry on the eve of the Civil War. They conclude that Southern manufacturing was not entirely backward or lacking in capital formation, but that planters and slaveholders did not participate in industrial enterprises at a high rate, despite the high returns that manufacturing produced for investors. They argue that Southerners were "exceptionally averse to risk, were not knowledgeable about the benefits of diversification, failed to alter their expectations in the light of accumulating evidence on the greater profitability of manufacturing, or attached unagreeably high social costs to industrial diversification." (161)

**Relationship**

Bateman and Weiss adopt methods similar to ours for examining the linkages between slaveholders and
industrial enterprises. We agree with Bateman and Weiss that Southern industry was far from backward or lacking in capital formation, but we find no evidence to support the idea that Southern leaders were averse to risk or that they perceived a social stigma to investing in industries. In our study the most successful planters were also engaged in related low-skill industries, such as distilling or lumbering.

Lloyd Benson, "Planters and Hoosiers: The Development of Sectional Society in Antebellum Indiana and Mississippi," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1990. [Citation: Key = H002]

Excerpt

"Without slavery the North became differentiated and complex in the ways that the South could not. The North's highly populated countryside could support a tight mesh of factories, canals, and railroads not possible in the South." (22)

"The most crucial economic differences between Indiana and Mississippi were not as much a consequence of ideology as of structural circumstances. Not a lack of entrepreneurial values, but a slavery-induced limitation on the local market size prevented Mississippi from becoming a commercial, urban, and middle class society as did Indiana." (187)

Synopsis

Benson's study describes the Southern state as more localized, atomized, and locally uniform than the Northern state, and he posits a localistic culture in the South compared to an institutional, structural culture in the North. One important difference between the two places was their relative ability to sustain businesses within local communities. Benson points to extensive landholding in the Southern communities and the consequences of consistent out-migration. Slavery, he suggests, determined the difference between these communities in ways more structural than ideological. Benson's study finds that the most competitive counties had the largest number of schools and newspapers, the greatest diversity of churches, the least inequality in agricultural landholding, and the highest population density. (278)

Relationship

Benson's dissertation helped lay the foundations for our own study, demonstrating the benefits of disciplined statistical analysis of sectional societies. Like Benson, we focus on the material contexts in which cultural expression and political action operated.

Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800 (London: Verso, 1997). [Citation: Key = H076]

Excerpt

"The development of slavery in the Americas "was associated with several of those processes which have been held to define modernity: the growth of instrumental rationality, the rise of national sentiment and the nation-state, racialized perceptions of identity, the spread of market relations and wage labour,
the development of administrative bureaucracies and modern tax systems, the growing sophistication of commerce and communication, the birth of consumer societies, the publication of newspapers and the beginnings of press advertising, 'action at a distance' and an individualist sensibility." (4)

Synopsis

Blackburn describes the evolution of the Atlantic system of slavery in an international context, emphasizing the crucial role slavery played in the emergence of modern Europe.

Relationship

The patterns Blackburn sees as intrinsic to the foundational years of Atlantic slavery we see still present centuries later on the eve of the American Civil War. Indeed, many of those structures were stronger in 1860 than they had ever been before.

Paul Bourke and Donald Debats, Washington County: Politics and Community in Antebellum America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). [Citation: Key = H056]

Excerpt

"First, we emphasize the nature of institutional rules for voting in the traditional electorate, and second, we stress the bearing that individual-level information can have on wider questions of popular engagement in past political life." (6)

"In these and many other ways that we explore in this study, the individual-level information available in the poll books of Washington County has enabled us to refine the picture of the traditional electorate derived from aggregate returns. We are able to take account of the fact that system-wide cues at the top of the ticket produced higher turnouts; that socio-economic differences served chiefly to distinguish voters from nonvoters; that socio-economic, cultural, and demographic factors separated partisan leaders but that these distinctions fell away in the wider electorate. None of this gives us warrant for generalizing about the policy issues that engaged state legislatures and the Congress; it does, however, help us to develop a sharper sense of the culture of those to whom policy cues were directed." (15)

"Those who were active in political organization in the 1850s understood what is now apparent to us: that the divisions that stratified the politically active faded out in the larger population, to be replaced by another stratification that looked more like a surveyor's map." (281)

"We have sought to present Washington County as a political culture in which rich and poor, members of all the county's Protestant communities, and men of all regional groups and all ages were to be found in the electorate on both sides of the general political contest. Although wealth did not distinguish between partisans, it did distinguish between consistent voters and those who voted irregularly or not at all." (249)

"It is difficult from general social profiles to work out the relationship of the visibles to the mass of the
electorate. Although that relationship remains elusive, the groupings of voters that we have observed suggest affinities structured more around spatial than social attributes." (246)

"Somewhat to the edge of the world of intense ideological commitment defined by the regular partisans, was the mass of people--more concerned, we may surmise, with ordinary life, prone from time to time to abstain from the big choices, to abandon party, and even to join the opposition. What determined which of these diverging actions they would take or the degree to which they would align themselves completely with the visible partisans cannot be known for particular individuals in any but a few random cases. But what may be recovered of the culture in which these people lived suggests that the physical and social networks to which they belonged provided the essential settings in which their choices about everything else, including politics and public affairs, were made." (322)

Synopsis

Using a statistical program called RISK, Bourke and Debats try to piece together the salient variables that affected individual voting in an antebellum Oregon community. They find a subtle, modest, and perhaps mysterious connection between partisan choice and general social indicators, such as wealth, region of birth, marital standing, length of residency, age, occupation, and religious adherence. They also find that variables added together formed no coherent picture of partisan voting and socio-economic position. These variables "wash out" in the general electorate, and Bourke and Debats assert that consistent participation in the electoral process characterized those who had a stake in the community, for the most part the wealthy. The groupings of partisanship, then, were more spatial than social, as clusters of family and neighbors committed to partisan men around them.

Relationship

We cannot address the issue of permanence and mobility in this study of 1860, but the Valley of the Shadow project's archive indicates that wealth, status, and longtime residency coalesced into political authority. We have not tested for family structures and neighborhood partisanship, as Bourke and Debats did, but we do find spatial partisanship in both counties. Bourke and Debats also find that political affiliation was a part of a larger cultural and social matrix, "one experience among many that defined the lives of people who resided in a particular locality." (275) We agree with Bourke and Debats that the physical and social networks of the community set the context of its choices in public affairs.

Vernon O. Burton, *In My Father's House Are Many Mansions: Family and Community in Edgefield, South Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985) [Citation: Key = H012]

Excerpt

"By examining variations in family culture and structure, both black and white, free and slave, this study attempts to specify which elements in those variations are race specific and which derive from the general social and cultural environment that affected whites and Afro-Americans equally. *In My Father's House* searches for the origins of the prejudices and stereotypes of southern black and white families and explores what difference family and community made in the course of events in
nineteenth-century Edgefield." (13)

"Neighborhoods within the various areas of Edgefield were often centered around church buildings, and the boundaries of these settlements, or communities within the larger community, were areas served by the church." (21)

"In 1860 there was one church building for every 252 white people in Edgefield." (21-22)

"Compared to the Northeast and Midwest, with their emphasis on towns and urban developments, the South was a land of farms and plantations. The county or district, not the town, was the unit of government. But towns did exist, and townlike centers dotted the rural countryside. Towns and villages provided economic and political focus for the countryside." (28)

"Southern elite families began to feel a need for increased privacy. The houses provided privacy through controlled access, and unlike the inhabitants of common houses, husbands and wives on the great plantations had their own bedrooms and apartments." (39)

"Average size and number of farms is deceiving. The number of farms operated by landowners actually decreased and when one excludes farms with no reported acreage, the average farm size increased from 1850 to 1860." (41)

"The census statistics on literacy for Edgefield, however, also suggest that most white Southerners were literate, though a striking correlation existed between illiteracy and poverty on the eve of the Civil War." (89)

Synopsis

Burton's detailed study of Edgefield, South Carolina, examines family, religious, class, and social structures to understand the differences and similarities between blacks and whites in the nineteenth-century community. Burton finds that the main difference was between the "town-dwelling black family and all the rest, black and white." Burton locates family patterns in the context of political power, pointing out that as black Republicans were defeated at the end of Reconstruction, for example, the incidence of female-headed black families increased in the towns. Black men, he discovers, continued their patriarchal authority in the rural areas. Exclusion from nonagricultural employment, then, not legacies of slavery or Africa, according to Burton, kept men from heading households in these urban places.

Relationship

Burton's finding (48) that rich and poor whites lived in proximity to one another corresponds to Augusta County. Burton's emphasis in his study is on social structures--especially family and kinship--and how they change over time, not on the Civil War, politics, or the relationship between structures and events. Our study concentrates, instead, on the social and economic logic of the communities by which they would align themselves in the flow of events. Edgefield's proportion of slaveowners in 1860 was nearly double that of Augusta, though the distribution of slaves and slaveownership in Augusta was more concentrated in the smaller slaveholders (fewer than 10 slaves). Despite these distinctions, Burton's study of Edgefield's family and social structures corresponds to ours, though there were many important differences. Edgefield was bigger than Augusta in 1860 and had a majority black population. But both
places cultivated industries, were organized around small towns and villages with a county seat of roughly the same size, built elaborate road and railroad infrastructures, nourished a growing professional class, harbored steep inequities in wealth distribution, devoted most of their resources to agriculture, and practiced widespread slavery.

Vannevar Bush, "As We May Think," *Atlantic Monthly* (July 1945) [Citation: Key = H060]

Excerpt

"Consider a future device for individual use, which is a sort of mechanized private file and library. It needs a name, and to coin one at random, "memex" will do. A memex is a device in which an individual stores all his books, records, and communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility. It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory.

It consists of a desk, and while it can presumably be operated from a distance, it is primarily the piece of furniture at which he works. On the top are slanting translucent screens, on which material can be projected for convenient reading. There is a keyboard, and sets of buttons and levers. Otherwise it looks like an ordinary desk.

In one end is the stored material. The matter of bulk is well taken care of by improved microfilm. Only a small part of the interior of the memex is devoted to storage, the rest to mechanism. Yet if the user inserted 5000 pages of material a day it would take him hundreds of years to fill the repository, so he can be profligate and enter material freely.

Most of the memex contents are purchased on microfilm ready for insertion. Books of all sorts, pictures, current periodicals, newspapers, are thus obtained and dropped into place. Business correspondence takes the same path. And there is provision for direct entry. On the top of the memex is a transparent plate. On this are placed longhand notes, photographs, memoranda, all sort of things. When one is in place, the depression of a lever causes it to be photographed onto the next blank space in a section of the memex film, dry photography being employed.

The owner of the memex, let us say, is interested in the origin and properties of the bow and arrow. Specifically he is studying why the short Turkish bow was apparently superior to the English long bow in the skirmishes of the Crusades. He has dozens of possibly pertinent books and articles in his memex. First he runs through an encyclopedia, finds an interesting but sketchy article, leaves it projected. Next, in a history, he finds another pertinent item, and ties the two together. Thus he goes, building a trail of many items. Occasionally he inserts a comment of his own, either linking it into the main trail or joining it by a side trail to a particular item. When it becomes evident that the elastic properties of available materials had a great deal to do with the bow, he branches off on a side trail which takes him through textbooks on elasticity and tables of physical constants. He inserts a page of longhand analysis of his own. Thus he builds a trail of his interest through the maze of materials available to him. . . . And his trails do not fade."

Synopsis

Bush sought to chart the future of physics and science in the post-war, post-atomic age. He directed the
Randolph B. Campbell, "Planters and Plain Folk: Harrison County, Texas, as a Test Case, 1850-1860," *Journal of Southern History* XL (No. 3), (1974): 369-398. [Citation: Key = H006]

Excerpt

"This study of antebellum society in microcosm supports the planter-dominance rather than the yeoman-democracy view of the Old South. There were more landholding farmers and nonslaveholding farmers in 1860 than in 1850 in Harrison County, but there were also many more slaveholding planters. And the position of small farmers and nonslaveholders relative to large operators and slaveholders declined in every category of agricultural wealth and production during the 1850s. . . Overall, there is certainly more empirical evidence of an economy dominated by planters than for one of rough equality among yeoman farmers. The question of political democracy is more complex, but there too the evidence points toward planter domination and a monopoly of leadership by the wealthy." (391-392)

"Where nonslaveholders were a minority of the class of small corn producers in 1850, they had become a sizable majority by 1860." (380)

"The proportion of small farmers and nonslaveholders relative to large operators and slaveholders declined in every category during the 1850s. This condition is especially noticeable in the production of the primary cash crop, cotton. It appears that as Harrison County's agricultural economy matured small producers became even less important in the market economy." (383)

"Clearly, a substantial degree of inequality existed, especially in the distributions of slaves and cotton, among Harrison County's farmers during the antebellum period." (386)

"Thus, those citizens of Harrison County who exercised leadership and influence in public affairs during the 1850s lived in a society marked by significant concentration of agricultural wealth and were themselves well above average in all aspects of wealth and property." (390-391)

Synopsis

Campbell argues against the yeoman-democracy thesis of Frank L. Owsley and his students that a large middle class operated "typical" Southern farms and that these smaller farmers (often nonslaveholders) owned land comparable in quality and size to slaveholders. Campbell's evidence from a county study in Texas suggests that in the 1850s planters did move to dominate the best land and "pushed out" nonslaveholding smaller farmers. Campbell uses U.S. census data, linking individuals and households across agriculture, population, and slaveholding schedules. Campbell points out that even small producers of corn declined in their position relative to the planters of Harrison County in the 1850s.

Relationship

The debate between the Owsley school emphasizing "plain folk democracy" and the Genovese interpretation stressing "planter hegemony" may have run its course. Drew Gilpin Faust's 1987 review of
the literature in *Interpreting Southern History* suggests that such arguments might be an "anachronistic oversimplification." We do not find in Augusta the planter dominance of the best soil that Campbell sees in Harrison County, Texas; however, we do not compare 1850 and 1860 to measure this change over time. We both find political domination of the leadership by the wealthy.

**Daniel W. Crofts, *Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secessionist Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). [Citation: Key = H014]

**Excerpt**

"Those who consider North and South utterly distinct and antagonistic by the late antebellum period will find this book an unmistakable challenge. The evidence presented here shows that many northerners and southerners believed that sectional differences were negotiable and looked forward to peaceful perpetuation of the Union. Upper South Unionists, the particular focus of this study, often embraced northern values. They expected the upper South's economy to develop increasing resemblance to the North's rather than to the deep South's. To be sure, the outbreak of war in April galvanized irreconcilable nationalisms North and South, including a defiant sense of southern separateness. But until that fateful juncture, the upper South spurned secession. Moderates both North and South outnumbered the antagonistic minorities in each section who fed on each other, gradually eroding the center. An undoubted majority of Americans preferred that the center hold and expected it to do so." (xix)

"Although Breckinridge gained the support of most upper South Democrats, his nomination appeared to some the work of deep South extremists. In certain localities such as the Memphis area of southwest Tennessee and the famed Tenth Legion of the Virginia Democracy in the Shenandoah Valley, party organizers supported Douglas rather than Breckinridge." (77)

"The election returns revealed that voters in the upper South had clung to traditional party allegiances. . . John Bell carried traditional Whig strongholds such as Loudoun, Augusta, and Kanawha counties. Lincoln's vote was confined to a few counties in the far northwest. Several clusters of Douglas strength-around Petersburg and in parts of the Shenandoah Valley and the northwest-prevented Breckinridge from carrying normally Democratic Virginia." (81)

"Do the ossified voting patterns mean that people in the upper South regarded the election as routine? Certainly not. Many southerners feared that a Republican president would destroy southern rights or tarnish southern honor. Others feared that a reckless southern response to his election would prove self-fulfilling. But a conviction persisted among southerners of various persuasions that danger could be overcome by voting for familiar and trusted party nominees." (82, 86)

**Synopsis**

Crofts' book focuses on the three "populous and pivotal states" of North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, attempting to combine an analysis of the Upper South in late 1860 and early 1861 with an analysis of the Republican Party's response to Upper South Unionism. He concludes that "one must take into account both slaveholding and previous patterns of party allegiance to understand why the upper South and lower South took such different stances during the months after Lincoln's election (xvi)."
Crofts identifies "three waves of change" that swept over and fundamentally reshaped the upper South's political contours. The first wave of the secessionist movement differed in the Upper South from the Lower South in that it did not "dislodge any state from the Union (xvii)." Rather, the call for secession created an "explicitly antisecession countermobilization," resulting in a second wave of change that "swept away the popular underpinnings of secession in February 1861 (xvii)." Unlike the Lower South, the persistence of the Whig opposition party in the upper South, Crofts asserts, "provided institutional barriers against secession." The third wave arose with Lincoln's proclamation calling for troops on April 15, which immediately engulfed Upper South Unionism. Crofts writes that "original and converted secessionists joined hands to defend southern honor and constitutional principles against what they perceived as corrupt, tyrannical opposition (xviii)."

**Relationship**

We share Crofts' interest in the upper South unionists; however, we do not consider the constitutional principles as critical to their decision as Crofts does. Instead, our analysis emphasizes slavery's dominant and pervasive role in the Upper South and its importance in shaping the social logic of Upper South Unionism.

**Excerpt**

"Available evidence plainly indicates that Cobb and other party loyalists received sectionally divisive cues from the party's cosmopolitan elite." (172)

Democratic secessionists "included almost all of the . . . cotton growers in the county." (176)

"All but one of the eight local voting districts in Southampton had a definite partisan identity." (178)

"The regional polarization of the vote within Southampton in early 1861 was accompanied by a record polarization between slaveholders and nonslaveholders." (179)

The data "suggest that the interconnected influences of family, neighborhood, partisanship, slaveholding, agricultural production, and religious affiliation combined to generate markedly different responses within a single county during the great crisis of 1860-61." (186)

**Synopsis**

Crofts analyzes individual voting returns for Southampton County from the 1840s through the election of 1860 and the secession votes in 1861. Crofts finds that the most salient determinate for voting seemed to be geographical location. His analysis divides the county into two halves--one upper section, where whites outnumbered slaves and were generally small and medium landholders, voted Whig by a two-to-one majority, and the other lower section, where slaves and free blacks outnumbered whites and whites were either big landholders or landless workers, who voted strongly Democratic. Neighborhoods with sharp wealth skew tended to be strongly Democratic, while those with a more even smallholding
demographic tended to be Whig. According to Crofts, the 1860 presidential election vote in Southamptoo followed a pattern established for years, but the secession voting created a much more polarized electorate. Secession, he argues, increased the division between the upper and lower county and the highest polarization ever between slaveholders and nonslaveholders.

**Relationship**

We do not find the kind of clear division in Augusta that Crofts found for Southampton--one section of the county committed to growth and Whiggery, another largely planter dominated and Democratic. Crofts' geographic argument accounts mainly for the division he sees between upper and lower Southampton, while ours systematically tests for the salience of a variety of geographic variables. We found a strong presence for slavery across Augusta, unlike Crofts for Southampton. On the other hand, we do see in 1860 voting patterns that the areas of concentrated Democratic voting were also ones with high levels of slaveholding and wealth.

**Geoff Cunfer, "Causes of the Dust Bowl," in Anne Kelly Knowles, ed., Past Time, Past Place: GIS for History (Redlands: ESRI Press, 2002): 93-104. [Citation: Key = H068]**

**Excerpt**

"This chapter asks the same question posed by New Dealers during the Depression and by Worster and Hurt: what natural and human factors contributed to the dust storms of the 1930s? It uses different methods and evidence than earlier studies and explores the question at a regional scale." (95)

**Synopsis**

Cunfer examines the causes of the Dust Bowl, using historical GIS techniques and methodologies. He finds that drought, not overplowing or the ways people used the land, was the main cause for the storms.


**Excerpt**

"In the case of history, a discipline where the crisis in scholarly publishing is particularly acute, the attraction of an e-book should be especially appealing. Any historian who has done long stints of research knows the frustration over his or her inability to communicate the fathomlessness of the archives and the bottomlessness of the past. If only my reader could have a look inside this box, you say to yourself, at all the letters in it, not just the lines from the letter I am quoting. If only I could follow that trail in my text just as I pursued it through the dossiers, when I felt free to take detours leading away from my main subject. If only I could show how themes crisscross outside my narrative and extend far beyond the boundaries of my book. Not that books should be exempt from the imperative of trimming a narrative down to a graceful shape. But instead of using an argument to close a case, they could open up new ways of making sense of the evidence, new possibilities of making available the raw material embedded in the story, a new consciousness of the complexities involved in construing the past."
"I am not advocating the sheer accumulation of data, or arguing for links to databanks—so-called hyperlinks. These can amount to little more than an elaborate form of footnoting. Instead of bloating the electronic book, I think it possible to structure it in layers arranged like a pyramid. The top layer could be a concise account of the subject, available perhaps in paperback. The next layer could contain expanded versions of different aspects of the argument, not arranged sequentially as in a narrative, but rather as self-contained units that feed into the topmost story. The third layer could be composed of documentation, possibly of different kinds, each set off by interpretative essays. A fourth layer might be theoretical or historiographical, with selections from previous scholarship and discussions of them. A fifth layer could be pedagogic, consisting of suggestions for classroom discussion and a model syllabus. And a sixth layer could contain readers' reports, exchanges between the author and the editor, and letters from readers, who could provide a growing corpus of commentary as the book made its way through different groups of readers."

Synopsis

Darnton's essay calls for a new form of historical scholarship that electronic publishing might make possible.

Charles B. Dew, Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001). [Citation: Key = H044]

Excerpt

"The commissioners sent out to spread the secessionist gospel in late 1860 and early 1861 clearly believed that the racial fate of their region was hanging in the balance in the wake of Lincoln's election. Only through disunion could the South be saved from the disastrous effects of Republican principles and Republican malevolence. Hesitation, submission—any course other than immediate secession—would place both slavery and white supremacy on the road to certain extinction." (80)

"In setting out to explain secession to their fellow Southerners, the commissioners have explained a very great deal to us as well. By illuminating so clearly the racial content of the secession persuasion, the commissioners would seem to have laid to rest, once and for all, any notion that slavery had nothing to do with the coming of the Civil War. To put it quite simply, slavery and race were absolutely critical elements in the coming of the war." (81)

Synopsis

Dew uses the speeches of the secession commissioners to examine the reasons these Southern secessionists gave for secession. These men emphasized in their speeches that Republican victory meant racial equality, racial amalgamation, and race war. Dew's narrative is aimed mainly at those who think slavery was not a causative factor in the coming of the war (relying instead on explanations such as states' rights). This book shows just how openly the secession commissioners linked slavery with the reasons for secession.

Relationship

-341-
Dew's book differs from our article in several important respects. Mainly, his book examines the rhetoric of the secession commissioners but not how it was received in Virginia. Our article explores the fundamental social logic by which some of that rhetoric might resonate with Augusta residents and Virginians generally and why much of it did not.

Carville Earle, "A Staple Interpretation of Slavery and Free Labor," *Geographical Review* LXVIII (1978): 51-65. [Citation: Key = H003]

Excerpt

"Slavery was headed to the North in the wake of a corn economy." (52)

"The decisive factor in the farmer's choice of either slave or free labor came down to the annual labor requirements of his staple crop: crops such as wheat, which required only a few weeks of attention, lent themselves to wage labor; whereas crops such as tobacco or cotton, which demanded sustained attention during a long growing season, lent themselves to slave labor." (51)

"The economically rational antebellum wheat farmer almost always employed wage labor because the few days of labor required times the daily wage rate usually fell below the cost of slaves." (55)

"Wheat was produced more efficiently with freemen than with slaves." (56)

"By the mid-1850s, slave labor probably was less costly than free labor in the production of corn, a multiple-day staple crop." (62)

Synopsis

Earle argues that slavery was economically effective only when applied to staple crops such as cotton and tobacco. He distinguishes between the intensive need to attend to these staple crops and other crops such as wheat which demanded intense bursts of attendance for short durations. Slavery was efficient for the former and wage workers for the latter. Earle traces the change in agricultural production in the Eastern Shore of Maryland in the eighteenth century from tobacco to wheat and in the Lower Midwest in the nineteenth century from wheat to corn. Earle characterizes corn as a crop requiring fairly intense cultivation and as easily adaptable to the efficiencies of slave labor. He argues that in the Lower Midwest the transition to corn brought with it pressure to use slave labor in these border states and made the region a key battleground over slavery in the 1850s.

Relationship

We agree with Earle that slavery was used across a range of crops, especially corn. While wheat required fewer man-hours and was not as efficiently produced with slave labor, its production was only part of a larger economy in Augusta. Earle's calculation of slavery's utility in wheat production does correspond to our findings. We found that the most successful Augusta plantations were slave-based and concentrated in relatively higher wheat production, but that wheat production on average in Augusta was not nearly as productive as in Franklin. In corn production, a more labor-intensive crop, Augusta's farmers, both slaveholders and nonslaveholders, were far more productive than their Franklin
counterparts.

Stanley L. Engerman, "Antebellum North and South in Comparative Perspective: A Discussion," *American Historical Review* 85 (1980): 1154-1160. [Citation: Key = H009]

Excerpt

"However similar the motivations of planter capitalists and industrial capitalists, however efficiently each section followed its comparative advantage, and however rapidly both sections were growing economically, one section included a slave-based agriculture and the other had, in addition to a commercial agriculture based on family farms, a developing industrial sector based upon wage labor. One section was more influenced by planter-slaveowners, the other more by merchant and industrial capitalists. These features affected the structure of society and led, for example (as Pessen notes), to certain restrictions on what was politically acceptable. Thus, beneath the structural similarities and some important similarities in motivation, behavior, and belief, there remained key differences, in desired policies and in the sources of wealth. These differences, even with some basic similarities in belief and behavior, in conjunction with the importance of attitudes toward race and slavery, had obvious implications for national political and social life." (1159)

"Pessen points to, but does not emphasize, certain differences, possibly crucial in the antebellum period, possible of potential subsequent importance. Underlying these differences is, of course, the role of slavery in Southern society—the differences between one section with a population over one-third black, mostly enslaved, and most productively used in plantation agriculture, and the other with less than 2 percent of the population black and relatively few enslaved." (1159)

Synopsis

Engerman disagrees with Edward Pessen's conclusion that the South and North were more similar than different and that their similarities had as much to do with the coming of the Civil War as their differences. Engerman argues that Pessen discounts the role slavery played in establishing baseline differences between the sections that became the crucial determinants in the coming of the war.

Relationship

Engerman notes that the trend in scholarship (agreeing with Pessen) has been toward less emphasis on differences between the sections and more on their similarity, especially in the area of economics. Engerman, though, points out that much of the scholarship to that point was not comparative but instead based on separate analysis of only one of the sections. Engerman argues that only comparative analysis will enable more definitive answers to the question of difference and similarity between North and South on the eve of the Civil War.


Excerpt
"What were the conditions that permitted the economic arguments against slavery to become so much more effective in the mid-1850s than they had been in the 1830s or 1840s? The question is puzzling since the period 1843-1857, during which the economic critique of slavery rose to preeminence, is often portrayed as one of vigorous economic expansion and general prosperity. . . . One part of the free U.S. population failed to share in this prosperity. These were the non-farm manual workers, especially those in the North, and especially the native-born skilled males." (354-355)

"Indeed, the whole period from 1840 to 1858 was one of hard times for native-born manual workers, broken only by three interludes. The longest of these extended from 1844 to 1846 or 1847; the other two (1851-1852 and 1856) were much weaker and briefer." (356)

"Not only was the decline in the real income of native workers large, but it persisted for nearly a decade. The worst phase of their depression came during 1853-1855. Those were years of substantial decline in the nonagricultural demand for labor, with sagging wages and widespread layoffs in construction, iron, and lumber." (358)

"By the eve of the Civil War life expectation was 10 years less than it had been just before the turn of the century and males born in 1860 reached final heights that were about 1.5 inches less than those born in the early 1830s." (360)

"Whether it was under the Know-Nothing label (as in Massachusetts), under the Republican label (as in Michigan), or under the fusionist label (as in Ohio and Indiana), disgruntled Whigs and Democrats were separated from the "protective" shields of the old party machines. (383)

"However, by 1860 ex-Whig supporters within the Republican party outnumbered the ex-Democrats by roughly 7 to 1. It thus appears that the Republicans were able to capture about half of the Democrats but virtually all of the Whigs who strayed into the Know-Nothing party. Indeed, since many Whigs remained loyal to their party in 1854 and 1855, the eventual Whig "catch" of the Republicans considerably exceeded the number who passed through the Know-Nothing movement. The bulk of the Whig voters were farmers, and it was farmers who constituted the bulk of the Republican vote. Moreover, the richer the farmers, the more likely they were to vote Republican." (384)

Synopsis

Fogel's book builds and extends his earlier work with Stanley Engerman in Time on the Cross. The book addresses many of the criticisms of their controversial work and more directly addresses the moral problem of slavery in American history. But Fogel's key argument in the development of the Republican Party and its successful national campaign in 1860 focuses on the "hidden depression" among Northern non-farm manual workers in the 1850s. He argues that these men represented about a quarter of the North's electorate and that they suffered from competition from immigrants, depressed wages, and declines in real income. At the same time, Fogel points out, prices for wheat, corn, and meat rose in the period on demand from shortages in Europe, making the non-farm worker poorer. He estimates the average decline in real income between 1848 and 1855 at 25 to 50 percent, and compares it to the economic misfortune in the Great Depression. These workers made up the key vote in the Republican column in 1860 and they were particularly receptive to Republican claims about the smothering role of the South and slavery in their present and future economic development.
Relationship

We agree with Fogel on the need to explain how the Republican Party's economic critique of slavery as damaging to white workers could have appeal in the expanding economy of the 1850s. Fogel's emphasis on the native non-farm workers and the hidden depression is persuasive. In Franklin County, however, the position of these workers in 1860 was not so tenuous as those he describes, and most were likely to have some property. The appeal of the Republicans' critique of slavery came not so much because financially strapped voters were receptive to it out of a sense of frustration but instead because the appeal accorded with the electorate's social experience. In communities across the North, as in Franklin County, the greatest concentrations of wealth lay in the rural agricultural areas not the cities and towns.

Eric Foner, "The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions," Civil War History 20 (September 1974): 197-214. [Citation: Key = H051]

Excerpt

"While rightly rejecting the economic determinism of progressive historians, the new political historians seem to be in danger of substituting a religious or cultural determinism of their own. Indeed, the interpretive framework of the new school is strikingly similar to that of the progressives. Both pose a sharp distinction between 'real' and 'unreal' issues, both put thousands of persons in the quasi-conspiratorial position of concealing their real intentions, and both take an extremely limited view of individual motivation. . . . But the new interpretation leaves a yawning gap between political processes and the outbreak of war." (200-01)

Synopsis

Foner gives an overview of the major schools of interpretation on the causes of the Civil War--"the new political history" and the "modernization thesis." Where new political historians, according to Foner, substitute religion and ethnicity for class determinism, modernization historians reduce the conflict to an "industrial" or "modern" (usually ill-defined) North versus an agricultural or "pre-modern" South. Foner suggests that neither approach sufficiently address the social history of North and South. He argues that little is known about the rank-and-file Republicans, Democrats, Northerners, and Southerners, about the everyday citizens and their relationship to politics. Foner emphasizes that American society as a whole was highly competitive and individualistic, and that any explanation of the Civil War must combine social and political approaches, taking account of how social and economic structures affected political ones and how events occurred in the wider context of these structures.

Relationship

Foner's study has influenced all historians of the sectional conflict, including us. Though he restricts his analysis to the level of ideology and politics, Foner demonstrated that white Northern men voted for the Republicans because the ideology of the party resonated so deeply with their own experiences and expectations. Despite our agreement, however, we find that Democrats shared much of the economic ideology of the Republicans, including a belief in the virtues of free labor for white men. A higher-resolution view of Northern communities such as Franklin reveal the importance of ethnic,
spatial, and generational differences as well as suggestions of at least subtly different notions regarding the welfare of black Americans.


**Excerpt**

"When I speak of the Republican ideology, therefore, I am dealing with the party's perception of what American society, both North and South, was like in the 1850s, and its view of what the nation's future ought to be." (5)

"The irrepressible conflict view is also weak when it centers on the moral issue of slavery, particularly in view of the distaste of the majority of northerners for the Negro and the widespread hostility toward abolitionists. Moral opposition to slavery was certainly one aspect of the Republican ideology, but by no means the only one, and to explain Republicans' actions on simple moral grounds is to miss the full richness of their ideology. And the revisionists can be criticized for denying altogether the urgency of the moral issue, and for drastically underestimating the social and economic differences and conflicts that divided North and South." (5)

"At the center of the Republican ideology was the notion of 'free labor.' This concept involved not merely an attitude toward work but a justification of ante-bellum northern society, and it led northern Republicans to an extensive critique of southern society, which appeared both different from and inferior to their own. Republicans believed in the existence of a conspiratorial 'Slave Power' which had seized control of the federal government and was attempting to pervert the Constitution for its own purposes. Two profoundly different and antagonistic civilizations, Republicans thus believed, had developed within the nation, and were competing for control of the political system." (9-10)

**Synopsis**

Foner's book argues that the Republican Party's ideology centered on the concept of "free labor" and "the creation and articulation of an ideology which blended personal and sectional interest with morality so perfectly that it became the most potent political force in the nation." (309) Foner treats ideology as pervasive, a systemic feature of nineteenth-century politics. By examining the way Republican ideology posed a threat to the very foundations of Southern society and economy, Foner suggests, we can see the root causes of the Civil War. Free labor, Foner contends, was so important to Republicans because it defined the right of white, laboring, productive citizens to enter the market with their skills, an ideology in direct confrontation with slavery. Free labor ideology helped bring conservatives closer to radicals in the party, as over time they came to see free labor linked inextricably to free soil and free men.

**Relationship**

We agree with Foner's explanation of Republican ideology and of the driving importance of it both in Franklin and in Augusta. Foner downplays the importance of race prejudice and of nativism in the rise of the Republicans to national power, and we find in Franklin evidence to support him. While there was significant racial prejudice in Franklin and Republicans there did little to make the moral case for ending
slavery, there was a connection between black activism and the victories of the Republicans. Nevertheless, Foner's emphasis on ideology as principally motivating the Republicans leaves aside the social context of local communities.

**William W. Freehling, The Reintegration of American History: Slavery and the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). [Citation: Key = H055]**

**Excerpt**

"With slavery swiftly concentrating southward and slowly fading northward, different social attitudes and political priorities developed. Lower South slaveholders came to call slavery a probably perpetual blessing, while Border South masters persistently called the institution a hopefully temporary evil. So too Lower South political warriors cared more about perpetuating slavery that the Union, while Border South leaders would compromise on slavery in order to save the Union." (182-183)

**Synopsis**

Freehling's essays in this volume emphasize the geographic split in the South between the Lower South, the Middle South, and the Border South. He defines the Middle South as Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, and the Border South as Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Freehling considers slavery in the nineteenth century increasingly nonviable in the Middle and Border regions, arguing that slaves were being sold to the Lower South in what he calls a "slave drain." (181)

**Relationship**

We disagree with Freehling's general thesis of Middle South slippage in its commitment to slavery and his geographical determinism. Instead, we emphasize slavery's adaptability in Virginia and the way social and economic institutions took shape around it.

**William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854, Volume 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). [Citation: Key = H037]**

**Excerpt**

"The Border South produced over half of Dixie's industrial products. The lower South produced less than a fifth. In 1850 the Border South's Baltimore, St. Louis, and Louisville ranked first, third, and fourth in order of size among southern cities, with a combined population of almost 300,000. The lower South's three largest cities, New Orleans, Charleston, and Mobile, ranked second, fifth, and seventh in Dixie, with a combined population well short of 200,000. The three leading Border South cities, despite twice as many whites as Gulf counterparts, possessed only a fourth as many slaves. In cities and in the countryside, the Border South melted into a North-South twilight-zone, more like Chicago than Charleston, more akin to midwestern grain farms than to southwestern cotton plantations." (19)

"South Carolinians also disliked Virginia gentlemen's tone on slavery. Vague approval of ending bondage, assuming proper conditions, could be heard under proper circumstances in proper Virginia.
drawing rooms. Proper circumstances meant no 'outside agitators' present. Right conditions meant removal of free blacks. But Virginia squires occasionally speculated that their blacks might someday be diffused to Africa or drained to the south, with whites streaming to Virginia to take slaves' place. Lowcountry South Carolinians, in contrast, could not conceive that whites would stream toward malarial swamps." (31)

"If the southward sale of slaves continued--and in the 1850s the slave drain increased--the plantation South could shrivel over many decades into a handful of Deep South states. As the Upper South's slaves drained away, the region's inhabitants would be freer to suspect that slavery and democracy were alien, freer to feel a greater commitment to permanent Union than to permanent slavery, freer to side with Illinoisans rather than with South Carolinians. If half the South gradually became more than half-northern in commitment, an ever demographically blacker, ever geographically shrinking North American slave empire was bound to feel holed up, hemmed in, at the northern majority's mercy." (24)

Synopsis

Rather than viewing the South as a monolith, Freehling emphasizes the South's diverse and at times contradictory nature by focusing on sub-regional differentiation. He believes the Lower South was ultimately radicalized because of its distrust of the Upper South's position on the expansion of slavery. Freehling attempts to show "that two antithetical abstract systems, democracy and despotism, when forced to rub against each other in close Southern quarters, intriguingly intermeshed to shape not just politics but a world." (ix) He sees Texas's annexation as the "largest turning point on the road to disunion." (353) The issue consumed the Southern election of 1844, focusing attention for the first time on "which party's measures, not men, were most loyal to slavery." (561) The result was a "Southern Whig drubbing" from which the party never recovered, revealing a "profoundly endangered republic." (562) Freehling believes annexation was a pivotal victory for the "Slavepower." Not even the Kansas-Nebraska Act "made southern frontiers safer." (564)

Relationship

Freehling emphasizes what he calls a "slave drain" from the Upper South, especially from Virginia, to the Lower South, and he connects this demographic shift with a wider economic and political one--the loosening of the Upper South from its slavery moorings. The border region, Freehling asserts, was "a world between" with high numbers of free blacks, wide practice of slave hiring, and fewer enslaved people as a percentage of the population with each passing census year. (35) Freehling focuses on the development in the North of what he calls the Great Slavepower Conspiracy, the idea that whites feared the South because of its political power and domination, and extends the idea of the Slavepower into the border South, where, he argues, mountain residents resented the eastern, privileged elite. Although Freehling's study takes the events up to 1854, it considers Virginia as paralyzed in the early 1850s, attempting unsuccessfully to balance slavery and egalitarianism. (514) In Augusta County, however, the late 1850s witnessed dynamic growth hand-in-hand with persistent practice of slavery. Augusta residents wove slavery into nearly every economic aspect of their lives, and only a handful even considered attempting to disentangle it. No one in Augusta suggested that slavery was doomed in the long run or even that strategies for ending enslavement should be openly discussed. Even Joseph A. Waddell, whose diary revealed the Whig editor's privately held distaste for slave sales and his expectation of eventual end of slavery, never wrote publicly these sentiments, and stood with the slavery
system in the sectional crisis despite his misgivings.


Excerpt

"The southerners’ warm praise of the benefits of freedom and progress have led many able historians, reviewing these and other matters, to attribute to the slaveholders a basically bourgeois worldview to which they merely tacked on an opportunistic defense of slave property and racial stratification. These historians have found irresistible the invitation to conflate the slaveholders' searing ambivalence with the kind of moral objections to the social devastation attendant upon unregulated capitalist development that were being heard in London, Paris, New York, and Boston, as well as in Charlottesville and Williamsburg, Columbia and Charleston, Huntsville and Mobile. They err, for the slaveholders, unlike conservatives in the North and abroad, explicitly identified the free-labor system itself as the source of the moral evils and forged a critique that struck at its heart. With varying degrees of boldness, one after another came to view the freedom of labor as a brutal fiction that undermined the propertied classes' sense of responsibility for the moral and material welfare of society." (33-34)

Synopsis

Genovese argues that Southern intellectuals, long underestimated and ignored by modern historians, wrestled in the decades before the Civil War with the dilemma of how to couple slavery with freedom and progress in American society. It seemed to them almost a choice between a forward-moving society that embraced modernity and possibly lost slavery in the process, or a society which chose to embrace the order and stability of slavery over modern progress. Examining in detail several Southern intellectuals, Genovese asserts that these intellectuals overcame the dilemma by forming arguments that celebrated slavery as a bulwark against the worst excesses of unrestricted modern "progress." Unwilling simply to abandon progress, Southern intellectuals argued that slavery was in fact a social system uniquely suited to careful progress, that blacks were uniquely suited to slavery, and that the South's slave-based society provided more real freedom than the North's progressive "wage-slavery."

Relationship

Our study concentrates on the material worlds of slavery and free-labor communities, not on the intellectual histories of these ideologies. Slaveholders in Augusta had every reason to see slavery not as inconsistent with modern progress but vitally connected to it.

Eugene D. Genovese, "Yeomen Farmers in a Slaveholders' Democracy," *Agricultural History* 49, no. 2, (April 1975). [Citation: Key = H040]

Excerpt

"Plantation-belt yeomen either aspired to become slaveholders or to live as marginal farmers under the limited protection of their stronger neighbors. And there was nothing irrational or perverse in their
attitude. White labor was scarce and unreliable, at least if a farmer needed steady help. Any farmer who wanted to expand his operations and make a better living had to buy slaves as soon as possible." (338)

Synopsis

Genovese's article focuses on the question of why yeomen farmers maintained allegiance to the slaveholding elite, "a social order that objectively oppressed them in a variety of ways." (332) He argues that it is important to distinguish between yeomen farmers of the upcountry and those of the plantation belt. Upcountry farmers held allegiance to the slave South not because they were "ignorant" but because they rejected an "outside world which threatened to impinge on the culture as well as the material interests of the local community." (336) Plantation belt yeomen accepted their position not because of ignorance or "racial fears," but because "they saw themselves as aspiring slaveholders or as nonslaveholding beneficiaries of a slaveholding world, the only world they knew." (340) Slaveholders maintained this loyalty by placing the slavery question "beyond discussion," creating "mutually desired silence and limited intercourse." (341, 336) The democratic movement in the South during the Jacksonian era assisted in erasing the slavery question from politics, thereby guaranteeing the slaveholders' property base.

Relationship

In our county slavery seems to have penetrated all geographic regions--from mountains to valleys. In Augusta County we find that nonslaveholders and slaveholders alike were acting within a matrix of national and local affairs. Far from rejecting the outside world to protect their locality, Augustans found themselves interlocked within larger mechanisms. Their struggle was how to negotiate these complex and intricate connections.


[Citation: Key = H077]

Excerpt

"To the slaves, the white point of view looked a bit bizarre, and the very meaning of paternalism shifted to one of interdependence. If the master had a duty to provide for his people and to behave like a decent human being, then his duty had to become the slave's right. Where the masters preferred to translate their own self-defined duties into privileges for their people--an utter absurdity the illogic of which the most servile slave could see through--the slaves understood duties to be duties. Because they knew that their masters depended upon their labor, which they sometimes even preferred to think freely given despite the obvious coercion--hence their strictures to Fanny Kemble and Lucy Chase upon manual work--they felt that they had earned their masters' protection and care." (146-147)

"The slaveholders established their hegemony over the slaves primarily through the development of an elaborate web of paternalistic relationships, but the slaves' place in that hegemonic system reflected deep contradictions, manifested in the dialectic of accommodation and resistance. The slaves' insistence on defining paternalism in their own way represented a rejection of the moral pretensions of the slaveholders, for it refused that psychological surrender of will which constituted the ideological
foundation of such pretensions. By developing a sense of moral worth and by asserting rights, the slaves transformed their acquiescence in paternalism into a rejection of slavery itself, although their masters assumed acquiescence in the one to demonstrate acquiescence in the other.” (658)

Synopsis

Genovese describes the interaction between slaves and slaveholders on the plantation, arguing that slavery was always a negotiated space. American slavery was a pre-capitalist institution, Genovese asserts, and American slaveholders saw themselves as benevolent paternalists (rather than acquisitive capitalists) who held the best interests of their slaves at heart. The slaves themselves seized upon this fantasy of the planters as an opportunity to ameliorate the harshness of slavery and build some security into their own lives. By accommodating slaveholders' ideas of paternalism, enslaved people were able to control the pace of work, receive recognition for their marriages, and place various other limits on slaveholders' powers. Thus slaves used accommodation to resist the power of their masters, cultivating a unique and autonomous African-American culture within the plantation system.

Relationship

We share Genovese's emphasis on the complex adaptations that characterized the institution of slavery. In Genovese's interpretation the daily negotiations between accommodation and resistance, between submission and self-dermination, added up to a capacious and flexible system whose longevity and vitality was the result.

David Germano, The Tibetan and Himlayan Digital Library, 2002. [Citation: Key = H071]

Excerpt

"The basic model is one of integration and flexibility. Rather than many different web resources using different systems, the digital library integrates all these various resources of different media and different databases into a single integrated architecture. This entails powerful searching facilities across these different resources, standard interfaces, and in general built-in interoperability across resources. This is further reinforced by using standard classification systems across the entire library, as well as the integrated presence of collections, references and tools. In addition, there is maximum flexibility of the data and resources contained by the digital library. Instead of resources being locked into one software system, or one style of presentation, everything—whether a text, a map, image, video, audio recording or database record—sits in the system as an independent, discrete object. These objects then can be used in different ways, as well as combined and detached from each other in accordance with different software functions and needs."

Synopsis

David Germano and a team of researchers in Religious Studies at the University of Virginia have created a digital library of Tibetan culture and history. The digital library uses FEDORA ("Flexible Extensible Digital Object Repository Architecture") to build system-wide integration. Germano has also developed a full GIS of Tibet with multimedia documentation of Tibetan places and events, and textual ethno-historical analysis of Tibetan places and events.

Excerpt

"The American political system was particularly vulnerable to sectional strains and tensions. One reason was the institutional structure of American politics. The Civil War occurred within a particular political institutional framework that, while it did not make the war inevitable, was essential to the coming of the war." (84)

"There was nothing inevitable, however, about the rise of the Republican party. Another set of events in the 1850s might have led to a different outcome, and thus the historian must analyze these developments from the perspective of the time, with due allowance for chance and contingency, rather than reasoning backward from the war's beginning in 1861. The Republican party's growing strength did not foreclose the possibility of avoiding war, but it significantly narrowed the range of options and limited the ability of political moderates to defuse the slavery issue in national politics." (95)

"That the Republican party was not allowed to contest elections in the South also had important consequences. Popular hostility prevented Republicans from campaigning or running candidates outside the border slave states--a situation that increased misperceptions on both sides." (120)

"Politicians and editors rallied popular support by indulging in sectional stereotypes and sectional boasting. They also misinterpreted the aims of their opponents. But while politicians capitalized on and inflamed popular fears in both sections, these fears were not artificially created nor can they be dismissed as mass paranoia. There was a Slave Power which did wield unusual power in American life, and the Republican party did threaten southern interests and the long-term future of slavery." (121)

Synopsis

Gienapp points to elements in the U.S. Constitution that created opportunities to destabilize the American political system. The lack of clarity on the right of secession, the size of states, the creation of the electoral college, the four-year term for the President, and the voting practices of antebellum states combined in a way that produced a political realignment in the 1850s and helped make possible a civil war in the 1860s.

Relationship

Gienapp argues that the causes of the sectional conflict begin with "the existence of slavery." (82) Gienapp also argues that just as slavery became an political issue because politicians "injected" it into the political system, it also fueled a "crystallization of rival sectional ideologies oriented toward protecting white equality and opportunity." (83) Our work focuses intensely on that process of crystallization, which can only be understood through its constituent elements of social, economic, and political structures in local communities, all in interaction.

Excerpt

"While it is hard to see power in the possession of a soil map, or politics in the measurement of atmospheric temperature, there are real ethical issues arising from many applications of GIS: a technology that can be used to promote democracy can also be used to deny it. The gerrymandered 1992 electoral map of North Carolina was designed by a GIS to empower minorities, but previous generations would have seen the creation of such an engineered district as an extreme abuse of the electoral process." (34)

"Thus geographical data modeling is the set of rules used to create a representation of geography in the discrete, digital world of a computer database. The human mind uses a myriad of poorly understood methods for structuring geographical knowledge; it is GIS's supreme conceit that one can structure a useful representation of geographical knowledge in the absurdly primitive domain of the digital computer, just as it is cartography's conceit that one can accomplish the same objective with pen and paper. Yet clearly there are areas of human activity--finding underground pipes, tracing the ownership of land, navigating through unfamiliar cities, managing forests--where it can be done with satisfaction." (36)

Synopsis

Goodchild argues for research to advance the technology beyond its limitations and to study the impact technology has on the organizations that use it.

Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote: A Curious History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). [Citation: Key = H064]

Excerpt

"Historians continued to believe in the moral and literary virtue of a clear, instructive narrative, but also cherished a newer desire for critical discussion of the sources." (220)

"Wise historians know that their craft resembles Penelope's art of weaving: footnotes and text will come together again and again, in ever-changing combinations of patterns and colors. Stability is not to be reached. Nonetheless, the culturally contingent and eminently fallible footnote offers the only guarantee we have that statements about the past derive from identifiable sources. . . . Only the use of footnotes enables historians to make their texts not monologues but conversations, in which modern scholars, their predecessors, and their subjects all take part." (223)

"Sadly, the footnote's rise to the status of standard scholarly tool has been accompanied--in many cases--by its stylistic decline to a list of highly abbreviated archival citations." (228)
"Only the use of footnotes enables historians to make their texts not monologues but conversations, in which modern scholars, their predecessors, and their subjects all take part." (234)

Synopsis

Anthony Grafton has written a fascinating history of annotation that shows how central that practice is to all historical scholarship. He demonstrates that "in the course of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, . . . a long series of debates and discussions among writers, translators, and printers gradually yielded something like the modern system of documentation--even if the process did not then reach, and still has not reached, completion. Across Europe, writers and publishers collaborated more intensively than ever before, trying to make every aspect of the physical presentation of text mirror and guide the reader through its content. A revolution in book design took place, as those concerned with authorship and publication carried out experiments in layout and design, trying to make books physically as well as intellectually accessible."

Steven Hahn, *The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). [Citation: Key = H015]

Excerpt

"A comparative glimpse at the Black Belt casts that hierarchy into sharper relief, for there the setting was rather different. To begin with, the richest landowners held a larger while the poorest held a smaller share of the total real wealth. Indeed, the Upcountry bore a closer resemblance to much of the rural North in this regard. Even more striking were geographical distinctions in absolute wealth: the Black Belt elite was far more imposing than its Upcountry counterpart. Real estate holdings among the top tenth of Black Belt's landowners normally averaged well over $20,000; in the Upcountry they averaged well under $10,000." (25)

"Yet, the racial appeals of proslavery theorists can easily obscure the underlying tenets of their argument and, perhaps, the very meaning of race to different social groups. For whether one considers the doctrines of George Fitzhugh and Henry Hughes or those of others who offered less of a challenge to bourgeois sensibilities, the defenders of slavery ultimately rested their case, not so much on the innate inferiority of blacks--though they never hesitated to make this point--but on the inevitability of class distinctions and the consequent moral superiority of a system whose social relations were not beholden to the whims of the marketplace." (87)

"Yeoman farmers, especially in nonplantation areas, did not need to accept--and generally did not accept--the paternalist underpinnings of the proslavery argument to feel a certain affinity with its social and cultural premises." (89)

"And it was not simply a penchant for local autonomy that enabled yeomen to feel a certain commonality of interest with the elite. Whatever the complex meanings of state rights, all parties clearly recognized that, as a political ideology, it served to defend slavery. That numerous Upcountry farmers owned slaves and that nonslaveholders occasionally hired them explains part of this proslavery sentiment. That others who had little direct involvement with the institution followed suit suggests that
the slavery issue tapped deeper concerns and fears. Those concerns and fears reflected the status of yeoman farmers as petty property holders and their staunch belief that property ownership formed the foundation of their independence. Thus, the planters struck a responsive chord when they argued that abolitionism threatened not only slave but all property." (108)

Synopsis

Rather Populism itself, Hahn's book examines the "experiences leading to and . . . informing" the Populist 'moment.' (10) His analysis of these experiences focuses on the transformation of social relations and confrontations in the context of a market economy penetrating into a Georgia Upcountry society of "different organization and sensibility." Yeomen in this society owned their farming operations and resources, relied on household labor, and maintained "a distinctive sort of contact with the labor market." (49) Hahn argues that relationships of "production and exchange, the habits of mutuality, the common use-rights, and the customs of inheritance" encouraged anticommercial sentiments along with a "general authoritarianism" that created deep-seated animosity toward the slaveholding class. (85) By convincing the white citizenry of their common stake in slavery, slaveholders "implicitly questioned the loyalties of the lower classes and exposed their fears of social conflicts." (85) Though yeomen expressed "complex reasons" for defending the Confederacy, "the requirements of defending a nascent slaveholders' republic brought those conflicts to the surface." (85) In the Civil War's wake arose an exploitative credit system, tied to changing local, national, and international markets, that held yeomen to staple agriculture. This situation led to political unrest in the Upcountry during the 1880s, fueling the "fires of Southern Populism." (152) The experience of an expanding agricultural market, railroad construction, and rising land values at this time all led to an increasing concentration of wealth. Hahn argues that "impersonal forces" were not responsible for the Upcountry's absorption into the national and international market, rather it "was accomplished, in large part, by landlords and, especially, by merchants who sought to make the best of postwar conditions, to extend the realm of staple agriculture, and to reap profits," resulting in heightened yeomen animosity towards local storekeepers, landlords, and Northern capitalists. (169) Hahn ultimately sees the controversy over fence law as the pivotal force that "galvanized budding antagonisms" and "paved the road to Populism." (240)

Relationship

In important ways, Hahn's Upcountry counties were similar to Augusta. Enslaved persons made up one-fifth of the population in the Upcountry, just as in Augusta. The railroad clustered development in the region, as in Augusta. Hahn, however, considers the world of the Upcountry "one in which production and consumption focused on the household, in which kinship rather than the marketplace mediated the most productive relations, in which general farming prevailed and family self-sufficiency proved the fundamental concern." (29) Hahn's argument concentrates on antebellum Upcountry resistance to any intrusion of the marketplace and on the postbellum railroad development which shattered an independent, yeoman household economy. In Hahn's analysis slavery was less significant for the way it transformed the economy and organized a social logic in support of itself than for the manner it provided common ground for slaveholders to meet nonslaveholders. We find in Augusta that slavery's role in economic development was central and as driving as the railroad. Augusta's social logic manifested few expressions of resistance to the market or fears of dependence. Instead, slavery appeared to catalyze market forces, and Augustans eagerly looked for opportunities to take advantage of these
forces.


**Excerpt**

"Traditional developmentalism is being criticized for being a Western product that perpetuates social and spatial inequality because it is market-driven, technology-based, resource-intensive, and undemocratic. . . GIS utilization for research, planning and project assessment has generally come to be seen as a technicist legitimation of the historical power relations associated with traditional developmentalism." (196)

"Through the Eastern Transvaal case study, we argue for a participatory process of social transformation which employs advanced digital technology. Our argument for a participatory GIS is intended to demonstrate a GIS application where local knowledge, community needs, and specific social histories are appreciated and incorporated into the development process, and 'expertise' is viewed as interactive." (197)

**Synopsis**

Trevor Harris, et al.'s approach to GIS in South Africa land reform history seeks to broaden the application of historical GIS to include traditional knowledge and history of relatively powerless peoples, to create what the authors call a "participatory GIS." The authors contend that GIS is not inherently undemocratic technology, but argue that by expanding its inclusive capability GIS can serve wider interests.

**Relationship**

Harris et al.'s approach confronts some similar problems in our work--how to incorporate "local knowledge" or other kinds of information into a spatial analysis.

Richard G. Healey and Trem R. Stamp, "Historical GIS as a Foundation for the Analysis of Regional Economic Growth," *Social Science History* (Fall 2000.) [Citation: Key = H066]

**Excerpt**

"Therefore, GIS meets the requirements for making operational the methodological approach outlined in the previous section. In the first place, it enables the location of economic activity and other geographical constraints to be quantified in a consistent and comprehensive way, to provide what one might call a "controllable description" of the geographical aspects of the phenomena being studied. By this phrase we mean that the investigator can analyze the extent to which specific geographical constraints apply to different data layers: for example, how proximity to transportation infrastructure affects different types of industrial plants. In addition, the precise plants affected in different ways can
be identified individually, so the impact of the constraints on their decision making and their productive activities can be investigated more specifically. Not only does geography matter, but GIS makes it much easier to determine the precise extent to which it matters in varying locations. This is a crucial point. The mathematical theory behind GIS gives a sound basis for the analytical operations it can perform. These analytical operations are designed to address precisely the kind of factors that nonspatial economic analysis must disregard because of its very assumptions, never mind its methodology. GIS is therefore an ideal complement to adjustment theory, providing comprehensive rather than partial investigation of processes of regional economic development." (584)

Synopsis

Healey and Stamp argue for the use of historical GIS as a methodology for testing regional economic development and present findings in two case studies: the growth of railroads in the U.S. to 1900 and the development of the anthracite coal industry in Pennsylvania in the 19th century. The authors present an argument for undertaking a regional and local analysis of economic development and using the locational attributes of data to develop spatial approaches to questions of regional economic dynamics.

Sam Bowers Hilliard, Hog Meat and Hoecake: Food Supply in the Old South, 1840-1860 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972). [Citation: Key = H005]

Excerpt

"Not always linked directly to all human activity in this area, cotton was the main force behind its culture and economy. It enriched the planter, impoverished the soil, made big farmers out of little ones and planters out of farmers. . . . Finally, it sustained the institution of slavery, making it a central element of the regional society and economy." (19)

"It is obvious that a description of the South as having been either 'self-sufficient' or 'dependent upon the West for food' would be unrealistic. From North Carolina to Louisiana, a number of agricultural 'regions' existed with each solving its problem of food supply as its situation, resources, and predilections permitted. In this respect the South differed little from other large sections of the country. But there is no justification for seeing the antebellum South as an area of such concentration on staple export agricultural production that it had to import most, or even much, of its food. As a region, it was, despite the exceptions noted, largely feeding itself." (235)

"Unlike corn, small grain production was far from universal in the South nor was it important when compared to corn." (160)

"The increase in the number of counties showing high ratios from 1850 to 1860 appears to reflect a strong renaissance in wheat growing throughout the Hill South." (168)

"The census manuscripts indicate that landholding size was much less significant than location in determining corn/cotton ratios." (151)

Synopsis
Hilliard examines the U.S. Census agricultural schedules for the South and built estimates of Southern patterns of consumption to test whether the region was so specialized in staple crops that it was not self-sufficient. Hilliard finds that landholding size was not as significant as location in determining the mix or ratio of staple crop and corn in the South. He observes that the heaviest corn production areas were in the hill country and that internal markets allowed corn grown in these regions to support intense cotton agriculture elsewhere. Hilliard estimates that Southern corn producers did not achieve the yields of their counterparts in the Northwest, but on a per capita basis produced a relatively high volume.

**Relationship**

We share Hilliard's interest in crop mixes and ratios as important measures of regional economic and social patterns. Hilliard points out that between 1840 and 1860 Virginia caught and then surpassed Pennsylvania in wheat production and that it was always ahead in per capita production. (166) Virginia, he finds, was the largest wheat producer in the South both in volume and per capita production (8.2 bushels per capita in 1860)—only Maryland and the old Northwest states out-produced Virginia. Hilliard maintains that despite this turn to wheat production in Virginia as the dominant staple crop, corn remained the primary agricultural commodity, as it was in the rest of the South. While Southern corn growers were not able to match the yield of the Northwest growers, Hilliard finds, they were able to produce a higher volume per capita. Augusta's mix of corn and wheat production match Hilliard's description for the kind of mix across the South in other regions with staple crops.


**Excerpt**

"Redlining during the middle decades of the twentieth century was a more complicated process than many historians have appreciated, in part because the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was neither the only nor the first lending organization to make maps with symbolic red lines." (88)

**Synopsis**

Hillier uses GIS to bring more precision to an investigation of mortgage lending in Philadelphia in the 1930s and 40s. She tests historians' arguments that the federal Home Owners' Loan Corporation helped cause disinvestment in low-income, mixed-use areas of American cities, and in the process institutionalized an already existing practice of "redlining." Credit risk was determined by mapping on the basis of neighborhoods. Hillier found that "neither the security grade nor the property's proximity to a red area explain differences in the total number of loans it received or in the loan-to-value ratio." Private lenders, she found, did not categorically refuse to lend to those within or near the red lines.

*Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). [Citation: Key = H022]*

**Excerpt**
"There would have been no Civil War without an underlying sectional conflict, but a specific chain of political events and politicians' decisions both aggravated that conflict and explain why the war started in April 1861. And among the most important links in this chain of causation were the decisions and developments that put the Whig party in its grave." (984)

"Although the often self-consciously respectable, God-fearing, church-going, sober middle classes in towns and cities across the nation also tended to be Whig, . . . the party could never have dominated almost every city in the country or the small towns and prosperous agricultural regions that constituted the core of its strength if only the social elite and smugly fastidious middle classes composed it." (951)

"To a large but not exclusive extent, therefore, explaining the Whig party's expiration requires explaining the shifting relationships after 1844 between the forces of interparty conflict and intraparty division. The diminution of the first and exacerbation of the second together did alienate Whig voters, provoke their defection, and thereby contribute to the problem of 'not enough people.'" (954)

"Sectional division was not the only thing that destroyed the Whig party and drove it to its grave. But the death of the Whig party clearly contributed to the outbreak of the war, if only by clearing the way for and, in the form of essential northern Whig converts, aiding the rise of the Republican party as the major opponent of Democrats in American political life." (981)

"For over thirty years, the accepted interpretation of the war's coming in the academy has been that it resulted from basic social, economic, and ideological differences between the sections deriving from the presence of African-American slavery in the South and its absence from the North. In its cruder--and more common--formulation, the 'forces' that caused the war were self-generating and operated toward their inevitable conclusion almost without the need of human agency. And most certainly, this argument goes, specific political leaders cannot be held accountable for the war since the sectional conflict producing it involved mass public opinion and sensibilities growing out of different economic and social systems, not something as epiphenomenal as politics." (982)

Synopsis

Holt meticulously tracks the rise and fall of the Whig Party at the national, state, and local levels. Holt wants to explain how the Whig Party could so completely disintegrate in the 1850s. His analysis concentrates on the party structures in the localities and states, where Holt finds the party suffered from weak interparty conflict and strong intraparty divisions.

Relationship

As in other works by Holt, we see a commanding understanding of the complex workings of the American political machinery. Like Holt, we believe that machinery had its own momentum and dynamics that prevented any party from serving as a mere projection of its voters' economic or ethnic identities. Unlike Holt, we believe that slavery drove much political action and contributed centrally to the collapse of the two-party system.

Michael F. Holt, *The Political Crisis of the 1850s* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992). [Citation: Key = H018]
"The basic objective of Republican campaigns from 1856 to 1860, therefore, was to persuade Northerners that slaveholders meant to enslave them through their control of the national government and to enlist Northern voters behind the Republican party in a defensive phalanx to ward off that slavery, and not in an offensive crusade to end black slavery." (191)

"When the Second Party System collapsed in the South, however, new frameworks of two-party competition for national, and more important for state offices did not emerge with equal strength everywhere. Interparty competition remained fairly close in most of the upper South states, so that both contending parties seemed to be legitimate alternatives to control the government. Within the states of the lower South, however, the Democratic party achieved such dominance after the Whigs collapsed and Know Nothingism faded that they became virtual one-party polities. In terms of confidence in the political process, which rested on the presence of perceived and viable party alternatives, the Deep South states had approached the status of South Carolina by 1860. This fact may have been why Yancey thought that secession as an antiparty movement could succeed in the cotton states alone." (230-231)

"Most important, however, the core of the secessionist persuasion was aimed at the same republican values of Southerners that Republicans appealed to among Northerners. Although the secessionists and their allies did, indeed, warn of the dangers of abolition and escalate demands concerning slavery in the territories, the essence of their appeal had less to do with black slavery than with protecting the rights of Southern whites from despotism. The central issue was neither race nor restriction, but republicanism. Where Republicans had located the antirepublican monster in the Slave Power conspiracy, secessionists identified it with the Republican party, which they labeled a threat to self-government, the rule of law, Southern liberty, and Southern equality." (240)

Synopsis

This is a study of the breakdown of the Second American Party System and the coming of the Civil War. Holt counters the argument that sectional tension over slavery prior to April 1861 "produced war between [North and South] after that date." (2) He believes such an interpretation fails to explain why a prolonged conflict produced war then and not at another time. Crucial to his study is not what pitted North against South but rather "how the nation could contain or control that division for so long and then allow it suddenly to erupt into war." (3) Holt argues that the key to Civil War causation can be found in the collapse of two-party system. Further, this collapse "aggravated and in part reflected a loss of popular faith in the normal party political process to meet the needs of voters." (4) He believes that a "deep-seated republican ideology," which sought to protect the equality and liberty of whites from aristocratic privilege and tyranny, shaped and intensified the political crisis during this time. The conflict boiled over because each section saw the other "as the subverter of republicanism. . . bent on perverting the traditional basis of society and government." (6) Sectional extremism and, eventually, war resulted because there was no "framework of two-party competition. . . to help restore public confidence that republicanism could once again be secured by normal political methods." (6)

Relationship

Holt's analysis covers the national political events of the 1850s and their culmination in the secession
crisis. While we agree with much of Holt's analysis, our emphasis on the fundamental difference that slavery made between North and South differs from Holt's interpretive assumption that the sections were not fundamentally different. Holt argued that the sections were intrinsically similar because of their shared republican ideology and political system; only the breakdown of the political system explained the divergence of the sections into Civil War. Holt further claimed that "the sectional conflict over slavery had been crucial in causing the Civil War, but the basic issue had less to do with the institution of black slavery than has been thought." (258) Holt's emphasis on the politics of slavery as an "abstract status men hoped to escape, a status they equated with the end of republican government" confined slavery's role in a way that our analysis does not.


Excerpt

"Recently, however, historians have begun to point out that politics often involves the whole fabric of human interrelationships and that political alignments are frequently shaped by local social and economic factors which do not appear in formal national or state party platforms. What is needed to discover and evaluate the importance of these factors, they persuasively argue, is a more comprehensive 'social analysis' of political history." (2)

"By 1860 the leadership of the opposing parties had also changed considerably from that of the Whigs and Democrats in the late 1840s . . . the Republican and Democratic leaders by 1860 came from much more similar backgrounds . . . [they] tended to come from the same socioeconomic groups . . . Republicans continued to be almost exclusively Protestants while a large proportion of Democrats were Catholics. . . Aside from this notable difference in religious background, however, the leaders of the two parties were remarkably alike." (291)

"In many ways then the votes for and against Lincoln in 1860 did not result from a single campaign but represented the continuation of a division which had occurred earlier." (302)

"In the years between 1856 and 1860 resistance to slavery extension alone could not sustain the Republican party in Pittsburgh. What interested the city's voters in these years was not Catholic aggressions, slavery, the South, or Kansas, but their own difficulties with railroads and tax increases." (309-310)

"The appeals and voting behavior in Pittsburgh create doubts about how much the moral issue of slavery shaped political patterns in the North in the 1850s. First, it is unclear that sectional and party differences grew out of a fundamental cleavage over the morality of slavery. Not the oppression of the slave, but slavery extension which threatened to bring the hated Negro into the territories and which apparently involved Southern aggression on Northern rights seems to have been the major popular grievance against the South in the North. Second, it is not certain that even sectional issues, let alone moral indignation, motivated Northern voters. Some local factors in Pittsburgh like the railroad tax crisis may have been unique, but in almost every city of the North local conditions may also have importantly shaped the nature of the Republican and Democratic parties." (312)
Synopsis

Holt examines the politics of the city of Pittsburgh and places it in the larger context of Pennsylvania and national party politics in the antebellum era. Holt argues that as the demographic profile of voters, especially the ethnoreligious profile, changed in the 1850s, the political parties became increasingly indistinguishable. In the beginning of the Second Party System Holt finds distinct differences between the Whigs and Democrats. Whigs were more likely to be middle and working class, native born, Protestant, and led by much wealthier leaders than the Democrats. Whig leaders were more connected to the business enterprises of Pittsburgh while Democrats were more likely to be lawyers and other professionals. In the climate of party convergence, he argues, the Republicans in Pennsylvania did not make a direct attack on slavery or its extension as a moral issue, but instead attacked the idea of slavery as a labor ideology--that it might eventually weaken the position of white working men in a free wage society. Holt finds that in Pennsylvania the tariff issue was not as important to voters as earlier historians have assumed, and that Pennsylvania prosperity in the late 1850s helped make the tariff less crucial in the election. Instead, Holt asserts that local issues explain the ways voters aligned in the state and national election--in Pittsburgh the railroad tax issue divided the electorate in ways more powerful than the extension of slavery issue.

Relationship

Holt's detailed study of Pennsylvania focuses on ethnocultural analysis of politics in the period leading up to the Civil War. It remains the closest analysis of politics and voting in an Northern border state. Our work examines geographical relationships more intensely than ethnocultural ones, though there is no doubt that ethnicity profoundly shaped party identity and loyalty in the North.

Kenneth E. Koons and Warren R. Hofstra, ed., After the Backcountry: Rural Life in the Great Valley of Virginia, 1800-1900 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2000). [Citation: Key = H053]

Excerpt

"Wheat organized economic life as well as social experience. It shaped directly the lives of those who produced it and indirectly the well-being of virtually every resident of the valley. Commercial wheat production served as the main catalyst for the growth of towns and for the establishment of commercial linkages with other regions."

Synopsis

Koons and Hofstra's edited collection of essays examines the nineteenth-century economic, social, religious, and cultural experience of residents in the Great Valley of Virginia. They argue that the Valley was dominated by wheat production, but they point out that wheat achieved its greatest predominance in the post-Civil War period. They suggest that the Valley constituted a regional "middle country," a place to pass through rather than to settle. They point out that slavery was readily adaptable to the mixed economy of the region, and they argue that it may have prevented the economy from growing in the antebellum period. The essays in this volume describe the settlement patterns and architectural practices...
of the region, finding that the Valley wealthy did not build large houses or elaborate estates on the model of the Tidewater planters. Instead, while they held slaves and practiced a dynamic commercial agriculture and mixed industry, they did not replicate the hierarchy or culture of the tobacco region. J. Susanne Simmons and Nancy Sorrell's essay, "Slave Hire and the Development of Slavery in Augusta County, Virginia," documents the widespread practice of slave hiring throughout the agricultural economy of Augusta, calling such practices "the cornerstone" of the rural economy in Augusta.

**Synopsis**

Kousser reviews Michael F. Holt's collection of essays in *Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln*. Kousser considers Holt a revisionist on the causation of the American Civil War and points out that many explanations of causation depend on when a study starts and the width of the focus. Kousser is convinced that revisionist historians of the Civil War have avoided facing the importance of slavery and race in the causation of the war, instead preferring to substitute a range of explanations--the fears of whites that they would be enslaved, the ethnocultural tensions between parties, the politics of Abraham Lincoln, the Republicans' attempt to
create a national party in 1864 around issues other than slavery, and the importance of republicanism to both North and South in the crisis.

William A. Link, *Roots of Secession: Slavery and Politics in Antebellum Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). [Citation: Key = H075]

**Excerpt**

"Slavery became a metaphor for larger social tensions of the late antebellum period. These tensions affected nonslaveholders and slaveholders alike; both realized that changes were affecting Virginia society, remaking the social landscape and reorienting patterns of social, economic, and cultural life." (5)

"Late antebellum Virginia, like the rest of the South, had long existed as a 'slave society' rather than a 'society with slaves.' Slavery infused the commonwealth's social and political institutions, constitutional system, and methods of agriculture, commerce, and industry. Although tobacco culture had passed into relative decline, the institution of slavery displayed remarkable resiliency. Despite the exodus of thousands of slaves to the Deep South, the expansion of slave hiring, and the presence of a sizeable free black population, slavery moved in lock-step with dynamic economic forces of the 1850s. Especially during this decade, the Transportation Revolution expanded markets, spread commercial agriculture, fostered manufacturing, extended mining, and, not the least important reinvigorated slavery's economic position. Wherever dynamic market forces made an appearance, slavery accompanied them, and, far from verging on extinction on the eve of the Civil War, the peculiar institution in Virginia remained adaptable, viable, and modernizing." (29)

**Synopsis**

Link argues that slavery was changing in the 1850s in Virginia and becoming more loosely controlled. Slave hiring, in particular, contributed to this shift, as did the growth of industry and manufacturing. Slave resistance mainly took the form of criminal acts against white slaveowners and overseers. Murder, assault, theft, and infanticide were all prevalent in the 1850s, and increasingly these acts threatened white Virginians' sense of security. Link argues that parallel threats in the late 1850s helped push white Virginians to secede--enslaved people's resistance to slavery and political opposition to slavery in the Republican Party.

**Relationship**

Link's argument that reactionary fears drove Virginians to secede differs from ours in several important respects. While there were many acts of enslaved people resisting the institution of slavery in Augusta, there is little to connect their action with the rhetoric of white secessionists. We consider the determining causes of secession to be grounded in the political and economic logic of Virginia's communities in the context of state, regional, and national politics.

"Virginia's transportation network remained highly localized with little integration; no intersectional
trunk lines connected Virginia's cities to Midwestern markets; and the manufacturing base remained
small, especially in relation to northern states. The central problem was that Virginia's slave economy
discouraged the development of a large commercial city that could provide investors, traffic and
passengers for major transportation projects." (3)

Virginia planter John Cocke "correctly surmised that the Old Dominion's urban landscape--a collection
of small cities vigorously competing for commerce and trade--had undermined Virginia's program of
state investment." (112)

"Slavery also discouraged the development of towns, thus putting an additional brake on the growth of
consumer demand. Because slaveholders had an economic incentive to keep their workers busy all year
around, many plantations were often diversified enterprises that grew their own food, employed their
own carpenters, and owned their own mills. Smaller farmers needing such services often turned to their
wealthier neighbors to hire out a skilled artisan or utilize the plantation's blacksmith. Virginia towns,
therefore, had relatively little to do with the day-to-day operations of a plantation outside of marketing
its crops." (160)

"Fertile soils, dense networks of family farms, thriving towns, and close proximity to booming urban
markets all helped make Cumberland a showcase for northern agriculture. Travelers frequently
commented on the beauty of the small, neat farms and well-kept countryside." (43)

"Virginia and Pennsylvania, I conclude, became a house divided because of the Old Dominion's failure
to develop a large commercial city . . . A major aim of this book is to explain how Philadelphia launched
itself into a cycle of self-reinforcing growth." (3)

"Rather than focusing scholarly energy on the 'capitalist' versus 'anticapitalist' interpretations of planter
behavior, the comparison of Pennsylvania and Virginia railroads shows how urban capital greatly
sharpened the regional differences between the two states." (139)

"While Philadelphia's economy benefited from agglomeration, urban growth in Virginia stagnated
because slavery discouraged rural population growth, thereby limiting the size of potential markets." (158)

Synopsis

Majewski's quantitative study compares Virginia and Pennsylvania, looking especially at a county in
each state--Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and Albemarle, Virginia. His purpose is to "understand the roots
of regional divergence" and he finds them in the economic structures of the two places and how
economic policies shaped the trajectories of growth and development. He is particularly interested in the
growth of Philadelphia and its effect on the hinterland surrounding it. Part of Majewski's purpose is to
"isolate the impact of slavery" (3) on the course of economic development. Majewski concludes that
Virginia's low population density was the "Achilles' heel" of its economy and that slavery was to blame
for this weakness. Farmers, planters, and slaves spread across the countryside could not develop the
necessary consumer demand for self-reinforcing growth that compared to Pennsylvania's towns and
Relationship

Majewski's emphasis on population density and the generally forward-looking ideology of Virginia corresponds with our own interpretation. Majewski's concern is to explain why Virginia with all of its capital and investment failed to develop "a true central place" that could accelerate industrial growth. Ours is to explain the social logic of communities in Pennsylvania and Virginia that would allow political expression to result in the conflict and crisis of secession. Majewski's counties are both contiguous to our counties, and his data on density, wealth, farm values, industrial concentration, and capital investment compare closely with ours. We differ with Majewski's emphasis on slavery as a hindrance to economic growth and a suffocating system, instead seeing it as productive, widely adopted and adapted by Augustans.


Excerpt

"Northern Whigs and their Republican successors after 1854 elaborated a free-labor rationale for their vision of capitalist development." (27)

"People who subscribed to these Whig-Republican principles tended to be those who had succeeded in the market economy, or aspired to." (30)

"the greatest Democratic support came from 'outsiders': workers who resented the deskilling of artisan occupations and the dependency of wage labor." (30)

"And while slavery certainly made the Old South 'different' from the North, the question whether differences outweighed similarities and generated an irrepressible conflict remains a matter of interpretation. North and South after all, shared the same language, the same Constitution, the same legal system, the same commitment to republican institutions, the same predominantly Protestant religion and British ethnic heritage, the same history, the same memories of a common struggle for nationhood." (39)

Synopsis

McPherson's book is a narrative account of the causes and fighting of the Civil War. McPherson believes that a genuine conflict over slavery divided North and South before the war. He argues that as long as "the slavery controversy focused on the morality of the institution where it already existed, the two party system managed to contain the passions it aroused." (41) When the controversy, however, began to focus on slavery's expansion into new territories, conflict became "irrepressible." (41) McPherson asserts that past attempts to explain Southern defeat have lacked the "dimension of contingency (857-858)." He believes that "Northern victory and Southern defeat in the war cannot be understood apart from the contingency that hung over every campaign, every battle, every election, every decision during the war." (858)
Relationship

McPherson's treatment of the coming of the war in *Battle Cry of Freedom* differs sharply from ours. For McPherson the conflict builds inexorably from a clash over modernization. He argues that secession was purely about protecting slavery and the right to extend it and that nonslaveholders join the cause because of white supremacy. He stresses the South's "defensive-aggressive temper," which grew from its "economic subordination" to the North, an economy that was "racing ahead of the South in crucial indices." (91) We find instead regions that were intensely competitive and successful, and a Southern community in which moderation and Whig ideas predominated, acting with purpose to enter the war when it came. McPherson's approach does not address the complex regional, subregional, and local interests and the internal conflicts over the future growth and development of the country.

*James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York: Knopf, 1982).

[Citation: Key = H017]

Excerpt

"Although speeches and editorials in the upper South bristled with references to rights, liberty, state sovereignty, honor, resistance to coercion, and identity with southern brothers, such rhetoric could not conceal the fundamental issue of slavery. The following table shows the correlation between slaveholding and support for secession in the Virginia and Tennessee conventions . . . The popular vote in secession referendums illustrated the point even more graphically . . . The upper South, like the lower, went to war to defend the freedom of white men to own slaves and to take them into the territories as they saw fit, lest these white men be enslaved by Black Republicans who threatened to deprive them of these liberties." (283-284)

"Heavy investment in social overhead capital, which transforms a localized subsistence economy into a nationally integrated market economy; rapid increases in output per capita, resulting from technological innovation and the shift from labor-intensive toward capital-intensive production; the accelerated growth of the industrial sector compared with other sectors of the economy; rapid urbanization, made possible by an increase in agricultural productivity that enables farmers to feed the growing cities; an expansion of education, literacy, and mass communications; a value system that emphasizes change rather than tradition; an evolution from the traditional, rural, village-oriented system of personal and kinship ties, in which status is 'ascriptive' (inherited), toward a fluid, cosmopolitan, impersonal, and pluralistic society, in which status is achieved by merit." (13)

"In the North, most of the old Whig/American constituency had gone over to the Republicans. . . . The contest soon resolved itself into a two-party campaign in each section: Lincoln versus Douglas in the North and Breckinridge versus Bell in the South." (132)

"In short, slavery and modernizing capitalism were irreconcilable." (50)

"The Republicans became the party of reformist, antislavery Protestantism. They also became the party of dynamic, innovative capitalism. . . Southerners and Catholics returned the hostility. Their epithets of 'Black Republicans,' 'Yankees,' and the 'Puritan party' summed up in turn a host of negative symbols
associated with the Republicans: abolitionism and racial equality, material acquisitiveness and sharp practice, hypocrisy, bigotry, and an offensive eagerness to reform other people's morals or to interfere with their property." (101)

Synopsis

McPherson's book synthesizes historical scholarship on the Civil War and Reconstruction around the idea of modernization. He builds his argument around several main points: that the war and Reconstruction were stages in America's progressive modernization, that New England was the engine of modern development in economy, society, culture, and intellectual life, and that the Republican Party was the driving force behind the idea of modernization. Modernization, according to McPherson, was effectively a value system associated with the Protestant work ethic, associated most especially with New England Presbyterians, Quakers, Congregationalists, and Unitarians. McPherson suggests that some Americans did not easily swallow the idea of modernization; resisters to modernization, he points out, were Catholics and Southerners. Considered broadly, McPherson's North and South were distinct regions on divergent tracks of development.

Relationship

We disagree with McPherson's New England-centric approach to the problem of the coming of the war, the development of the Republican Party, and the character of the Southern and Northern societies and economies. McPherson's list of different Northern and Southern paths of development, of course, is encompassing enough to describe patterns of development we find in Augusta and Franklin, but McPherson's analysis offers no gradations. His approach is built around fundamental and far-reaching differences between the sections, ours around the social and economic logic of local communities and the difference that slavery made in orienting them.

Peyton McCrary, Clark Miller, and Dale Baum, "Class and Party in the Secession Crisis: Voting Behavior in the Deep South, 1856-1861," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8 no. 2 (Winter 1978): 429-459. [Citation: Key = H050]

Excerpt

"Our results destroy any hope for a clear-cut class division in the voting alignments of these states. At best we can point to slight variations in the sorts of counties that voted for each ticket. The most significant differences in social background were those which separated the Breckinridge and Bell constituencies." (450)

"Our search yielded little clear-cut evidence of class alignments in voting behavior on the brink of the Civil War. Even with the inclusion of ethnocultural variables, which often explained as much as economic factors, our socioeconomic models were never able to account for as much of the variation in the vote as party identification alone." (456)

Synopsis

The authors examine voting in both state and national elections and the secession elections to determine
whether there was strong continuity between the Breckinridge vote and votes for immediate secession and whether voter turnout played a role in secession with Unionists staying home. The authors use multiple ecological regression to estimate the differences in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The authors find realignment a commonality in all three states, but one that depended more on previous party preference than on class in determining who voted for secession.

Relationship

In Augusta and Franklin voting in 1860 was associated with earlier party choices. This Deep South study of the secession vote finds that there was a close association between the Breckinridge votes and those for secession. In our study, however, the correlation has not been tested.


Excerpt

"The North--along with a few countries in northwestern Europe--hurtled forward eagerly toward a future of industrial-capitalism that many Southerners found distasteful if not frightening; the South remained proudly and even defiantly rooted in the past." (22)

"The South's concept of republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the North's had. With complete sincerity the South fought to preserve its version of the republic of the Founding Fathers--a government of limited powers that protected the rights of property, including slave property, and whose constituency comprised an independent gentry and yeomanry of the white race undisturbed by large cities, heartless factories, restless free workers, and class conflict. The accession of the Republican party, with its ideology of competitive, egalitarian, free-labor capitalism, was a signal to the South that the Northern majority had turned irrevocably toward this frightening future." (22)

Synopsis

McPherson suggested that the North was exceptional in its development, while the South "resembled a majority of the societies in the world." (22) McPherson compared Northern and Southern "urbanization, industrialization, labor force, demographic structure, violence and martial values, education, and attitudes toward change." He found compelling differences that were increasing over time. McPherson agreed with David Potter's thesis of Southern distinctiveness as a result of its "folk culture." This "gemeinschaft culture," McPherson argued, emphasized kinship, agricultural life, tradition, social hierarchy, deference, and honor. The North by contrast was moving toward a "gesellschaft culture"--"impersonal, bureaucratic, meritocratic, urbanizing, commercial, industrializing, mobile, and rootless." (12)

Relationship

We agree with some aspects of McPherson's emphasis on divergence between the North and the South. The school system in Augusta, for example, was not as well developed as in Franklin. McPherson,
however, emphasized a larger "conflict of civilizations" in which the North was moving forward while the South was stuck in the past. We argue that the Southern community, far from stuck, was modernizing as aggressively as the Northern community, developing its institutions around a social logic dominated by slavery. There was indeed a "conflict of civilizations," but that conflict was based directly on slavery, not in the mediating abstraction of "modernity."


**Excerpt**

"Taken together these dissident and ambivalent areas of North and South define the traumatic zone of this ragged vivisection (fig. 79). And perhaps the best indication of the breadth of the tear in the body politic were the thousands of young men who crossed the Ohio River or left other Northern-held lands and headed south to join the Confederate army and the thousands who fled north from the seceding states to join the Union forces (more than 30,000 from Tennessee). It was a profound sorting that affected not only districts, towns, and countrysides but clans and families, and it took place from the Atlantic seaboard to the Plains (where the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole nations each split and sent men to both sides). Finally, the ugliest wound in this American trauma, the narrower borderland that equaled anyone's worst fears, was soon defined by guerrilla bands, bushwackers, barnburners, looters, and assassins who ravaged every district of divided or contrary allegiances from western Virginia to eastern Kansas. For the unfortunate citizens of those areas the failure of peaceable secession brought not just war but chaos." (487)

"Maps cannot convey the pain and suffering attendant upon the disintegration of the United States, but our search for a geographical definition of the borderlands can at least suggest how we must surely have something more than a simple map of North and South, of a Mason-Dixon Line (even as a shorthand term), of the Union and the Confederacy as two entities, if we are to have any sense at all of what 'secession' meant in this complicated geopolitical structure during its unprecedented crisis." (489)

**Synopsis**

Emphasizing the complex ways geographic structures and systems affect historical change, Meinig's history of the United States argues for a more nuanced appreciation for geographical context. Charting the country's spread westward from 1800 to 1867, Meinig asserts that ever-shifting local conditions played an important role in how historical actors made their decisions, and in how the country developed throughout the nineteenth century. If historians are to understand the expansion of the United States, argues Meinig, they must better understand America's changing geography.

**Relationship**

We agree fully with Meinig's emphasis in his marvelous multivolume work.

**Excerpt**

"Like every human medium of communication, digital media have been developed to perform tasks that were too difficult to do without them. Hypertext and simulations, the two most promising formats for digital narrative, were both invented after World War II as a way of mastering the complexity of an expanding knowledge base. . . . The earliest vision of hypertext reflects the classic American quest--a charting of the wilderness, an imposition of order over chaos, and the mastery of vast resources for concrete, practical purposes." (90-91)

**Synopsis**

Murray's book explores how narrative and narrative forms have changed in the electronic medium. She examines various electronic narratives, from games to simulations and other forms of cybernarrative. Murray emphasizes the importance of four characteristics of electronic narratives--spatial, participatory, procedural, and encyclopedic.

Kenneth W. Noe, *Southwest Virginia's Railroad: Modernization and the Sectional Crisis* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994). [Citation: Key = H007]

**Excerpt**

The Virginia and Tennessee Railroad "hastened the development of capitalistic, slave-based, cash crop agriculture in Southwest Virginia." (43)

"In a sense, both Northwest Virginia and Southwest Virginia, as well as the commercial minded of Arkansas, Western North Carolina, and East Tennessee, unloaded their ideology as well as their goods off the train. Not only did southern modernization and slavery go hand in hand, then, but the determination to defend slavery and the broader economic and social system it held on its back joined them." (7-8)

"In Southwest Virginia, as elsewhere in the South, modernization and the expansion of an institution as 'unmodern' as chattel slavery went hand-in-hand." (70)

"Mountain agriculture was commercialized quite early and to a surprisingly high degree. Many immigrants came to the region with commercial activities in mind, and, like Western North Carolinians and the East Tennesseans of Cades Cove, began producing for outside markets quite early." (32)

"Urbanization and industrialization, in sum, grew dramatically during the 1850s as results of the railroad and its links to the wider South." (66)

"All in all, the Seventh and Eighth Censuses reveal that slavery in Southwest Virginia was spreading out of the counties where the institution already had established itself and was establishing a foothold in
more mountainous parts of the region." (78)

"The mountain farmer principally raised cereals, especially corn and oats, but also buckwheat, rye, and wheat." (33-34)

Synopsis

Noe argues that Southwest Virginia was far from an economic backwater, resistant to the market economy, in the years leading up to the Civil War. Instead, he finds that the region was remarkably energetic in its economic development, placing the shift in Appalachian history much earlier than other scholars such as Ronald D. Eller. Noe also finds high levels of slavery in subregions of Southwest Virginia in the 1850s and a clear linkage between the introduction of the railroad and the growth of slavery and cash crop agriculture, mainly wheat. Noe's book is part of a growing literature on Appalachia, from John Inscoe to Durwood Dunn and Gene Wilhelm, to find that slavery and market forces were at work in the region, connecting it to other parts of the South and developing in it a class structure built around slavery.

Relationship

We agree with Noe's argument that Virginia's western areas were moving simultaneously in the 1850s toward greater engagement with slavery and market commerce through the railroad. We agree also with Noe's emphasis on railroad development and the importance of Southwest Virginia's rail link to Richmond in contrast to Northwest Virginia's connection to Ohio. Noe's particular discussion of subregions and counties also supports our close analysis. For example, Noe examined agricultural change over the 1850s along the railroad and found an explosion in the cultivation of tobacco and wheat, both tied to increases in slave population in the region. (43) By 1856, 435 out of 643 workers on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad were enslaved. (82)

James Oakes, *Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990). [Citation: Key = H020]

Excerpt

"This does not mean that the slave South was, at bottom, a liberal capitalist society. Nor does it mean that liberal capitalism was thoroughly compatible with slavery. In the end the universalization of rights and the dynamic force of free labor overwhelmed and destroyed slavery. But southern slave society emerged within rather than apart from the liberal capitalist world, and that made a crucial difference. For the ambiguous relationship between slavery and liberal capitalism thereby became intrinsic to the Old South, not merely the basis of sectional animosity. And herein lay the greatest of all the ironies that mark southern history. The slaveholders had emerged triumphant from the American revolution, wielding considerable influence in a new and unified nation, but in their very triumph they had helped to unleash forces over which they would eventually lose control." (79)

Synopsis

James Oakes offers an interpretation of the Old South that stresses the paradoxical relationship between
slavery and liberal capitalism in the American South. American attachments to liberal capitalism celebrated the freedom of the individual, shaping an important aspect of Southern ideology. But the institution of slavery was the explicit denial of that freedom, and so the Old South was made up of contradicting ideological tendencies. Slaveholders celebrated the liberal rights of white men while also denying those same rights to slaves, explicitly placing the slave outside of society. This awkward relationship between slavery and liberal capitalism affected all aspects of Southern society, such as the evolution of Southern legal, political, and social institutions. Yet it also exacerbated tensions between slaveholders and non-slaveholders and ultimately set the North and South against one another. For Oakes it was the ambiguous relationship between liberal capitalism and slavery that produced the series of conflicts which ended in war between the North and South. Indeed, Oakes argues, "the pathway from the American Revolution to the Civil War begins at the intersection of slavery and liberal capitalism" (xiv).

Relationship

**James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982).** [Citation: Key = H079]

**Excerpt**

"Such cruelty followed logically from the nearly universal goal of the slaveholders-material advancement. The poorest German or Scotch-Irish immigrant joined with the wealthiest English planters in viewing America as a land of unprecedented abundance. As slavery became the most popular means of acquiring wealth and status, the restraining force of reciprocal obligation gave way to the truly invisible hand of the marketplace." (p. 25) -"If different masters manifested varying degrees of guilt, few escaped it entirely, for the elements of psychological conflict were intrinsic to slaveholding culture. But that culture also produced a secular ideology that explicitly repudiated the suggestion that slaveholding was immoral. Grounded in the historical and material experiences of the master class, this ideology contained a major ambiguity of its own: the more slaveholders glorified success, the more they feared failure. Thus did their secular ideology reinforce the slaveholders' moral dilemma: To succeed was to risk one's soul; to fail was a disgrace." (p. 122)

**Synopsis**

Arguing against Eugene Genovese's portrayal of American slaveholders as paternalists, Oakes asserts that most slaveowners were acquisitive capitalists who eagerly embraced the marketplace. The majority of Southern masters, Oakes points out, owned only a few slaves and their ranks were dominated by a diverse group of people who had fought their way into slaveholding. For this "middle-class" of slaveholders, the right to own slaves was an opportunity to gain wealth and status which they openly pursued. Moreover, these small-holding slaveowners, politically active and eager to move to western territories, were the most influential group of slaveholders in the South, defending the peculiar institution as both racially and economically expedient. While guilt-ridden over slavery because of their evangelical Christianity, American slaveholders in Oakes's interpretation increasingly abandoned the myth of paternalism. For them, and for Oakes, this placed slavery at the center of American
development into a capitalist economic system, not as an aberration.

Relationship

We find much to agree with in Oakes' interpretation of the market orientation of slaveholding and its role in the Southern economy. Our examination of Augusta does not find, however, that paternalism was weakening. Instead, paternalism continued to characterize the households of many of the wealthier slaveholders at the same time as these individuals diversified, employing slave labor across a range of industries and settings. Slaveholders in the middle class with one or a handful of enslaved laborers rented and hired out their slaves.


Excerpt

"Behind all the calculations and statistics, the counting of bales and the totaling of horsepower, the assessment of resources and the evaluation of experience lay critical differences in values. Share the same plans for urban growth they might. But the business ethic which shaped Boston's dedication to achieving that growth was central to her entire culture, while it was only peripheral in Charleston." (219)

"Boston developed a complex network while Charleston pursued a simpler model. Preoccupied with the benefits of a direct trade with Europe in which southern staples would be exchanged for products manufactured abroad, Charleston pursued, in a publicly subsidized western railroad and an eastward shipping line, the means to expand her function as a hinged tollgate through which imports passed in one direction and exports in the other." (54)

"The same physical and economic realities which limited Charleston's shipping potential also shaped her railroad venture. Her agricultural hinterland promised it only one major cargo--cotton. The paucity of manufacturing throughout Carolina limited the demand for two-way transportation of raw materials and finished products as it also restricted Charleston's potential to become a center for diversified regional marketing." (55)

"The economic development of each city was defined by conditions which no exchange of investment alternatives, management styles, and political strategies could have reversed completely. Boston could be a hub city despite her perch on a small and precipitous peninsula because she was surrounded by a populous and growing hinterland whose manufacturing potential was stoked by the immigrants and commodities which ships brought into her fine harbor. Charleston, by contrast, was an urban oasis in an agricultural land whose soil was deteriorating and whose population was leaving. Charleston's backcountry, no less than her social values and her remoteness from shipping lanes, limited her ability even to be a hinge city." (70)

"It does seem plausible that while Charleston's powerful Episcopal and orthodox Calvinist churches reinforced the traditional values which, in large measure, limited the city's ability to seize and exploit new opportunities, the theological liberalism of Boston's powerful Unitarian establishment encouraged
innovative responses to new economic forces without at the same time threatening social or political stability." (137)

"Charleston's justification of education was therefore largely put in individual rather than communal terms. Fathers of high as well as of middling rank, like their Yankee equivalents, urged their sons to study that they might, in future, support themselves." (110)

"Certainly Bostonians shared Charlestonians' eagerness to offer their children the means for upward mobility; and even more surely they offered their city's youth extensive access to free or cheap schooling. But no similarity can hide their fundamental disagreement about the social and economic function of education and the consequent imperative for public schools. In Boston, no matter what one's rank, the primary value of knowledge was its utility." (112)

Synopsis

William and Jane Pease develop a wide array of data drawn from censuses, city directories, newspapers, church records, and municipal records to compare Boston and Charleston in the antebellum period. They are most concerned with class structures and the activities and social structures of the elite leading the cities. They conclude that significant differences characterized these places. First, they find that Boston was a city of greater human capital, taking full advantage of resources and free labor to energize and develop a dynamic capitalism. Second, they find that Charleston languished in the satisfaction of slavery's social benefits to white elites, no matter that its profitability suffered on worn-out soil and in depressed cotton and rice markets. The Peases describe an aggressively industrial North, where the ambitious sorts of men had set aside agrarian values and agricultural profits.

The differences the Peases find between these cities generally fit a larger framework of Yankee dynamism and Southern languor in society and economy. Boston's Unitarian establishment, for example, the Peases claim, set a tone of liberalism that "encouraged innovative responses to new economic forces without at the same time threatening social or political stability," while Charleston's Episcopalians and main-line Presbyterians "reinforced traditional values" that "limited the city's ability to seize and exploit new opportunities." (137)

Relationship

The comparison between North and South of these cities offers an excellent basis for beginning to examine differences and similarities. The Pease's study also offers an excellent appendix on methods and data analysis. In many ways, it seems, the Pease's study sets out to find differences and finds them, then attributes them to slavery and differing attitudes toward modernization. Our study examines some of these same questions but within the context of geographical relationships and finds that the differences are not the ones that the Peases identified. We see little difference in elite views of modernization and we find a dynamic developmental view in the Southern county. We also see a vibrant agricultural Northern community where the connections between commercial agriculture and skilled industrial development make the Northern economic and social logic distinctly different from the South's.
Edward Pessen, "How Different from Each Other Were the Antebellum North and South," American Historical Review 85 (1980): 1119-1149. [Citation: Key = H004]

Excerpt

"Southern whites, rural and urban, lived as did Northerners--in a stratified society marked by great inequalities in status, material condition, and opportunity." (1136)

"The burden of recent research is that small social and economic elites exercised a degree of control over the most important institutions in the antebellum North that bears close resemblance to the great power attributed to the great planter-slaveowners by William E. Dodd a half century ago and by Eugene D. Genovese more recently." (1142)

"Far from being in any sense members of a colony or dependency on the North, the Southern upper classes enjoyed close ties with the Northern capitalists who were, in a sense, their business partners. The South was an integral component of a wealthy and dynamic national economy, no part of which conformed perfectly to a textbook definition of pure capitalism." (1147)

"That they were drawn into the most terrible of all American wars may have been due, as is often the case when great powers fight, as much to their similarities as to their differences. The war owed more, I believe, to the inevitably opposed but similarly selfish interests--or perceived interests--of North and South than to the differences in their cultures and institutions." (1146)

"For all of their distinctiveness, the Old South and North were complementary elements in an American society that was everywhere primarily rural, capitalistic, materialistic, and socially stratified, racially, ethnically, and religiously heterogeneous, and stridently chauvinistic and expansionist--a society whose practice fell far short of, when it was not totally in conflict with, its lofty theory." (1149)

"If the Southern rate of urban expansion still did not match the Northern quantitatively, Southern cities, old and new, were qualitatively not unlike their Northern counterparts." (1133)

"Northern and Southern farmers increasingly specialized but in dissimilar crops. Tobacco and, above all, rice, sugar, and cotton were largely unknown to the North. Yet in the South, as in the North, farmers--whether large or small--sought and, for the most part achieved, self-sufficiency. They produced more grains and corn than anything else and in both sections raised and kept domestic animals roughly equal in quantity and, it has recently been claimed, comparable in quality." (1122)

"What Stanley L. Engerman has said about Southern planters seems to apply equally well to Northern agriculturalists: they were certainly not 'non-calculating individuals not concerned with money.'" (1122-1123)

"Evidence bearing on the conditions of white Northern as well as black Southern labor demonstrates that during the middle decades of the nineteenth century the real wages of Northern workingmen declined and their living conditions remained bleak, their job security was reduced, their skills increasingly devalued, and in many respects their lives became more insecure and precarious." (1124)
"On the eve of the Civil War one-half of the free adult males in both the South and the North held less than 1 percent of the real and personal property. In contrast the richest 1 percent owned 27 percent of the wealth. Turning from the remarkable similarity in sectional patterns of wealthholding at the bottom and the very top, the richest 5 to 10 percent of property owners controlled a somewhat greater share of the South's wealth, while what might be called the upper middle deciles (those below the top tenth) held a slightly smaller share in the North. The South also came close to monopolizing wealthy counties, the per capita wealth of which was $4,000 or more and, despite its smaller population, the South, according to the 1860 census, contained almost two-thirds of those persons in the nation whose worth was at least $110,000. According to Lee Soltow, the leading student of this evidence, these sectional disparities 'could be attributed almost entirely to slave values. . . . If one could eliminate slave market value from the distribution of wealth in 1860 . . . , the inequality levels in the North and South were similar.'"

Synopsis

Pessen brings together a wide array of scholarship in this sweeping essay on whether the North and South were different on the eve of the Civil War. He divides his analysis into three parts: economy, social structure, and politics and power. In the section on economy Pessen argues that the regions were more complementary than opposed. Pessen carefully avoids explaining "away" rather than explaining Southern industrial activity, though he argues that the South's high per capita rates of industrial growth depended entirely on the fact of low white population. Pessen argues that social structures in the North and South were similar in wealth distribution, vertical mobility rates, and lifestyles and fashions. Though similar, Pessen points out, the sections "were not carbon copies of one another." The chief difference was slavery. In politics and political power Pessen summarizes a range of quantitative studies of voting patterns and finds that in both sections leadership was conferred on wealthy men and that parties were pragmatic engines of economic and social promotion. Even in the 1850s national parties remained cohesive on all issues except those directly related to slavery and its expansion; moreover, he points out, most issues of concern were local. On a whole range of indicators, Pessen summarizes literature that "appears to overturn the traditional view of a distinctive antebellum South."

Pessen considers the low density of population a possible product of difference between the sections, not at all a historical accident. Pessen suggests that striking similarities in the sections do not erase their visible differences, and that these differences, especially those rooted in the social and daily life of communities, might have been decisive in overcoming the ties of similarity.

Relationship

We agree with Pessen's comparative approach, of course. Augusta and Franklin were examples of the expansionist and successful, rural and capitalistic American society of 1860 that Pessen emphasizes. On the other hand, we believe slavery created a self-understanding among Southern whites that achieved political expression.


Excerpt
"Pennsylvania was the northern 'parent'--and Virginia the southern one--that together nurtured much of the Border." (446)

"In looking at the Upper South and Border and what the war meant for these regions, it is hard to avoid the sweeping assessment: that the U.S. Civil War was another great watershed in which the victory went to a zealous, skilled, and destiny-minded minority--the principal cadre of which just happened to be descended from the intense and grasping Puritan and Yankee minority that had also been the largest single force in the two previous cousins' wars. The defeat of southern culture, agriculture, and politics did not end at the borders of the former Confederacy." (456)

"Religious denominationalism, as much as economics or ideology, drove the great transatlantic political currents that ultimately ended slavery, maintained the United States as one nation, and inhibited the British government, despite its huge textile industry, from aiding the embattled cotton states. . . Those great currents, the two nations' Protestant belief systems, were surprisingly similar. In the United States, especially in Greater New England, the Second Great Awakening bred an evangelical politics of social and moral intervention that coalesced into the Republican Party and underpinned the election of Abraham Lincoln, for all that he wisely softened the neo-Puritan message. . . . In both nations, nineteenth-century electoral politics still strongly reflected religion and denominationalism." (390)

**Synopsis**

Phillips takes a broad perspective on ethnicity, politics, and culture in the American Revolution, War of 1812, and American Civil War. He calls these the "cousins' wars" because he sees them as three related events in the English-Atlantic world, all of them related by lineage to England's own Civil War and the religious strife that accompanied it. Phillips' analysis of the Civil War's causes focuses on geography and agriculture. He argues that the divisions between North and South were primarily religious--Puritan Yankee New England and Episcopalian, Methodist South. The great border region was divided by history and settlement, a region of mixed loyalties where in 1860-61 the decisive loyalties were worked out. Phillips' account of the war's origins is explicitly cultural, and his account of political expression follows in this vein.

**Relationship**

We find Phillips' vigorously argued book to be useful in its depiction of the border as a crucial area in the sectional crisis. On the other hand, we do not follow his emphasis on cultural continuities from Britain as a crucial part of the American Civil War. The differences we see along the border were not cultural but material and political.

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**Excerpt**

"Since electronic information technologies provide more information and faster access across broader spans of space, they are presumed to be technologies that are liberating. Such a mythos of public benefit
accruing from the ability to gain access to new and broader forms of data, and to represent this data spatially in a wide array of images, has been instrumental in the adoption of the new telematics within universities, planning agencies, environmental bodies, and the corporate and business world." (20)

Synopsis

Pickles traces some of the arguments within the discipline of geography over the use and practice of GIS. Some geographers have embraced the technology while others have seen it as an "instrumental reassertion in a discipline that has fought hard to rid itself of notions of space as the dead and the inert." Pickles argues that GIS needs a "critical theory" that understands the technology within the broader set of economic and cultural relationships defined by power, business, markets, and academic pressures.


Excerpt

"It was actually in Washtenaw County--not Tuscaloosa County--that slavery proved to be a divisive issue for proponents of benevolence. In Washtenaw, many abolitionists viewed slavery as a sin and believed that their association with any organization that tolerated slavery would taint them with the sin as well. Even if they endorsed the objectives of benevolence, they could not in good conscience pursue those ends by collaborating with national societies that refused to denounce slavery sufficiently." (152)

"The defense of slavery never disappeared from Tuscaloosa's newspapers for the remainder of the antebellum period, but it would be incorrect to focus on the mail controversy of 1835 and conclude that the defense of chattel slavery was white Tuscaloosans' foremost public preoccupation...the defense of slavery and the ferreting out of abolitionists were matters upon which white Tuscaloosans almost universally agreed. So strong was the consensus on these issues that during presidential elections, each party tried to outdo its adversary by proclaiming that the other candidate was a threat to the South and slavery, and that the opposition party in the North was the stronghold of abolitionists. But when Alabamians competed against one another for state offices, they contended over issues that characterized the second party system, and did not debate issues associated with slavery." (310-311)

"While it is undoubtedly true that some white southerners feared that any reform more radical than temperance was too closely linked to abolition and were thus unreceptive or hostile to it, it is also true that the greater intellectual ferment in Washtenaw County--rather than merely a deeper conservatism in Tuscaloos County--partly accounts for the counties' different receptions to these two radical causes...Despite their important differences, the similarities between Washtenaw and Tuscaloosa Counties with respect to antebellum reform are also important. During the antebellum years, more people participated in or in some way encountered temperance and evangelical benevolence than Fourierism, women's rights, and even abolitionism. In both counties, proponents of benevolence not only desired to provide people with the means to salvation; they also endeavored to transform the morals of Americans and to remove the barriers that they believed created social problems, hindered the development of human potential, and ultimately stood in the way of economic progress. Temperance devotees also promoted similar goals. These two reforms, as well as abolition, were advanced by individuals who identified..."
closely—though at times elusively—with the growth of American towns and cities, education, and the market economy.” (470)

Synopsis

Quist's study looks at how deeply and extensively the antebellum reform climate penetrated into the lives of most Americans. He argues that a study of reform during this time must assess how "most Americans observed and experienced it—that is, as it functioned in the village and the countryside." (4) Quist examines two counties—Tuscaloosa, Alabama and Washtenaw, Michigan—and reveals that the residents of both counties embraced the antebellum reform impulse. Quist's study challenges the historiographical tendency to see the South, with its cotton-based plantation economy, as an increasingly distinctive region opposed to the North's free labor economy, because he finds just as vibrant a reform movement there as in his Northern community. In both places, Quist believes, market forces helped sustain and energize reform movements. Quist argues that the differences in the counties' reform movements resulted from the "greater intellectual ferment in Washtenaw County . . . rather than merely a deeper conservatism in Tuscaloosa County" and that this partly accounts for the counties' different receptivity to reform. (470) Quist's study emphasizes the similarities between these places and their reform histories. Slavery plays out differently, however, as a reform issue, and Quist notes that its effect in the Southern community was unifying, while its effect in the Northern community was fracturing.

Relationship

We find much to agree with in Quist's portrayal of counties farther west than Augusta and Franklin. Augusta County was as devoted to efforts at temperance, Sunday Schools, and tract societies as Franklin, perhaps more so because of its Whiggish orientation. While the Underground Railroad reportedly ran through Franklin County and while voters turned quickly to the Republicans, there is little evidence of organized abolitionism in this border community.

Robert M. Schwartz, "Railways and Population Change in Industrializing England: An Introduction to Historical GIS June 22, 1999 [Citation: Key = H070]

Excerpt

"The social and economic transformation of nineteenth-century England and Wales is the classic example of western industrialization and urbanization. Viewed from the perspective of social and environmental history, this transformation provides an interesting way to examine the impact of new technology on past human and physical environments. One far-reaching example is the steam-powered railroad system which grew to reach nearly all corners of England and Wales from its beginning in the 1830s to its apogee on the eve of World War I. The landscape of the Victorian City was a monument to the railway age, with its huge train stations and rail yards, together with the great earthworks and tunnels that the rail network required. To its stations, moreover, came more and more individuals and families who were moving to town in search of better opportunities, leaving the countryside behind and villages in decline.

Did the railways facilitate migration from countryside to town? What was the timing, extent, and
The geography of rural depopulation? Did rural men and women migrate in similar patterns? Thanks to GIS methods, all of these questions can be taken up more effectively now than was previously possible.

Synopsis

Schwartz's online class exercise applies historical GIS methods to examine questions of migration and economic change.

William G. Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and the Second Party System, 1824-1861 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996). [Citation: Key = H023]

Excerpt

"While the most detailed study of the Virginia Democratic Republicans insisted that ethnicity and religion did not influence voting, the analysis of both polling place 'neighborhoods' and individual voters shows ethnoreligious factors to have been crucial determinants of partisan identification for a significant number of voters. The importance of neighborhoods clustered around churches with a community core of kinship networks can hardly be exaggerated." (11)

"While there was some fluctuation on the anti-Democratic side as the national Whig party disintegrated and its followers drifted first to the Know Nothings and then to Bell's Constitutional Union party, the Virginia electorate showed a relative stability throughout the 1850s. The national Whig party had disappeared, but the old Whig leaders and the fraternity of voters and the anti-Democratic cadre who had manned the grass-roots party machinery remained to sustain Virginia unionism in its myriad forms. In the course of the entire decade, only a small number of Virginians actually switched allegiance." (284-285)

"While the Democrats had consistently received a higher proportion of slaveholders' votes than the Whigs, slaveholders and non-slaveholders supported both parties and in the presidential election Virginia voters divided along traditional lines." (286)

"The Old Dominion lingered as a genteel republic in the age of the common man." (264)

"Party allegiance had no effect on the way delegates voted on apportionment. Instead, delegates from east and west stood fast on the opposite sides of the issues. The final division on representation could have been no less partisan or more sharply sectional." (281)

"The conflict over secession pitted a party dominated by slaveholders against one representing men with no direct stake in the peculiar institution and divided the electorate in a sectional fashion that had previously been associated with the question of constitutional reform." (291)

Synopsis

Shade argues that Virginia in the 1850s became more "democratic" and that neither the Whigs nor the Democrats were sectional parties within the state. The Whigs were not, he argues, the "party of the West," nor were the Democrats the party of the Tidewater. Shade contradicts older interpretations that...
stressed the geographic split in Virginia—that the non-slaveholding Germans of the Shenandoah Valley and the small independent farmers in the counties of the southwest typified Democrats or that large slaveholders in the east and nascent manufacturers in salt, iron, and woolens in the west were Whigs. Instead, Shade asserts that Whigs prevailed in towns and in town-dominated counties and that Democrats did better in agricultural areas where large planters were clustered. Shade finds the ethnoreligious explanation for party formation most persuasive. Neighborhood, church, and family ties, he finds, determined party allegiance. The state changed dramatically in the 1850s as fewer than half of Virginia white men worked as farmers and the power of the planters among the social elite declined significantly. The change in leadership was equally dramatic, Shade finds. Lawyers rose and planters declined in their membership at the state constitutional conventions. Shade considers this growth and development the crucial factor for explaining Virginia's movement toward secession. The election of 1860 in Virginia, he argues, resembled the same patterns already established in earlier elections, patterns that were completely swept away in the six months before the 1861 constitutional convention that voted to secede. The elections for constitutional convention delegates for the first time set non-slaveholding unionists against slaveholding secessionists.

Relationship

Our data remain inconclusive on Shade's argument that the Valley counties were dominated by religious and ethnic political alignments. Shade finds that Scots-Irish--Presbyterian and Anglican--Valley residents supported the Whig Party and the Know-Nothings, while the Germans--Mennonite, Lutheran, and German Reformed--residents voted Democratic. We agree with Shade that political affiliations were shaped by ethnic and religious identity in the Valley, though our analysis of Augusta County does not show a direct correlation. We suggest that the correlation between ethnic and religious identity and political expression may have varied significantly from county to county.


[Citation: Key = H010]

Excerpt

"The Civil War has usually been described as a conflict between two wholly distinct sections, abruptly divided by state boundary lines. It grew out of the controversy over slavery, it is said, and was waged on the one side by slaveholders and their misguided neighbors, while on the other side the people of the North fought to emancipate the slaves and maintain the Union. Such a view, though a natural one, gives an incorrect impression of the character of the struggle. In the first place, the boundary between the sections, throughout most of its course was artificial. . . . In the second place, there was in the beginning, and there existed during the whole course of the war, a middle section in which the question of slavery was unimportant compared with other issues. . . . This great homogeneous section, extending almost the whole width of the country, had it in its power to determine the outcome of the Civil War. Its white population was nearly as great at that of the eleven seceded States." (1-2)

"Viewing the results of the election in the Borderland as a whole, two facts stand out with great distinctness. The first was the relatively slight change that took place in the former party alignments, which indicates in itself that the issue of union or separatism was not popularly regarded as the chief one
of the campaign. The second was the conservative attitude of the voters. In practically every section of the Borderland they expressed their preferences for Douglas or Bell, the two candidates who emphasized in their appeals for support the necessity of continuing the policies of compromise and conciliation in settling sectional differences." (75)

Synopsis

Smith argues that the Borderland constituted a distinct and homogeneous region of approximately 5 million white people. The region had interests with both the North and the South but was more cohesive and united within than with either section. Smith suggests that slavery as an issue remained unimportant in the Borderland until the secession crisis, when the issue of slavery was ripped from its normal context as just one of a cluster of issues. Parts of the Borderland, he argues, "were [geographically] different without being disunited." Smith also argues that white people of the Borderland were "much less attached to slavery than those of the South." (31)

Relationship

We find Smith's interest in the Borderland as a distinct region compelling. Smith's work discusses climate, natural geography, transportation, markets, and ethnicity. We do not support Smith's argument that slavery was of "slight importance" in the region, that slave labor was "utterly unsuited" to wheat production and "out of the question" for corn.

[Citation: Key = H069]

Excerpt

"The Great Britain Historical GIS is not simply an old map, or a collection of old maps. As far as possible it is a record of change, and in particular a record of changing boundaries, which has been assembled from a combination of old maps and also textual records of change. For example, an official report tells us that a particular district had its boundary changed on the 1st of January 1905, while two separate maps show boundaries in 1901 and 1908. Our system stores ALL of this information, including the date of the change, so it can construct an accurate map of the district for ANY date, not just 1901 and 1908. Exactly how we do this is explained in the description of the Mark I GIS, but the important point is that our system is not simply a base map for the historian--it can be used as a base map generator, creating maps for a wide range of dates, types of unit and parts of the country."

Synopsis

Southall, Gregory, and Ell have developed this massive online historical GIS project containing ranges of data at the parish level in Great Britain from the 1830s forward for researchers.

[Citation: Key = H058]
Excerpt

"It is now clear that these sorts of publications require an enormous amount of thought and effort beyond the basic work of research and writing. The process of creating historical scholarship that is truly intended for the electronic medium requires reconceptualizing the materials from the ground up to take full advantage of the electronic medium." (4)

Synopsis

Townsend describes the high costs and potentially high benefits of electronic scholarship and suggests that historians consider new forms for journal articles and monographs. He considers many of the digital publications to be little more than minor adaptations of the traditional print forms and calls for a scholarship that takes full advantage of the digital technologies.


Excerpt

"I have concluded that in Cumberland County, the pivotal partisan controversy arose over questions of political economy. In effect, the voters had to decide how they wanted their community to fit into the rapidly developing world of international capitalism." (14)

"These business activities made Fayetteville a bustling and ambitious town eager to share the prosperity of Jacksonian America." (37)

"The position of artisans in Fayetteville was ambiguous. The commerce of the town required a number of skilled services necessary for the export of agricultural products. Business opportunities were good for millers, tanners, blacksmiths, wagonmakers, saddle and harness makers, coopers, and wheelwrights. Fayetteville also needed the normal complement of workers to make clothing, furniture, and buildings. Successful practitioners of these trades could become leading citizens. . . . Constant turnover in the names of artisans who advertised in the columns of Fayetteville's press suggests that many skilled workers did not find enough encouragement to stay very long. Some artisans may never have owned their own shops, remaining journeymen all their lives. White workers of this description competed with black workers, both slave and free. Poor white families seeking to apprentice a son to a skilled trade sometimes met the humiliating notice that 'colored boys would be preferred.' The artisan in Fayetteville thus occupied a respectable position in society or a precarious one, depending on his luck, his skill, and the state of the economy." (43)

"Seventy years after its founding, Fayetteville's economy still depended on trade. Distant farmers were then in the habit of bringing their staples to Fayetteville for sale or barter." (36)

"If their land was fertile enough to grow staples, the favorite crops of Cumberland County farmers were cotton and corn. The cotton was sold in Fayetteville, but much of the corn was eaten locally by people or animals." (31)
"Planters were not the typical farmers of Cumberland County. The majority of farmers were not slaveholders, but in 1830, a few less than 85 percent of the rural heads of households owned their own land." (28)

Synopsis

Watson's study concludes that slavery was not a political issue in Cumberland County for most of the period because of the unanimity of whites on the matter. Proslavery rhetoric was not, therefore, crucial to party formation in the county. Parties were built around a cluster of issues related to economic development in the region, its merits and demerits. Watson finds that Whigs centered in the main towns cultivated a republican culture of progress, banking, and state-supported railroads, while Democrats spread throughout the rural county emphasized the virtues of self-sufficient, profitable agriculture. Watson links these party developments to the Transportation Revolution. Rival communities within the county, he argues, vied for political power to achieve dominance and that "each arose from a different social framework, each had its own vision of the social future, and each followed its own privileged elite." (322)

Relationship

Watson's county bore some similarity to Augusta County. Both were not especially planter-dominated, though both were successful. Both had a strong central place and vibrant political parties and newspapers, as well as active social institutions. Augusta had a higher soil quality throughout and probably more productive agriculture in general. Watson's county grew cotton and corn, not wheat and corn, as in Augusta, and it was well below the per capita production of North Carolina as a whole. Augusta by contrast was one of the leading agricultural producers in Virginia. Watson finds that Cumberland's problem was "general economic stagnation" and a lack of growth. He places this problem at the heart of the county's political struggles and sees it as a microcosm of a larger pattern of slow growth in North Carolina. Cumberland County voted steadily Democratic throughout the second party system, while Augusta was predominantly Whig.

Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1986). [Citation: Key = H046]

Excerpt

"What sort of an economic class did the slaveholders comprise, and what sort of an economy did they bequeath to the postbellum South? The key to both of these questions is a basic difference between investment in slaves on the one hand, and investment in land and most forms of industrial capital on the other: slaves were movable, the other forms of investment were not. . . This simple distinction had a pervasive influence on economic life, affecting population growth, private investment patterns, farming practices, mineral exploration, and political coalitions. Slavery generated a weaker and looser connection between property holders and the land they occupied." (17)

"We can see these effects [of slavery] not just by contrast with the North, but by the marked changes in direction of economic activity after the war. The new incentives associated with simple land ownership
led to a reallocation of land from corn to cotton, new enthusiasm for railroads and local development, and the rise of new manufacturing and mining sectors." (11)

"Property rights in human beings shaped the investment strategies, the economic geography, and the political economy of the South. As compared to the American North the incentives of slave property tended to disperse population across the land, reduce investments in transportation and in cities, and limit the exploration of southern natural resources. Above all, slave owners had no incentives to open up labor market links with outside areas, and the resulting inelasticity of the labor supply squeezed out labor-intensive manufacturing activity." (11)

"The value of investments in slaves was independent of local development, and planters had little to gain from improvements in roads and marketing facilities in a particular area. They had little at stake in community life generally, no particular desire to attract settlers by building schools and villages and factories. Since immovable land was a small part of their wealth, they had no great interest in spending time and money looking for precious metals or coal and iron deposits. . . They were not landlords but 'laborlords.'" (18)

"Northern observers in the late antebellum years had little doubt that the slave South was backward and stagnant. This view was not just based on remoteness and poor information, because eyewitness visits produced some of the most negative impressions." (31)

"Most slaveowners were . . . footloose. In one respect this was highly efficient, resulting in a rapid migration of slaves to the areas of highest fertility. But the implication for the regional economy was a sparse population spread thinly and broadly across the countryside." (26)

**Synopsis**

Wright's book draws a distinction between the economic development of the South and the North in the antebellum period. Wright examines the structures of economic growth--town development, railroads, agricultural practices, and manufacturing and mining. Wright points out that the average slaveholder held almost two-thirds of his total wealth in slaves (19), and he explains how slavery's legacies extended into the post-Civil War period. Wright argues that slaveholders placed little wealth or value on land, a practice that set them apart from the North, where intensive land value growth was the norm. Slaveholders, according to Wright, were "land killers" whose disregard for the land and the low value associated with land led them to adopt wasteful agricultural practices that led to severe soil erosion.

**Relationship**

We agree with Wright's emphasis on land value as an important sign of the difference slavery made, but most of Wright's evidence comes from the Cotton South. In our study it does not appear that slaveholders adopted wasteful extensive agricultural production. Instead, we find that Augusta's agricultural enterprises were highly productive even on the worst soil in the county.