SEOND ARMY CORPS,
June 3, 1864--6 a. m.
General MEADE:
My First and Second Divisions have both been engaged. The men are
very
close to the enemy, under a crest, but seem unable to carry it. Birney
is occupying the advanced line of works vacated by First and Second Divisions
in moving to the assault. The commanders of First and Second Divisions
do not think they can use more troops than their own with any great certainty
of success. I shall await your orders, but express the opinion that if
the first dash in an assault fails, other attempts are not apt to succeed
better.
WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 3, 1864--6.35 a. m.
Major-General HANCOCK:
Your dispatch received. You will make the attack and support it well,
so that in the event of being successful, the advantage gained can be held.
If unsuccessful report at once.
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS,
June 3, 1864--7 a. m.
Lieutenant-General Grant:
Reports from Wright announce some progress. His advance occupies a
line of the enemy's pits--I presume their skirmish line. He reports the
Eighteenth Corps having occupied the same line, but retiring. His (Wright's)
line is pushing on. No report from Smith. I sent you
one from Hancock, reporting he was about attempting another assault, written
before my order to him to do so had reached him. I should be glad to have
your views as to the continuance of these attacks, if unsuccessful.
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.
NEAR COLD HARBOR June 3, 1861--7 a. m.
Major-General Meade,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend
the offensive, but when one does succeed push it vigorously, and if necessary
pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken.
I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
COLD HARBOR, JUNE 3, 1864-12:30 p. m.
Major-General MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case
an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for
the present. Hold our most advanced positions, and strengthen them. Whilst
on the defensive, our line may be contracted from the right, if practicable.
Reconnaissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made
to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition
under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army
now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do
this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments
of Richmond than to have them go back there. Wright and Hancock should
be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's
lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 3, 1864-5.45 p. m.
Lieut. Gen. U. S. GRANT,
Commanding:
GENERAL: The telegrams you return were sent from here by me, so that
you need not return them. Warren was re-enforced by Birney, and posted
him on his left, where he now is, forming connection between Smith and
Warren. I have notified Warren there are no other troops to send
him, and that he and Burnside must contract their lines to-night. Everything
is apparently quiet along the lines. We hold all our advanced positions,
and are intrenching. To-night Hancock will establish batteries, and
we will begin all along the lines digging up to the enemy's works. I have
sent out officers to each of the corps and to the hospitals to endeavor
to form some estimate of the casualties to-day.
Respectfully,
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Major-General HALLECK,
Cold Harbor, Va., June 5, 1864.
Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it
would not be practicable to hold a line northeast of Richmond that would
protect the Fredericksburg railroad, to enable us to use it for supplying
the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect,
exhausting much of our strength in guarding it, and would leave open to
the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James.
My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north
of Richmond, then, after destroying his lines of communication north of
the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee
in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I now find, after
more than thirty days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance
to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive,
behind breast-works, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front
of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind
them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make,
all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have,
therefore, resolved upon the following plan: I will continue to hold substantially
the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of
any favorable circumstance that may present itself, until the cavalry can
be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver
Dam for some 25 or 30 miles west. When this is effected, I will move the
army to the south side of James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy
and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy
on the north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most
probable contingency six or more, ferry-boats of the largest class ought
to be immediately provided. Once on the south side of the James River I
can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy, except what is furnished
by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg that will be lost
to him also. Should Hunter not succeed I will still make the effort to
destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with
a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. The feeling of the two armies
now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments,
while our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments,
but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be
found without this protection.
Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.