Race, Evolution, and Culture

Race, Evolution, and Culture is a collection of George Stockings short essays centered around the history of racial thought. Our discussion of Race, Evolution, and Culture will involve six of the eleven essays found in the book. We will follow the order of the relevant chapters (change to real title): 1) methodological problems with regards to the historiography of the behavioral sciences, 2) early French anthropological thought 3) Matthew Arnold and E.B. Tylor 4) the presence of "cultural Darwinism" and "philosophical idealism" in Tylor, 5) the perception of the primitive man in evolutionary Anthropology, and 6) an historical perspective regarding Franz Boas notions of culture.

Stocking lays the groundwork for Race, Evolution, and Culture with an essay that addresses problems with presentism in the historiography of the behavioral sciences. Stocking notes the discrepancy that exists between the historiographical methods of social scientists and those of historians. The former, he claims, often focus on the past in relation to how it can benefit the present (presentism). Such a focus leads social scientists to neglect the context that induced progress in favor of the progress itself. They seek to draw connections between past and present rather than focusing on the contexts in which historical phenomena occur. Stocking maintains that instead of presentism, historiographers should adopt perspectives based more on historicism (the study of history "because it is there".) Looking at history with little or no purpose concerning the connection of the past with the present enables researchers to take in the full context of historical events; to see the problems that precipitated progress. Approaching history along the lines of historicism will enable investigators to derive more meaning from history because of their recognition of the context in which progress is made. This enables investigators to "renew" problems that have significance today and to abandon concerns over insignificant, previous work.

Stocking follows the opening essay with an essay on "French Anthropology in 1800". In the essay, Stocking describes the development of the first Anthropological Society (Societe des Observateurs de lHomme) in France and its concern with mans natural history. Although the Society only lasted for one year, it connoted significant aspects of anthropology. Stocking cited the Societys preparations for an expedition to Australia as an illustration of anthropological thought at the time. In response to a forthcoming expedition to Australia, Society members prepared guidelines for investigating the Australian "savages". Stocking maintained that the two sets of guidelines that followed, written by Joseph Marie de Gerando (Citizen Degerando) and Georges Cuvier, indicated the development of anthropology during the early nineteenth century. Gerando noted the unfairness of evaluating primitive people based on their status as compared to the advanced culture of Europe. Savages represented people lower on the evolutionary line. More representative of the nineteenth century, Cuvier sought to compare the "primitive people" along racial lines. He heeded the influence of race on culture, thus stressed acquiring skulls for comparison. However, despite the guidelines written by Cuvier and de Gerando, the young student who went on the voyage paid little attention to these instructions and instead tested the previously held belief in a negative relationship between morality and the physical prowess. Although his conclusions lead him to abandon recognition of the latter relationship, namePeron (the young student) concluded that races were different more than had previously been thought and deduced that physical differences between races explained cultural differences. Thus, Stocking argued, fueled by the discoveries of Peron and others, "primitive" people began to be seen as racially inferior, instead of being viewed as simply less developed members of the same origin. Hence, the "decline of the noble savage".

Stocking faced several methodological problems with the analysis which he notes in an introduction to the essay. Stocking acknowledges the use of "spotty" sources, a lack of consideration for the full context of the time, and an overzealous "cramming" of nineteenth century French anthropological history at the end of the essay. However, Stockings analysis presented an argument useful to those interested in the movement away from anthropological thought rooted in Enlightenment thought. Stockings essay entitled "Matthew Arnold, E.B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention" discussed the development of the idea of culture in terms of the different perceptions of Matthew Arnold and E.B Tylor. Stocking argued that historians of anthropology have mistakenly credited Tylor with defining modern concepts of culture. In fact, Stocking maintained, Arnolds notion of culture comes closer to resembling the modern meaning of culture. The method that Stocking used to make this argument was a comparison of the two early anthropologists with an emphasis on the context surrounding their work. Stocking notes that Tylors definition of culture, rooted in polygenist thought was relativistic in theory but in practice, comparative. According to Tylor, groups of people could be put into different stages of the universal process of cultural development based on their degree of industrial development. The same laws that explained industrial development explained cultural development. Arnold on the other hand, based his definition of culture in more psychological terms. He came closer to the modern perception that related culture with the internal makeup of persons. In this sense, industrial development did not indicate moral development.

In the essay, Stocking did a particularly good job establishing the context in which the ideas of each man developed. This facilitated less bias on the part of the reader, as he is able to depict each figure within the set of problems addressed by their work. However, Stocking spends considerably less time discussing the ideas of Arnold than those of Tylor and doesnt clearly present the use of invention in Tylors work.

In the following essay, Stocking responded to criticism of his article, "Matthew Arnold, E.B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention". He responded largely to the criticism of Morris Opler, an anthropologist. Stocking reproached Oplers lack of consideration of the full context of Tylor within Oplers criticism. Oplers labeling of Tylor as a "Cultural Darwinist" and a "philosophical idealist" resulted from reading too much Darwinian influence into Tylor in the case of the former label and a lack of consideration of the "the relevant philosophical contexts in which his thinking developed" for the latter. Stocking maintained that Tylor, although interested in some aspects of Darwins work (i.e., "the fact of mans decent"), was not directly influenced by Darwin theory of natural selection to the degree that Opler claimed. Instead of a societys natural selection of the most appropriate practices, Tylors work dealt largely with social practices that exemplified habits. Stocking argued that Tylors evolutionist ideas were rooted outside of Darwin. Prior to Darwin, controversy existed over whether civilization was the result of progress from savagery or whether it represented a status issued by God and the point from which "savages" degenerated. According to Stocking, this controversy represented the roots of Tylor more so than Darwin. Furthermore, Opler connected Tylor to philosophical idealists with little proof of connection. Opler attributeed idealistic tendencies to Tylor when Tylor actually tended towards materialism. Stockings final point in the essay was very similar to his points in the opening essay namely; that of the importance of studying historical affairs in their full context. He noted the dangers of Oplers use of Tylor to argue a modern controversy:
"The defects of Oplers analysis of Tylor take on a somewhat broader significance in this context. Indeed it might be argued that they are neither accidental nor idiosyncratic. On the contrary, they flow all to easily from a certain form of special pleading: the attempt to read back into the history of anthropology one or another point of view in contemporary theoretical debate, to claim one or another "founder" of the discipline for a specific current viewpoint, or conversely, to damn such a viewpoint by associating it with doctrines outside of the framework of anthropological discourse."
Thus , Stockings argument in this essay related to his argument in the first essay: the importance of viewing history "because it is there." He asserted that his main goal with this essay to appeal to "the need for this historicism."

This essay (change to title)represented a rich collection of historiographical fundamentals. Stocking applied concepts elucidated in the first essay in the analysis of Oplers claims. He demonstrated how Oplers argument exemplified conclusions drawn outside of the full historical context. Because Stocking highlighted solid historigraphical fundamentals, the essay has utility outside of the content of Oplers essay. Historians of many fields can identify with his points concerning the need to view historical events and "progress" in their full context. The solid reasoning of the essay made one wonder how Professor Opler could have responded.

Stocking continued to trace the history of anthropology in "The Dark-Skinned Savage: The Image of Primitive Man in Evolutionary Anthropology". In an introduction to the essay Stocking noted that the current essay brought together several points made in previous essays "in order to delineate the major outlines of the late nineteenth century image of the dark-skinned savageagainst which Franz Boas directed "The Mind of Primitive Man."" In other words, the essay laid the groundwork for the preceding essay on the work of Boas.

In the essay (change to title), Stocking established the anthropological context of Boas by describing the work of E.B. Tylor, Lewis Henry Morgan, and Herbert Spencer. Stocking observed how the work of the three is connected by their regard of each for the psychic unity of mankind (The theory of "psychic unity" held that all groups progressed in like manner towards the highest civilization, Western Europe.) Following this relatively short discourse on the roots of "psychic unity", Stocking proceeded into a lengthy and complex discussion concerned with the development and adjustment of the theory of "physic unity" and how such development and adjustment facilitated the growth of twentieth century anthropological perceptions of race. In this section of the essay, he noted how the theory of the psychic unity of mankind evolved towards a perception that made discrepancies between races. Nineteenth century anthropologists using the comparative method evolved from positivistic views of dark skinned people to views that gave inferior qualities more permanence. Up until the early twentieth century, anthropologists abided by ideas of white supremacy and the child-like inferiority of dark-skinned peoples. Such "inferior" peoples were more instinctual and exercised less control over their environment. Thus, the context was established for the work of Franz Boas.

A methodological problem that Stocking noted in the introduction to the essay is his use of three figures as defining the relevant anthropological development. However Stocking justified his use of Tylor, Morgan, and Spencer because of their dominant influence on the circumstances in which Boas developed his ideas. Space also limited Stockings discussion.

The last essay that we will discuss from Race, Culture, and Evolution is "Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical Perspective". According to Stocking the aim of the essay was to reconstruct "the changing pattern of Boas thought on culture during a certain period in his life." Stocking central argument was that Boas helped establish the "context" in which the modern definition of culture emerged. In the early stages of the essay Stocking laid the philosophical context prior to Boas definition of culture. He noted the domination of the "humanist" perspective with regards to culture; a perspective that viewed the quality of a culture in terms of its members ability to exercise control over their environment. Primitive culture was characterized by the impulsive, habitual nature of its members, who were predominantly of color. Following the opening discussion of the humanist perspective, Stocking traced the development of Boas conception of culture and the influence that Boas fieldwork had on the development of his thought. Boas diffusionist, relativistic perspective concerning culture challenged evolutionary ideas of the importance of invention and objected to comparative methods used to put different groups into a respective evolutionary category. Boas maintained that diverse cultures existed, and historical interaction (diffusion) among cultures largely explained "progress." These ideas, Stocking maintained paved the way for prevalent perceptions of culture.

Following the discussion of Boas ideas related to culture, Stocking traced Boas ideas of race. He began his discussion of Boas racial ideas in much the same way that he began his discussion of Boas ideas of culture: he noted the context in which the development of those ideas occurred. Stocking traced Boas questioning of "traditional racial assumptions", ideas that influenced Boas, and Boas use of fieldwork. Stocking presented particularly well the ideas of Boas concerning "primitive mentality". Boas held that all men, regardless of their culture, incorporated "basic organization" (i.e., abstraction, inhibition, and choice). Traditions passed on among different cultures defined appropriate responses within a society; thus, "savage" or "primitive" mental capacity was not inferior to that of "civilized" man. Stocking centralized the work of Boas in the following passage:
the general effect of Boas argument was to show that the behavior of all men, regardless of race or cultural stage, was determined by a traditional body of habitual behavior patterns passed on through that what we would now call the enculturative process and buttressed by ethically tainted secondary rationalizations-in other words, by the particular "cultures" in which they lived.

Stocking tied in Boas use of folklore to further illustrate the role that Boas idea of "behavioral determinism" had on the modern concept of culture. Stocking concluded the essay with a summary of how ideas central to current definitions of culture, "historicity, plurality, behavioral determinism, integration, and relativism", stemmed from the work of Boas.
As with each of Stockings essays analyzed in this composition, he stressed the context in which ideas developed. In this particular essay, he strove to present an understandable picture of Boas ideas with regards to their influence on modern conceptions of culture. In the introduction to the essay, he admitted that he was somewhat restricted because of the space appropriate for an essay (This appears to be a problem that he faces in many of the essays in Race, Culture, and Evolution.) Regardless, it was amazing how Stocking fit such an amount of information in thirty plus pages.

Evolution and Society

In Evolution and Society, Burrow looked into the hold that the theory of social evolution had on Victorian intellectuals. He laid the groundwork for his analysis by tracing intellectual trends in the philosophy of history during the early nineteenth century. In the first chapter, Burrow noted the intellectual intrigue during the Enlightenment to explain the differences between civilized man and savage man. He skimmed French progressive philosophy based on the positivist idea of the rationality of all men and elaborated on the use of conjecture and the comparative method in Scottish philosophy. In this preliminary discussion, Burrow, similar to Stocking noted the two major problems associated with the study of anthropology: 1) the removal of significant events from the context in which they occurred and 2) "the over-use of Darwin in accounting for the rapid development of anthropology in the third quarter of the last century." However, in more detail than Stocking, Burrow noted that the latter problem resulted from historians "neglectof the first half of the nineteenth century" and historians separation of political/social concerns from an analysis of the history of anthropology.

Following the introductory chapter, Burrow focused on the replacement of what he termed "tolerant cosmopolitanism" with "cultural chauvinism". He used the writings of James Mill and Jeremy Bentham to analyze the transition in thought. Burrow noted the cultural relativism in the earlier writing of Bentham and Mills subsequent contempt for the primitive culture of India in History of British India as representative of the shift away from conjectural history that took place during the early nineteenth century. In order to conclude chapter two and transit into chapter three, Burrow noted the importance of James Mills son (John Stuart Mill) as an indication of the general defection from "common sense" Scottish philosophy.

Chapter three highlighted the role that John S. Mill had on the development anthropology, noted the roots of anthropological thought in Britain, and depicted the need for a scientific analysis of social development. Referring to the writings of J.S. Mill, Sir Henry Maine, Harriet Martineau, John Grote, and Fitzjames Stephans (as well as others), Burrow argued that evolutionary social theory grew out of the need to prove the superiority of civilized man given the gradual failure of utilitarianism and the growing contempt with religious explanations of social order. J.S. Mills discontent with "historical relativism" and displeasure with the lack of coverage of common people in historical inquiry during his time, indicated the movement away from rational philosophy as "an adequate basis for social understanding". Many intellectuals sought a new method, one that utilized science, to explain the unilateral development of social groups. As a result, intellectuals became more occupied with developing the "science of history". Burrow maintained that social evolutionary theory rose to meet this need. He also briefly mentioned that the rapid rise of industry created a need for a theory of social development that predicted the future amidst unstable times.

Burrow followed this discussion on the need for social evolution theory with a discourse concerning the attempts of intellectuals to resolve the demand for an adequate theory using laws of nature. With historiography in mind, Burrow noted the difficulty of measuring the influence of scientific fields to the development of social evolution theory because of the mixed nature of such scientific fields during this time. Nevertheless, he cited how the geological work of Sir Charles Lyell contributed to the use of natural laws as an explanation of historical phenomena. He also suggested three ways in which Darwins theory of natural selection affected early anthropology: 1) connected man with animals (nature), 2) justified "racial differences in terms of environmental differences over a long period of time, rather than regarding them as ultimate and unaccountable data" and 3) the use of "natural selection" in sociological contexts. In addition, Burrow detailed the work of the Anthropological Society of London (ca.1863). He suggested that the historical significance of the Society was not that it illustrated new anthropological methods, but rather it demonstrated the difficulties faced with applying new methods that related social order with natural laws. Burrow brought together the gist of the argument up to this point with the following statement:

The evolutionary method in social thinking triumphed, not only because it was in tune with that of the vogue sciences of the period, but because it offered a way of coping with new kinds of experience and new methods of interpreting them-methods which had been germinating throughout the earlier part of the century, with admittedly, a sudden acceleration between 1858-1863-with the fewest possible adjustments.

The three chapters that followed this general discussion analyzed three figures Burrow considered important to the movement of evolutionary social theory. The first notable that he discussed was Sir Henry Maine. In the preface, Burrow described Maine as "the first, and in many ways the most thorough, student of institutions by the newer methods (of social evolution)." Burrow followed a general biographical sketch of Maine with an analysis of Maines perspective concerning social groups. Largely based on Maines works, Ancient Law, Popular Government, and Observation of India, Burrow held that Maine recognized the complexity of social theory, yet practiced aspects of evolutionary thought. Concerned largely with jurisprudence, Maines observations considered the complexity of a society while comparing them with the European standard. For example, colonial India had certain Aryan qualities (thus, had a shared heritage with Europeans), yet represented a less civilized model than Western Europe. However, the discrepancy in their development did not warrant haphazard policymaking in India based on "inflexible biological laws" or grounded solely in general perceptions of human nature. While general patterns of development and human nature should be considered, the complicated nature of societies meant that a careful, reasoned approach to law-making should be practiced.

Burrowed followed the discussion of Maine with an analysis of Herbert Spencer. Burrow labeled Spencer "the philosopher of the whole movement (social evolution)", and credited him with "contributions to social theory which still arouse the attention of contemporary sociologists." Burrow began the discussion of Spencer by laying the groundwork for the development of Spencers ideas, and by describing the central theory of Spencers writings: social institutions changed as a result of natural causes. Burrow outlined Spencers thought by citing several of Spencers books. Burrow commented on Spencers fervent belief in the power of natural laws to explain the progressive development of social institutions. All progress, indeed Spencer believed history depicted constant progress, could be explained by scientific laws similar to those of evolutionary biology. Science explained how social structures evolved to their present state. According to Burrow, "Spencers belief in the universality of natural causation was, together with his laissez-faire political creed, the bedrock of his thinking." Burrow also noted the influence that Spencer received from the French and German sources of biological evolutionism.

The last of the three social evolutionary followers that Burrow highlighted was E.B Tylor. However, in an interesting move, Burrow opened the chapter on Tylor by looking into the work of Sir John Lubbock and J.F. McLennan. He noted their connection with the development of social evolutionary thought, Lubbocks work with prehistoric man, and McLennons work with primitive legal institutions. From this point, Burrow progressed into a discussion of Tylor and his major significance in bringing about the use of social evolution in anthropology. Initially, Burrows analysis of Tylor highlighted, in a somewhat general way, the highly significant role played by Tylor "in determining the direction taken by anthropological studies." Tylor, who focused on religion in primitive groups turned the tide of anthropology away from a preoccupation with legal institutions. Burrowed followed this summary of Tylors influence by tracing Tylors intellectual history. His examination focused the first enterprise of Tylor, Anahuac. Based on a trip to South America early in Tylors life, and precisely because it was his first work, Anahuac exposed the heart of Tylor work: his theory of a common human nature and pattern of positive development, yet resistance to diffusionist and degenerationist ideas. Tylor was preoccupied with diminishing social relics rendered useless by development ("survivals"), in order to facilitate progress. Burrow noted that Tylor was inspired by a perception that the removal of useless vestiges paved the way for mans progress.

In the concluding remarks in Evolution and Society, Burrow noted the reasoning behind Victorian anthropologists attraction to social evolutionary thought. Social evolution appealed to the positivistic outlook that "things" eventually turn out the way that they should and attracted intellectuals who saw validity in diverse approaches to looking at societies. Science could provide reasonable explanations for the constant progress of mankind, no matter what his current state. Such an absolute, positive approach to science had its roots in the positivistic, universal precepts of the Enlightenment.

Evolution and Society offered a descriptive, though sometimes tangled account of the appeal of social evolutionary thought to Victorian intellectuals. Although Burrow did a wonderful job of tying his argument together in his concluding thoughts, there were portions of Burrows analysis of Maine and Spencer that were difficult to connect with his central claims of the allure of social evolutionary thought. While my lack of familiarity with the period and context under investigation explain some of the difficulties, Burrow could have better related his analysis of Maine and Spencer with their influence on the hold of social evolutionary thought. There were portions in which his account of the context of each man seemed too detailed (at least for a novice reader) and tended to draw the reader away from the central issue at hand: the appeal of social evolution theory to Victorian intellectuals. The last criticism of Burrow concerns his sentence structure in Evolution and Society. On numerous occasions, Burrow employed long and arduous sentences making the content of the sentences difficult to grasp.* Clearer sentences would have made the already difficult material in portions of the book more digestible.

The differences between Burrows approach to Tylor and Stockings approach to Tylor are also worth noting. They illuminate significant aspects of the approach taken by each author in the examination of the same historical period. Stockings more critical analysis of Tylor was more in line with his desire to refute the large influence of Darwin on Tylor and to deny the superior significance credited Tylor in the development of modern concepts of culture. Unlike Burrow, Stockings purpose was not to trace the hold that social evolution had on Victorian intellectuals; rather, his purposes were to cover Tylors influences and question the primary significance attributed Tylor. In keeping with this theme, Stocking emphasized less the central ideas of Tylor. In contrast, Burrows more favorable analysis of Tylor coincided with his purpose to expose Tylors role in the success of social evolution theory; a theory eventually transposed in the formation of newer anthropological methods. Thorough his use of Anahuac, Burrow presented an account of the methodology and central ideas of Tylor that was more detailed than the account rendered by Stocking. Although this may have resulted from Burrows use of Tylors first work (Anahuac), it is more likely that it resulted from a greater need to expose the ideas of Tylor. Therefore, each historian presented a different, though valid, picture of the same period in keeping with the purposes of their works.