Letters Between Grant, Meade, and Halleck


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Cold Harbor, Va., June 3, 1864--2 p. m.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, (Received 7.55 a. m. 4th.)

Chief of Staff:

We assaulted at 4.30 o'clock this morning, driving the enemy within his intrenchments at all points, but without gaining any decisive advantage. Our troops now occupy a position close to the enemy, some places within 50 yards, and are intrenching. Our loss was not severe, nor do I suppose the enemy to have lost heavily. We captured over 300 prisoners, mostly from Breckinridge's command.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

SEOND ARMY CORPS,
June 3, 1864--6 a. m.

General MEADE:

My First and Second Divisions have both been engaged. The men are very close to the enemy, under a crest, but seem unable to carry it. Birney is occupying the advanced line of works vacated by First and Second Divisions in moving to the assault. The commanders of First and Second Divisions do not think they can use more troops than their own with any great certainty of success. I shall await your orders, but express the opinion that if the first dash in an assault fails, other attempts are not apt to succeed better.

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 3, 1864--6.35 a. m.

Major-General HANCOCK:

Your dispatch received. You will make the attack and support it well, so that in the event of being successful, the advantage gained can be held. If unsuccessful report at once.

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS,
June 3, 1864--7 a. m.
Lieutenant-General Grant:

Reports from Wright announce some progress. His advance occupies a line of the enemy's pits--I presume their skirmish line. He reports the Eighteenth Corps having occupied the same line, but retiring. His (Wright's) line is pushing on.  No report from Smith.   I sent you one from Hancock, reporting he was about attempting another assault, written before my order to him to do so had reached him. I should be glad to have your views as to the continuance of these attacks, if unsuccessful.

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.
 


NEAR COLD HARBOR June 3, 1861--7 a. m.
Major-General Meade,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive, but when one does succeed push it vigorously, and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


COLD HARBOR, JUNE 3, 1864-12:30 p. m.
Major-General MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions, and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive, our line may be contracted from the right, if practicable. Reconnaissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there. Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 3, 1864-5.45 p. m.
Lieut. Gen. U. S. GRANT,
Commanding:

GENERAL: The telegrams you return were sent from here by me, so that you need not return them. Warren was re-enforced by Birney, and posted him on his left, where he now is, forming connection between Smith and Warren.  I have notified Warren there are no other troops to send him, and that he and Burnside must contract their lines to-night. Everything is apparently quiet along the lines. We hold all our advanced positions, and are intrenching.  To-night Hancock will establish batteries, and we will begin all along the lines digging up to the enemy's works. I have sent out officers to each of the corps and to the hospitals to endeavor to form some estimate of the casualties to-day.

Respectfully,
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Major-General HALLECK,               Cold Harbor, Va., June 5, 1864.
Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: A  full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would not be practicable to hold a line northeast of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad, to enable us to use it for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength in guarding it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond, then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I now find, after more than thirty days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive, behind breast-works, or feebly on the offensive immediately  in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have, therefore, resolved upon the following plan: I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself, until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some 25 or 30 miles west. When this is effected, I will move the army to the south side of James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on the north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most probable contingency six or more, ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. Once on the south side of the James River I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy, except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, while our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments,  but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection.

Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


[Source: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Series I, Volume XXXVI, pages 524-526, 598]